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Abstract of PH.D. Thesis 
The Measurement of Unemployment in Europe with 
particular reference to Britain, France and Poland. 
The a im of the thes i sis to estab 1 ish a theoret i ca 1 
framework for the measurement of unemployment. The 
measurement of social phenomena is understood as a 
social construction. The main characteristics of the 
history of statistics and statistical production are 
identified as the state monopoly of statistics and the 
prevailing view of statistics, statistical 
consciousness. 
Three aspects of the origins and development of 
unemployment are then scrutinised. Firstly, the 
relationship between unemployment, wage-labour, gender, 
and the industrial revolution are discussed. Secondly, 
on an ideological level, the late conceptualisation of 
unemployment is considered, its significance being the 
relative autonomy between the reality and representation 
of unemployment. Thirdly, the history of social policy 
and state labour market intervention are studied to 
demonstrate the way in which both have shaped 
unemployment and its measurement. 
The next stage of analysis is the measurement of 
unemployment in Europe. This takes two forms a general 
overview of contemporary Western Europe and single 
country studies of Britain, France and Poland. The 
former attempts to outline some of the general issues of 
the measurement of unemployment and to establish a 
methodological approach for the single country studies. 
The criteria of choice for closer investigation included 
political controversies in unemployment measurement, 
labour market intervention, social and economic 
development, and the 'statistical revolution' in Eastern 
Europe. Britain was chosen because of the acuteness of 
the controversies in the measurement of unemployment and 
its leading position in the industrial revolution, due 
to the latter both unemployment and statistics have a 
comparatively long and significant history. France also 
shares these characteristics but aspects of its 
development, its unique path of industrialisation and 
the impact of the French Revolution on the state, make 
it worthy of study in its own right. Poland is 
dissimilar to Britain and France in both these respects, 
however its experiences of state-formation with 
independence, Stalinism and the transition to a market 
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Introduction ~ The Measurement of Unemployment: 
! Problem of Measuring Social Phenomena 
The measurement of social phenomena is an issue that has 
been insufficiently dealt with both on a theoretical and 
an appl ied level. The process of measurement may at 
first sight seem stra i ghtforward. The rea 1 i ty however, 
should be understood as a combination of pressures 
constantly shaping and reshaping measured phenomena and 
the measurement process. The measurement of soc i a 1 
phenomena should be considered as a complex social 
process. However, a mythology surrounds measurement 
which needs scientific explanation. 1 
This mythology is the result, even when not obviously 
so, of empiricist and positivist tendencies in the 
measurement of social phenomena. Both view the world as 
one where objects and subjects are clearly demarcated 
and where knowledge is an accumulation of facts. For 
empiricism, the accumulation of facts is the end in 
itself; for positivism, it is the means to the end of 
scientific law. For both, statistical data are facts 
and therefore superior to opinion in the construction of 
knowledge. 
However, measurement is neither a purely quantitative 
nor a purely objective process; in statistics there can 
1 
be no radical separation between quantity and quality, 
between object and subject. Lack of c 1 ar i ty on th i s 
point leads to confusion. The subjective and qualitative 
dimensions of measurement are not initially obvious, but 
this . 1S no reason for discounting their significance. 
Quality and subjectivity intervene in the process of 
measurement as a consequence of the relation between the 
object of measurement and the measurer, the choices of 
measurers. the i nst i tut i ona 1 context of measurers. and 
the definitions and categorisation of phenomena. Hence, 
our first demon to exorcise is the notion of measurement 
as an exclusively objective or quantitative process. If 
this were the case, unemployment measurement would be a 
purely technical operation without significant cause for 
controversy. Nobody could disagree who is to be 
considered unemployed, or how many are unemployed. 
However clearly this is not so. 
Secondly, there is the myth of universal measurement. It 
seems that all social phenomena can be quantified or 
measured in modern soc i ety. This myth of universal 
measurement concea 1 s the d i sputab 1 e pr i or i ties in the 
selection of phenomena to be quantified. 2 Hence 
governments are prone to publish more regular 
unemployment figures than poverty figures. Finally, 
there is the myth of historical measurement which 
conceals the internal and external pressures that often 
2 
invalidate historical comparison of measured social 
phenomena. Comparisons between the levels of measured 
unemployment in the 1930s and the 1980s demonstrate 
that the superficial juxtaposition of unemployment 
figures which are calculated on different bases is far 
from adequate. 
Hence, the measurement of social phenomena requires 
serious analysis at the general and at the applied 
level. The central question is the measurement of social 
phenomena and the need to analyse the social process of 
measurement. Specifically, we are concerned with the 
measurement of unemployment but the aim is to generate 
conclusions that are applicable to social measurement in 
general. Therefore, the question becomes how can the 
measurement of unemployment be understood as a social 
process? How does the social construction of 
unemployment interact with the measurement of social 
phenomena? 
The prob 1 emat i c of unemp 1 oyment measurement was chosen 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, unemployment provides 
a complex phenomena which allows a richness of analysis 
that other social phenomena could not. 3 Secondly, real 
arguments exist about unemployment not only in the realm 
of economic theory or policy, but also at the level of 
3 
measurement - indeed, it is one of the soc i a 1 phenomena 
whose measurement has produced some of the most 
extensive and controversial debate. Thirdly, there is a 
body of work which, despite its limitations, has in 
recent years made a step forward in the understanding of 
unemployment as a social and historical construction. 4 
Finally, there is the importance of unemployment as an 
indictment of the society that creates it, and as a 
measure of economic, social and political well-being. 5 
Having specified the central question of the thesis, we 
are now presented with the questions of approach and 
methodology. Within the broad subject of measurement of 
social phenomena and the development of unemployment in 
particular. 
We can identify several general weaknesses in the 
existing scholarship. Firstly, the general separation of 
unemployment from the process of measurement constitutes 
a significant shortcoming. Garside, a British economic 
historian commissioned by the Warwick University 
Industrial Relations Unit, did attempt to discuss both 
aspects but did so in a manner that considered the 
technical evolution of unemployment measurement as its 
subject. He therefore undertheorises the development of 
unemployment and statistics as social processes. 6 The 
seriousness of this weakness of separating unemployment 
4 
from its measurement becomes clear when we consider that 
we usually confront unemployment in political and 
economic debate in its quantified form. It would be a 
worthless exercise to criticise any particular work for 
this separation, but it is valid to say that the 
separation is a fetter upon the establishment of a well 
founded discussion of unemployment. 
related to the second weakness, 
scholars to treat unemployment in 
This separation is 
a tendency among 
a deterministic or 
one-sided manner. Several scholars have examined the 
relationship between unemployment and a structural 
theme. For Garside it was the technical changes in 
unemployment measurement; for Robert Salais, a leading 
French official labour statistician and academic, it was 
the fordist large-scale unit of production; for John 
Garraty, an American economic historian, it was economic 
thought. Each of these authors has dealt with 
unemployment in a deterministic manner as they selected 
a variable with which they tried to establish a 
historical relationship to unemployment. 
Another weakness of the approaches to unemployment is 
that they are restricted, whether it be in a historical 
or geographical sense. This criticism may at first sight 
seem unjustified - surely it is not possible to write an 
account that deals with the general experience of 
unemployment. However the criticism does stand when we 
5 
consider that the conclusions that authors draw are 
often meant to apply for unemployment in general but are 
based on the study of France or Britain or Massachusetts 
or the twentieth century.7 
To summarise then, the current literature separates the 
two dimensions of measurement and unemployment. Some 
scholars have developed historical analysis of the 
development of unemployment, but they are restricted to 
a single case, be it a country or region. Others attempt 
a wider starting point but ignore the historical 
dimension. Another approach focuses upon the purely 
technical changes in the process of unemployment 
measurement. In each case there is no satisfactory 
attempt to understand the two dimensions on comparative 
and historical levels. 
The methodo 1 og i ca 1 cha 11 enge therefore is to overcome 
the deficiencies or lacunae in existing scholarship. It 
is in the attempt to bridge these gaps that the 
originality of the thesis lies. The major weaknesses of 
existing analysis can be overcome at least partially by 
the following. 
Firstly, the separation between the processes of 
unemployment and measurement is rejected. These 
6 
processes are understood as comp 1 ex interact i ng soc i a 1 
and historical constructions. Thus both unemployment and 
measurement require historical-theoretical analysis. 
Having done this, a synthesis is possible. This analysis 
should be considered as the theoretical foundations of 
the thesis. 
,S e con d 1 y, we r e j e c t the t rap 0 f est a b 1 ish i n g the 
relationship between unemployment and some other 
historical variable (the obvious choice would be 
statistics). Measured unemployment is not determined by 
economic thought, techniques of measurement or fordist 
production. Instead we adopt an approach which examines 
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unemployment, 
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unemployment measurement. This is done by not relying 
simply on a single case study. Instead a comparative 
approach is adopted which begins with a general 
contemporary chapter on the measurement of unemployment 
in contemporary Western Europe and moves on to more 
focused studies firmly rooting our understanding of 
measured unemployment in the soil of Britain, France and 
7 
Poland. This combination serves as the methodological 
means for a generalised, rather than partial, study. 
This is complemented by a general historical analysis of 
unemployment and the measurement of social phenomena. 
The single-country studies enable detailed and concrete 
discussion of the problems set up by the theoretical 
discussion. Thus, we avoid both overgeneralisation and 
also the limitation of the single case study. 
Having outlined the logic of the thesis, it is now 
necessary to identify the major concerns of the 
individual chapters to explain their selection, 
progression and their relationship one another. 
The first chapter develops a historical analysis of the 
statistical measurement of social processes. The 
existing histories of statistics serve as a useful 
source for identifying important questions concerning 
the social process of measurement. Firstly, the question 
of periodisation, origins and distinguishing features of 
statistics are broached. Historians disagree on these 
points but their answers are connected to the question 
of the choice of historical approach to statistics and 
the dynamic principle involved in statistics. 8 Secondly, 
the existing literature poses the question of 
methodological approach. Authors have adopted various 
8 
approaches to the history of statistics. 9 We aim to 
discuss the advantages of each and draw conclusions as 
to which approach holds the key to unlocking the 
historical nature and significance of the development of 
statistical measurement of social phenomena. Thirdly, we 
then attempt to establish the dynamic of the measurement 
of social phenomena and to grasp its pattern of 
development from its origins to the present. 
The second chapter explores the development of 
unemployment. Again, our starting point is to examine 
existing 1 iterature and to select the sequence of 
questions needed to understand unemployment. Several of 
these studies either identify industrial capitalism or 
wage-labour as the underlying reason for the emergence 
of unemployment. This observation opens out a number of 
issues which require attention. Firstly, the question of 
how wage-labour brings about unemployment is 
investigated. Secondly, if wage labour is the cause of 
unemployment then we need to explain why 'unemployment' 
was not recognised at a far earl ier stage than most 
scholars accept. Thirdly, we must consider how to deal 
wi th the poor who 1 ack work before genera 1 i sed wage-
labour and whether they should be considered unemployed. 
Fourthly, if industrial capitalism generalises wage-
labour and therefore the possibility for unemployment, 
we wi 11 assess why the experience of men and women was 
so markedly different in this respect. Finally, we must 
9 
ask why the state seems to have such an impact upon the 
definition of unemployment. 
Chapter three app 1 i es some of the issues deve loped in 
the first two chapters to contemporary Western Europe. 
Firstly, the organisations dealing with unemployment 
measurement and their methods of measurement are 
discussed. Secondly, a detailed method of categorising 
the flows between labour market states of employment, 
inactivity and unemployment is developed. Having done 
this it will be shown that people move between different 
labour market states for specific reasons. Flow 
categories can thus be establ ished in the comparative 
analysis of unemployment rates. Hence, we find that 
migration, disability, education and training, women and 
early retirement all potentially influence levels of 
unemployment as well as more obvious economic 
conditions. I n comparing the measurement of 
unemployment in Western Europe, these categories cannot 
be ignored. The justification of choosing to investigate 
contemporary Western Europe is to demonstrate the 
comparative methodology for a relatively homogeneous set 
of countries. 
Having established a general case in the first three 
chapters, the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters apply 
our findings to individual country studies. The 
10 
underlying logic is to pose the central question of the 
thesis at the particular as well as the general level. 
The choice of the individual country studies allows a 
demonstration of complexity at the level of comparison. 
The methodology established in Chapter three is combined 
with a wider discussion of historical, institutional and 
theoretical issues. 
The British case was selected for a number of reasons. 
Political controversy of measured unemployment has been 
particularly sharpened in Britain since the 1970s. 10 
Britain was also the first industrial nation and in 
respect of its economic and social development 
demonstrates several features which make it an apt 
choice for study and comparison. As the first to undergo 
the industrial revolution there are well established 
long-run trends in unemployment. Its early development 
of industrial capitalism also makes it suitable on the 
statistical count. 11 In Britain, there is a long 
history of official statistics. Modern statistics itself 
is said to have its origin in political arithmetic which 
was founded in post-Civil War Britain. Hence for the 
processes described in chapters one and two Britain 
offers an extensive literature and was at the forefront 
of these processes in many cases. It also provides us 
with a long history of debate and controversy about 
(measured) unemployment. Moreover by the end of the 
11 
post-war boom Britain was hit not only by the stagnation 
which affected much of the world economy but also by a 
decline relative to its nearest rivals. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s unemployment was an important political, 
social and economic issue. The country experienced 
persistent mass unemployment which spurred sharp 
political arguments and ideological reformulations. 
Thatcherism sought a new approach to unemployment and a 
shake up in the statistical apparatus of the state. 
Interestingly, the radical programme adopted by the 
government was hailed as an economic miracle, that was, 
they claimed substantiated by statistical evidence. 
The French case demonstrates important points of 
comparison with Britain. An interesting 1 iterature 
exists for the construction of unemployment in France, 
in particular the work of Salais which should be 
considered as an important step forward in the 
understanding of unemployment. 12 France too has 
experienced political controversy about the measurement 
of unemp 1 oyment. France too has along history of 
economic and social development but a pattern of 
development with important differences from Britain. 13 
French development is often dogged by the question of 
relative backwardness. The trajectory of French 
development is discussed and the implications for 
measured unemployment establ ished. France, despite its 
12 
similarities with Britain, retained a far larger 
agricultural sector in the process of economic 
development. Its institutions which deal with the labour 
market and its measurement are significantly different 
from those in Britain. Also strategies for dealing with 
unemployment offer an interesting comparison to 
Britain. 14 Despite similar forms of policy, (i.e. 
welfarist responses to mass unemployment which have the 
effect of reducing the scope for unemployment) the 
content of policy was different. 
Poland has been selected as it raises a series of fresh 
questions about the measurement of unemployment, most 
obviously because of its Stalinist past. The case of 
Stalinism questions the degree to which we can 
generalise our conclusions. Firstly, there is the 
comparison of the institutions of statistical 
measurement and their relation to the state and the 
examination of the statistical apparatus in transition 
a t the end of the Second Wor 1 d War and in the recent 
'post-communist transition , . 15 Secondly, there are the 
questions raised by the nature of the labour force under 
Stalinism and the claim that unemployment had been 
abolished. 16 Whether or not this was the case, the 
subsequent transition poses important questions in terms 
of the conceptualisation and measurement of 
unemployment. In this respect Poland has been viewed as 
13 
at the forefront of the transition process in Eastern 
Europe with its programme of shock therapy.!7 Also, the 
scale of economic crisis is much greater than in either 
Britain or France, testing our conclusions about 
unemployment 
dramatically. 
when conditions start to change 
Our conclusions seek to establish three things. 
Firstly. the validity of our central questions is 
restated. Secondly, the limitations and suitability of 
our methodology should be clarified, in particular with 
the choice of countries in chapters four, five and six. 
Thirdly, to summarise and synthesise conclusions of the 
preceding chapters to glve genera 1 and i nterna lly 
coherent answers to the thesis. 
14 
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Chapter One: The History, Development and Social Meaning 
of Statistics 
This first chapter begins our analysis with a study of 
the measurement of social phenomena, statistics. A 
thesis concerned with the measurement of unemployment 
should start with this question for several reasons. 
Firstly, the importance of statistics in today's society 
cannot be underestimated. Modern finance and industry 
rely upon the production of accurate data. Governments 
and political parties are judged on the basis of 
statistical indicators: polls, membership figures, 
economic indicators. Policy-makers depend on statistics. 
Social scientists use statistics to gauge the 
authenticity 
unemployment 
of their theories. In this context, 
statistics has proved of concern in 
different academic disciplines, policy-making areas and 
public debate. 
Secondly, the statistical process itself 1 S 
undertheorised. Without starting with the problematic 
of social statistics, the measurement of unemployment 
could not be understood. With this plan, we are able to 
establish the characteristics of statistics prior to our 
study of unemployment and the country studies of 
unemployment figures. Therefore we are better placed to 
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disentangle features of statistics themselves from 
realities of unemployment proper. 
Thirdly, statistical knowledge is often presented as 
objective data untouched by the grubby, subjective hands 
of human beings. This empiricist approach to data has 
long been discarded by serious commentators on social 
statistics. All statistics are the end result of a 
social process. As Max Weber put it, 
Nowadays ...... there is a widespread notion that 
science has become a problem of calculation, 
fabricated in laboratories or statistical filing 
systems just as 'in a factory', a calculation 
involving only the cool intellect not one's 'heart 
and sou 1'. First of a 11 one must say that such 
comments lack all c 1arjty about what goes on in a 
factory or laboratory. 
Finally, statistical knowledge is socially constructed; 
it is in the light of this that we have to consider the 
theoretical problems that arise from the history of 
statistics. 2 Advanced industrial society is complex and 
quantification has become a necessary compliment to 
observation. However, in the long history of humanity, 
this has not always been the case. Indeed, the 
statistical revolution is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, its maturity dating only from about the turn 
of the nineteenth century. The history of statistics, 
then, itself requires investigation. We must study 
measurement before we study the measurement of 
unemployment. 
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One aspect of this social construction of statistics 
more than any other requires particular attention, that 
is, the role of the state in the development of 
statistics. The state established a very early monopoly 
of statistical collection. Although many organisations 
use and reprocess and develop information derived from 
the state, for example, opinion polls and market 
research, no other organisation is able to challenge 
this monopoly. A radical group of British official 
statisticians, the Government Statisticians Collective, 
drew attention to this, 
Statistics do not, in some mysterious way, emanate 
directly from the social conditions they appear to 
describe, ......... between the two lie the 
assumptions, conceptions and priorities of the 
state and the social order, a large, complex and 
imperfectly functioning bureaucracy, tonnes of 
paper and computing machinery, and - last
3
but not 
least - millions of hours of human grind. 
If statistics are a socio-historical construction, then 
we need to understand the process of construction. In 
our introduction we identified the undertheorisation of 
the measurement of unemployment as a problem in the 
existing literature. Insight into the socio-historical 
construction of statistics can provide one aspect of a 
solution to the problem of undertheorisation, insight 
into the construction of unemployment another. The 
relationship between the two completes the theoretical 
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jigsaw. 
~ Theoretical Issues in the Development of Statistics 
Our criteria for an historical understanding of 
statistics are threefold. 
Firstly, it is necessary to establish what defines 
statistical and non-statistical epochs, or as 
authors have put the question - when does the 




'history of statistics' need to be critically discussed. 
Thirdly, from our discussion of historical approaches, 
we aim to analyse the issues involved in investigating 
the historical nature of statistics. We need to judge 
whether statistics should be considered historically 
autonomous, how to clarify the relationship between 
statistics and other historical variables, ideology, 
science, the state, and what the driving force or logic 
of statistical development is. 
From a linguistic perspective, the word 'statistics' is 
derived from the Latin word statisticus - being of state 
affairs. Indeed, statistics entered the English language 
with the meaning 'the study of states'. These 
'statistical' investigations were being undertaken by 
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German scholars from the seventeenth century. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word did not take 
its present meaning until the nineteenth century. From 
the late seventeenth to the nineteenth century 
'political arithmetic' denoted what we would understand 
by statistics today. However, in the nineteenth century, 
the word statistics was rapidly adopted by various 
languages. A modern definition is provided by Webster's 
New International Dictionary, 
A science dealing with the collection, analysis, 
interpretation and presentation of masses of 
numer~cal data. A collection of quantitative 
data. 
One might conclude on the basis of linguistic evidence 
alone that statistics did not develop until the 
nineteenth century. However, enumeration and collection 
of data predated the linguistic development of the word 
statistics. The early enumerations, for example the 
Biblical census, Domesday book, Chinese numerical 
tables, and European poll tax returns, pose a particular 
problem for us. Zhu and Madansky categorised these 
enumerations as being embryonically statistical. They 
considered that there was enough in common between them 
and modern statistics to consider them part of the same 
phenomenon. 5 On the other hand it has been argued that 
it is unrealistic to class such examples as part of the 
same species as modern statistics. M.G.Kendall attempted 
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to resolve this problem, asking 'Where shall the history 
of statistics begin?' 
The temptation to begin a history of statistics 
with references to endeavours in the ancient world 
to record information about states is one no 
writer has been able to resist. The numbering of 
the people of Israel, Augustus's balance-sheets of 
the Roman Empire, Charlemange's inventory of his 
possessions, the Domesday book, are felt to be a 
natural preliminary to the emergence descriptive 
statistics of the eighteenth century; as though 
they were early attempts undertaken in the spirit 
of modern statistics, hampered by the backward 
state of sociaJ organisation, but inspired by the 
same concepts. 
Despite the differences, both perspectives concur that a 
qualitative distinction has to be made between these 
early enumerations and modern statistics. How this 
distinction is made is a theoretical problem. For 
Kendall, what distinguishes early enumerations from 
modern statistics can be put under three headings. 
Firstly, data collection is seen as an end in itself, a 
viable and necessary direction of research (unlike 
former enumerations which were by and large incidental 
or without interpretation ). Consequently, statistical 
work implies a theoretical framework, an understanding 
of the inherent value of information, a statistical 
consciousness. Secondly, statistics takes on a 
comparative dimension, enumerations previously were 
unable to show comparison and therefore analyse results. 
Data was not collected in a comparative or systematic 
fashion. Statistical interpretation was non-existent. 
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Finally, the collection of data was not informed by 
structural or institutional forms concerned with 
statistics, such as the statistical societies or the 
official statistical offices. These criteria offer us 
one interpretation for the distinction, one which is by 
no means universally accepted. 
Despite the differences between historical interpret-
ations of the nature of the break and the precise 
distinction between statistical and non-statistical 
epochs, a consensus can be constructed. Agreement does 
exist that a qualitative change took place from the mid-
seventeenth century with the rise of political 
arithmetic. This change is the origin of the 
revolutionary process which was to culminate in the 
explosion of statistics in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries which gave rise to employment and unemployment 
statistics as well as a mass of other statistical 
material. 
This break is confirmed by an analysis of population 
statistics. In historical terms, the quantification of 
population provides a essential starting point in 
analysing the origins of the measurement of social 
phenomena. An understanding of population is impossible 
without an accurate idea of its size. The census, 
therefore, assumed a central significance within the 
evolution of statistics. 
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It is claimed that the first modern census took place in 
Quebec in 1666, others would opt for the Swedish census 
of 1749. 7 This is not the real issue, the precise date 
is not the crucial point what is important is the 
general period of change. The criteria of a modern 
census combines three elements. Firstly, the modern 
census is guided by an understanding of statistics as a 
science. Secondly, that censuses are taken in a standard 
and regularly repeated form. Thirdly, that they have 
been increasingly taken by experts or professional 
statisticians. Table one shows the uneven pattern of 
census across Europe. 
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Current 
Table 1.1 charts when states had their first census and 
when institutional structures to collect statistics were 
put in place. A statistical awakening clearly took place 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An 
acceleration of census occurred throughout the 
nineteenth century. The nineteenth century witnessed a 
spectacular explosion of statistics. 
There are three obvious conclusions to be draw from 
this. It seems evident that the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries mark a qualitative break with the past, whose 
statistical origins lie with the transformation brought 
about in the seventeenth century. This process 
constitutes what we might consider 'the statistical 
revolution'. Secondly, the growth of census taking has 
been uninterrupted throughout the whole period. By the 
end of the nineteenth century in Europe, national 
censuses were required on a scientific, regular, nation-
wide scale. Thirdly, we must note the connected and 





in the chronological ranking of 
and the first-census taking 
connection does exist in the 
development on a European scale 





The history of statistics poses us with another related 
28 
problem, that of which approach to use in order to best 
describe its evolution. The various approaches reflect 
the long term trends in histiography.8 John Koren 
provided one of the earliest attempts to write a history 
of statistics. As editor of an early volume entitled The 
History of Statistics he brought together many prominent 
official statisticians 
backgrounds. 9 The book 
from various 
is filled with 
national 
important 
information and detail on the emergence of statistics in 
various countries. However, as a history of statistics, 
it suffered from major weaknesses. It combined an 
empiricist approach with a set assumptions that 
statistics was somehow an autonomous sphere outside the 
development of society. In one sense the volume is 
unsatisfactory as a history of statistics precisely 
because it was written by official statisticians rather 
than historians. Koren and his colleagues did not pose 
criteria for developing a historical understanding of 
statistics. Thus, the book lacked a clear theoretical 
framework. 
Greenwood's response was to examine early statistics 
from a biographical perspective. 10 He used document-
ation, letters and biographical accounts from political 
arithmetician's lives in order to shed light onto 
statistics. Biographical research into key statisticians 
provided interesting background but failed to explain 
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the logic of statistical development. It suffered from 
the narrowness of Koren's collection on the history of 
statistics. 
These were both attempts to understand statistics 
independently of other historical processes. Both show 
the limitations of the assumption of the historical 
independence of statistics. 
Other historians have attempted wider explanations but 
are divided according to whether they view intellectual 
or socio-economic processes as fundamental to that 
change. 
Westergaard, writing in the inter-war period, described 
statistics in terms of an intellectual cycle of 
progress, stagnation and enthusiasm. II The ideas were 
carried and developed in the minds of one individual to 
the next. His narrative style logically complements this 
idealist approach. Hence, the early orthodoxy of the 
history of statistics that emerged from this analysis 
charted the intellectual process which was undertaken by 
like-minded progressive individuals. This approach made 
a great deal of sense when one considers the 
intellectual climate of the first statisticians, the 
development of modern science and medicine, Newtonian 
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physics, and the enlightenment. Hilts, in his 1968 Ph.D 
on the history of statistics, developed this argument. 
In his account of European pioneering statisticians, he 
clearly set out his perspective thus, 
What is aimed is something more general, a 
discussion of statistics within the context of 
ni~eteent12 century thought concerning the social 
SClences. 
He focused therefore upon the pioneers themselves and 
the ideas that accompanied the development of 
statistics. It appeared only natural to identify 
statistics within various intellectual spheres, 
(political economy, liberalism, science, eugenics) 
operating through the actions of important individuals, 
(Petty, Graunt, Quetelet, 8abbage and Pearson). 
Compared to the perspective of Koren and Greenwood, it 
was certainly a step forward, however, one limitation to 
this historical methodology was raised by Thomas Kuhn, 
a historian of the scientific revolutions. He pin-
pointed revolution as a key concept in the development 
of science. 
Concerned with scientific development, the 
historian ..... appears to have two main tasks. On 
the one hand, he must determine by what man and at 
what point in time each contemporary fact, law, 
and theory was discovered or invented. On the 
other, he must describe and explain the congeries 
of error, myth, and superstition that inhibited 
the more rapid accumulation of the constituents 
of modern science text .... In recent years, 
however, a few historians of science have been 
finding it more and more difficult to fulfil the 
functions that the concept of development-by-
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accumulation assigns to them. As chroniclers of an 
incremental process, they discover additional 
research which makes it harder, not easier to 
answer questions like: When was oxygen discovered? 
Who first conceived of energy conservation ? 
Increasingly, a few of them think thj3 are asking 
the wrong sorts of questions to ask. 
In two respects Kuhn's criticism of orthodox histories 
of science apply to the history of statistics. Firstly, 
the history of statistics has to involve wider concerns 
than 'who?' and 'when?' Secondly, Kuhn's rejection of 
gradualism, his distinction of evolutionary and 
revolutionary aspects of the historical process applies 
to statistics as to science in general. 
In contrast to the intellectual approach, Cullen and 
Shaw and Miles looked to social and economic factors 
rather than individuals and ideas alone. Cullen, who was 
researching the statistical movement ln nineteenth 
century Britain, correlated statistical phases of 
development with certain social classes and their 
political and sociological point of view. 14 Cullen 
concluded that the nineteenth century statistical 
movement in Britain was essentially a bourgeois 
phenomenon, tracing links with reforming whigs. However, 
he did not attempt to analyse the deeper significance of 
this and its relation to the revolutionary rise of this 
class in Europe. As a result, Cullen's sociological or 
class approach was descriptive rather than dynamic. 
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Shaw and Miles's perspective contrasted that of the 
idealist historians even more starkly.IS They were 
concerned with statistics as result of changing mode of 
production. Like Cullen, they assigned importance to the 
class character of the early statisticians, but for them 
this was of far greater significance, because of the 
role played by this class in the changes in the economic 
and social order. The new mode of production, modern 
capitalism, needed statistical science: its 
urbanisation, its complexity, the commodification of 
1 ife, the extended technical threshold enabled and 
called forth modern statistics. Mi les and Shaw 
identify commodity production as the crucial element in 
the rise of statistics. Their approach is an attempt at 
applying a Marxist methodology to the subject. For Marx 
and Engels, 
The simple fact is that human beings must have 
their food, drink, clothing and shelter first of 
a II, before they can interest themse lves in 
politics, science, art, religion and the like. 16 
According to Marxism then, the stage of development of 
material production was crucial to all other aspects of 
society. This distinction between the economic base and 
the superstructure is applied by Miles and Shaw to the 
development of statistics. Thus, they pin-pointed 
generalised commodity production as a condition which 
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necessitated the quantification of all aspects of 
production. They compare ancient and modern 
quantification thus, 
••.... a lthough quantification is involved in such 
inventories, they cannot reasonab ly be regarded as 
statistical analyses. Nor did record-keeping and 
monetary comparisons, in themselves, necessitate 
the de ve lopment of s ta tis tics. Th is was because 
people in both ancient and feudal societies were 
still mainly involved in producing goods for their 
own use. Although commodity production grew, it 
was still limited in scope: it had not become the 
typical form of production. The full dynamism of a 
money economy, in which more and 19re things are 
quantified, had not yet developed. 
However, the first nations to take the census and set 
up statistical offices were not those nations to first 
undergo the industrial revolution. This does not 
invalidate the explanation, it does however demonstrate 
a limitation. In its defence, industrialisation was an 
Europe-wide phenomenon whose origins can be found from 
the seventeenth century, the industrial revolution 
displaced rural industrialisation with industrial 
urbanisation. Hence, this thesis is only a partial 
explanation. 
To be able to understand the early development of 
statistics it is necessary therefore to synthesise the 
various elements emphasised by different historians. 
Firstly, the idealist approach, despite its ability to 
locate statistics within a period of intellectual 
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upheaval, is unconvincing because it leaves the timing, 
pattern and development of statistics in the arbitrarily 
hands of individuals. It is unable to explain why at 
certain points of development the state and society 
concerned themselves with statistics. Neither is it 
convincingly able to explain why at a certain historical 
epoch individuals were spurred to action, breakthroughs, 
discoveries in the statistical sphere or explain why 
statistics developed in such a dramatic explosive 
fashion. Therborn summed up the weakness of this 
approach, 
But that the blossoming of political economy was 
part of a large and sophisticated intellectual 
movement does not mean that it 'floated freely' 
above the classes and their struggle. This is 
obvious from the business and careers of many 
economists or civil servants. William Petty, whom 
Marx referred to as the first classical economist, 
made himself one of the country's biggest 
landlord]8 in the course of his survey of 
Ireland. 
Secondly, a descriptive sociological approach is limited 
in terms of its inability to go beyond explaining the 
concerns, the environmental and behavioural 
characteristics of the middle class pioneers of social 
statistics in Britain. For example, the descriptive 
sociological perspective is incapable in explaining the 
dynamic involved in the class relations that put these 
individuals in the position of challenging the ideas 
and methods of the old order yet retaining a distinct 
agenda reflecting the assumptions, prejudices and 
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interest of their class. This agenda was primarily 
concerned with education, crime and sanitation. Finally, 
whilst Miles and Irvine's materialist explanation can 
locate deeper causes for the development of statistics 
in this period but there is a danger of it being too 
crude an analysis, ignoring the complexity, 
contradictions, struggles of individuals and the 
importance of intellectual breakthroughs. 
To overcome these problems therefore we need to reject 
both idealism and crude materialism, in favour of a 
dialectical synthesis of both approaches. Such a 
perspective would retain the surface complexity of the 
pattern of individual and state achievement. And at the 
same time explaining the underlying historical reasons 
for statistical quantification. Thus, it avoids the 
mistake of determinism which is simply not borne out by 
the evidence. 
1.2 Understanding the Pioneers: From Political 
Arithmetic to the Statistical Societies 
A consensus has developed that the real origins of 
modern statistics are to be found with political 
arithmetic of the late seventeenth century in Britain. 19 
Political arithmetic was guided by the principle that 
the systematic collection of data could lead to 
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understanding in political, economic and social matters. 
Its chief adherents were Sir William Petty, John Graunt, 
Charles Davenant, Edmund Halley, and later Arthur Young. 
Their work consisted of a statistical assessment of data 
collected by the state, a criticism of the methods 
involved . 1 n such practices and a belief i n 
quantification as a means of understanding society. The 
first work in the political arithmetic tradition was 
John Graunt's Natural and Political Observations on the 
Bills of Mortality. It consisted of an analysis of 
off i cia 1 figures of morta 1 i ty in London wh i ch were 
collected because of the threat of the plague. Graunt's 
work differed from its subject in the sense that Kendall 
argued, that statistics cannot be simply equated with 
enumeration; Graunt's work is statistical whereas the 
bills of mortality are not. 20 Real similarities can also 
be seen between modern statisticians and Sir William 
Petty. He went so far as to call for a central 
statistical office. His aim was the scientific 
understanding the society by measurement. 
Instead of using only comparative and superlative 
words, and intellectua I arguments, I have taken 
the course (as a specimen of political arithmetic 
I have long aimed at) to express myself in terms 
of number, weight, or measure; to use only 
arguments of sense, and to consider only such 
causes; as have risible foundations in Nature; 
leaving those that depend on the mutable minds, 
op7n70ns, appetites, and passions of particular 
men, to the consideration of others .... Nor the 
observations or positions expressed by number, 
weight, and measure ... are either true, or not 
apparently false, and which if not already true, 
certain, and evident, yet may not be made so by 
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the sovereign power ... Nor would it misbehave 
authority itself/to clear the truth of those 
mat2irs which private endeavours cannot reach 
to. 
So what motivated the political arithmeticians to 
develop statistics? On an intellectual level, Petty was 
an acquaintance and admirer of the materialist 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes and a founding member of the 
Royal Society heavily influenced by the ideas of Francis 
Bacon. These two figures reflected a new intellectual 
environment which the political arithmeticians 
inherited. Materialism and Baconian science represented 
a challenge to the prevailing ideas which combined 
strict religious determinism with elements of Greek 
philosophy and science. The Baconian tradition broke 
with this rigid intellectual perspective to emphasise 
human reason, scientific method and progress. This 
element has been used to describe the motivation of 
early statisticians, that is, the appeal of knowledge 
and science. An example of the desire to liberate 
society from superstition is that both John Graunt and 
the German political arithmetician Kasper . Neumann 
reviewed bills of mortality in order to amongst other 
things refute popular notions that public health 
depended on the phases of the moon. Before Graunt's work 
it was commonly believed that women outnumbered men 
three to one. It is also clear that Petty was 
dissatisfied with the contemporary comparative studies 
38 
of states, the 'Staatsmerkwurdigkeiten ' , which were 
predominately impressionistic. Quantification of 
phenomena could expose myths and (especially demographic 
statistics) could provide a benchmark with which to 
compare different states. Three of the most significant 
political arithmeticians, Graunt, Petty, and Sir Charles 
Davenant, not only estimated population but also the 
number of fensible men (those who could be mobilised for 
war). So whilst political arithmetic concerned itself 
with dispelling the dark cloak of superstition, pure or 
abstract science was not the proposed alternative. For 
political arithmeticians, like the German 'Staatsmerk-
wurdigkeiten ' scholars, their new science was an 
applied science. This was no less true when a further 
step forward was made by Swedish population 
statisticians in the mid-eighteenth century with the 
censuses under Wargentin. 22 
Further weight is added to the argument of an 
intellectual driving force to statistics by the 
scientific revolution of the age. Science was very 
important to the development of early statistics, 
indeed, political arithmetic falls within the period of 
'scientific revolution ' .23 It should be no surprise then 
that Petty, Graunt, and Edmund Halley were all members 
of the Royal Society. However this organisation not only 
gathered together like-minded individuals but also gave 
some institutional support to political arithmetic. It 
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was able to give the framework for transmission of 
ideas. Halley, an astronomer and scientist, compiled a 
life table from Neumann's review of Breslau bills of 
deaths and births. He had been influenced by Graunt's 
book and it was the Royal Society that put him in 
contact with Neumann's study. The Society was also to 
communicate the ideas of political arithmetic to the 
mathematician Leibniz. Leibniz, as a result, was 
convinced of the need for an official statistical 
department. The impetus for Swedish population 
statistics came from the Swedish Academy of Sciences 
with its first two secretaries, Elvius and Wargentin 
being the prime movers behind the Swedish censuses. 24 
Political arithmetic was part of a wider scientific 
revolution which stood in contradiction to existing 
ideas which it sought to shake off. The struggle between 
these ideas took place within a context of wider 
struggles involving all aspects of society. The church 
was subordinated to the state. The political order was 
being reorganised to allow a transition away from 
feudalism to capitalism. In Britain at the time of 
political arithmetic this process was taking a 
particularly sharpened form with aftermath of the 
English Civil War, the terms of the restoration of the 
monarchy and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Society 
was undergoing profound transformation, the economy, 
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class structure, individuals and ideology were bound up 
in this upheaval. By and large, the political 
arithmeticians were removed from older forms of landed 
wealth, they belonged to an expanding urban classes, 
doctors, scientists, professors and government 
officials. They looked to 'number, weight and measure' 
in order to understand their new world. 
In Britain, where the political arithmetic was perhaps 
most developed, there seems to be a loss of impetus as 
it matured. The next significant statistical movement 
occurred in the 1830s. This is not to say that in the 
intervening period that no advance was made, but that 
this advance was not as significant in motivating or 
involving individuals as either the period of political 
arithmetic or the period of the statistical societies, 
the 1830s. This period was of great importance for the 
the history of official statistics with the 
establishment of the census and statistical offices in 
several countries. Statistics became more widely used. 
Life tables were used to calculate annuities and 
pensions on a mathematical basis. Statistics were 
involved in a controversy over whether English 
population was increasing or declining, which could only 
be answered by a state census. The controversy was 
interesting in that it attempted to evaluate the changes 
that had occurred since the Glorious Revolution; an 
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argument that surely reflected the advocacy of and 
antagonism to change that existed in and between classes 
in the eighteenth century England. Glass, a historian of 
British population statistics, identified in this 
controversy the antagonism between old and new wealth, 
between the land-owning and the merchant classes. 
Moreover, whatever the course of population in 
England in the eighteenth century, the initiation, 
at least, of the argument of a higher population 
in the past derived far more from a desire to 
demonstrate the historical truth of the Bible, a 
nostalgia for a misconceived and over-glorified 
antiquity, and a distaste for th25 growing importance of manufacture and commerce. 
Both the political arithmeticians and those involved in 
the population controversy responded to real changes in 
their social environment, respectively civil war and 
industrial revolution. This has to be a key to our 
understanding of the reason for statistics being 
collected. A similar pattern emerged with the 
statistical societies in the 1830s. With the stagnation 
of political arithmetic it was not until the development 
of the statistical movement that another period of 
public statistical enthusiasm emerged. As with political 
arithmetic this phenomenon requires further examination 
as it has been the source of historical interest and 
scholarship which can throw further light onto 
statistical development. 
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In 1833 the Manchester Statistical Society was 
founded. It was followed by the Statistical Society of 
London the year after. These exist to the present day. 
Others were established but failed to survive the 
initial period of optimism. These are of interest in 
that they illustrate certain general propositions about 
the history of statistics. Statistics and statisticians 
are influenced quite heavily by such factors as 
generation, ideology and class. These individuals came 
to realise the limitations imposed on their statistical 
endeavours. As a result, they looked to the state to 
organise the collection of statistics by a body of 
professional statisticians. 
Let us start with an analysis of the concerns of the 
Statistical Societies. David Elesh in his study of the 
Manchester Statistical Society's first statistical 
surveys showed their dominant concerns. 26 The Manchester 
Statistical Society was interested (in order of 
frequency of research) in education, the condition of 
the working class, criminality and to a lesser extent 
vital statistics and religion. As such, they reflected 
the concerns of the expanding British bourgeoisie of the 
nineteenth century. This is qualitatively different from 
the issues that concerned the earlier political 
arithmeticians who were primarily concerned with vital 
and medical statistics. However in common with the 
political arithmeticians the Manchester Statistical 
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Society applied statistics to the outside world 
(especially with the view to affecting government 
policy). Obershall looked at the articles of the London 
Society's journal to find similar results, public 
health, economics, population and census, crime, the 
condition of the poor, and government were the primary 
topics. 27 The remarkable narrowness of the subjects 
discussed by the societies shows the degree of 
homogeneity both within and between the statistical 
societies. They were linked by a liberal reforming 
perspective in which the key to transforming the 
condition of the newly emerging working class and the 
attendant problem of urban crime (and presumably 
Chartism and political instability) was education, which 
could be demonstrated by statistics. 
Having identified the 'scientific focus' of the 
statistical societies we can move on to how and by whom 
they were formed and the link between their social 
composition and political ideology. There are a number 
of similarities between the founders of the Manchester 
and London Societies. 
The London Society emerged from the creation of a 
statistical section of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Section F was formed under the 
efforts of Charles Babbage, the inventor of the first 
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computer. He was influenced by the great Belgian 
statistician Adolphe Quetelet, who aided in the 
establishment of the statistical section. 28 The 
scientific element was present therefore in the 
inception of the movement both institutionally but also 
in terms of individuals. However, perhaps more 
importantly Babbage and his colleagues had a common 
political background, Whig politics, and for Babbage it 
was artificial to separate one from the other. 29 It was 
a political ideology shared to a greater or lesser 
degree by the others who founded the society. 
They were far from being a band of intellectual 
young turks launching an attack on the citadel of 
orthodoxy. Rather, in broad terms, they came from 
within that orthodoxy, already, .... men of 
middle age or older and of high standing in 
intellectual, particularly Liberal intellectual, 
circles. The statistical movement began as it was 
to remain (though definitely less so), a movement 
of the reforming establishment, Whig to Liberal 
in politics, non-Benthami~v (yet not yet 
consciouslyanti-Benthamite). 
Generally, this period of British history was not only 
characterised by 'statistical enthusiasm' to borrow 
Westergaard's phrase, but also by the great liberal 
reforms(1831-1846), beginning with the Reform Act and 
culminating in the repeal of the Corn Law. Within this 
bourgeois reforming period, a minority looked to 
statistics as providing a means to influence government. 
This was almost exclusively the political and class 
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nature of the statistical movement. Statistical 
societies' surveys of strikes reflected their hostility 
to working class struggles and organisation. The middle 
class was confronted by a new industrial working class 
which it considered an alien mass with criminal, 
alcoholic and revolutionary tendencies. As Cullen has 
pointed out, 
The aim remained the creation of a virtuous and 
quiescent working class. Humanitarianism, class 
intere1t and statistics made powerful reforming brew.~ 
The other British statistical societies were a rather 
fleeting affair, quickly losing impetus after their 
foundation. The usual pattern being, after a B.A.A.S. 
meeting, they found statistical work more expensive and 
time-consuming than they had anticipated. Most proved 
unable to produce any surveys, all finding enormous 
difficulties in continuity and maintaining enthusiasm, 
this being even true for the early years of the London 
society. This was due by and large to the fact that many 
were primarily concerned with reform and had other 
political and business commitments. Elements we noticed 
before continued, throughout this era specific social 
and ideological forms accompanied the development of 
statistics, notably the emergence of new urban middle 
classes and the extension of the scientific community 
and scientific values. 
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This was not only true of the use of statistics in 
Britain but also elsewhere. In France, the Parisian 
Chamber of Commerce responded to the revolutions of 1848 
with a pioneering statistical survey of industry. It 
showed their hostility to the worker's demands. 32 The 
radical quarant-huitards argued that the economic 
structure of society was responsible for the conflict, 
and that state regulation of unemployment and sub-
contracting was the solution. The survey took issue with 
their case arguing for laissez-faire and family values 
to dissipate social conflict. 
As with political arithmetic the statistical movement 
had international links through common ideologies of 
reform and science. This can be seen in the links and 
influence Adolphe Quetelet had with both the London 
Statistical Society and the French statisticians such as 
Louis Villerme, Benoisten de Chateauneuf and Andre 
Guerry who were involved in the Annals d'Hygiene 
Publique et Medicine Legale. 33 Again these statisticians 
attempted to influence government in a reforming 
direction, embracing similar subjects from a similar 
class perspective. This was to be repeated again at the 
turn of the twentieth century, with the British 
inquiries of Booth, Rowntree and Bowley, but by this 
time the momentum had decisively shifted towards the 
state in the collection of statistics and there had 
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evolved a professional cadre of official 
statisticians. 34 
In summary therefore we have identified several elements 
common to statisticians and the conceptualisation of 
socio-economic statistics in this era. First we notice a 
shared belief in scientific method. Secondly there is 
the desire to explain, understand and bring about 
rational government on the basis of statistical 
knowledge. Thirdly, statisticians have been associated 
with specific social class which shaped their work. 
Finally common to most statisticians is the desire for 
the state to place a greater emphasis upon the gathering 
of statistics. These features were characteristically 
strong due to the amateurism and immaturity of 
statistics and the enormous transformation that was 
occurring more generally in society in a period that was 
after all the transition from rural to urban 
society. As statistics developed, those 
industrial 
engaged in 
statistics underwent two connected transformations. They 
lost their amateur status with the growing bureaucratic 
professionalisation and they also developed a common 
statistical consciousness. 
1.3 Origins of ~ State Monopoly of Statistics: State-
Formation and the Professionalisation of Statistics 
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Accounts of statistics which centre on individual 
achievement and intellectual development are inadequate 
for a further reason; that is they pay too little 
attention to the role of the state in the rise of 
statistics. This omission fits with the idealist account 
of the history of statistics. However, the state is a 
fundamental element in the statistical revolution. Most 
histories of statistics tend to either underplay or 
undertheorise the role of the state. It is important 
therefore to set out the connection between the 
the different tendencies of state-formation and 
development of statistics. State-formation was a complex 
interaction of mercantilism, absolutism, war and 
bourgeois revolution. 
Mercantilism has been the subject of debate and 
disagreement between historians. 35 However, we can 
overcome most of the difficulties involved in the term 
if we do not extravagantly claim it was an international 
system in thought and reality, but a real economic 
tendency in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Coleman set the parameters for a more 
understanding of mercantilism, 
acceptable 
.. Much contemporary concern was for the balance of 
trade; and that state measures to encourage the 
export and discourage the import of manufactured 
goods were widespread. Go further and accept van 
Klaveren's criterion of mercantilist economic 
policy: "The objective is always the development, 
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from an agrarian base, of an industrial, 
commercial and maritime superstructure coupled 
with an attempt to secure a bigger share of 
international commerce for one's citizens H • Regard 
may thus be paid to two pervasive mercantilist 
themes: the belief in a fixed cake of commerce so 
that one nation's gain is another's loss; and the 
con~ern witj6fostering of activities other than 
agr7culture. 
Mercantilism involved an economic competition which 
called forth comparison between states. This was 
reflected in the ethos of the German staatsmerkwurd-
igkeiten scholars and the political arithmeticians. 
Indeed, the role of Colbert, the French arch-
mercantilist Finance Minister, responsible for giving an 
impetus to French official statistics is an obvious 
connection with mercantilism. 
We may say that in the hands of Colbert, as in the 
hands of Sully, statistics were the essential 
instrument with which t~ese two great ministers, 
60 years apart and 7n strikingly analogous 
circumstances, succeeded in re-establishing order 
in the public finances aj~ prosperity to the 
national economy of France. 
However, it is often difficult and would be counter-
productive to disentangle the different tendencies to 
state formation prior to the industrial revolution, 
absolutism, mercantilism and war. Hence, Glass explained 
the Austrian census of 1754 as due to a combination of 
mercantilist thinking and war. The census, which was 
among the first modern censuses, 
.. in turn, was a response to the effects of the 
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Turkish Wars j~d partly to the great influence 
mercantilism. 
of 
Indeed, national economic competition complimented 
military competition. War became a major component of 
the state's desire to have an accurate sense of its own 
proportions. War in turn also fed tendencies towards 
state formation. Hence, in the estimates of population 
of the political arithmeticians the numbers of men that 
could be mobilised at times of war was one of the stated 
aims. It was one of the arguments used in favour of the 
census when Potter's bill was brought to the House of 
Commons in 1754. 39 It also accounts for the earliest 
modern census, the Swedish census of 1749, which was, 
primarily a response to the mortality and 
depopulation associated with, or
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resulting from 
the Great Northern War (1700-21). 
More generally, we cannot link statistics to state-
formation unless we understand that there were 
intermediary stages before the emergence of the modern 
bourgeois state. The crisis of feudalism gave rise to 
varying reactions across Europe. In the East feudalism 
was intensified. In France and other European states the 
weakening structures of feudalism were counterbalanced 
by the absolutist state. In Britain and Netherlands by 
the Seventeenth Century, a third option of bourgeois 
revolution punctured the crisis of feudalism. 
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It is only with the bourgeois revolution that state-
formation was consolidated in its modern sense. In this 
respect, due to its intensity and internationalisation, 
the French Revolution consolidated this process on a 
wider European scale. 
At a comparative and international level, the 
history of statistics in revolutionary- Napoleonic 
France is significant because of France's 
undoubted lead in the field. As in so many other 
areas, the French example was directly and 
indirectly influential on the developments in 
other countries.'Il 
Indeed, Woolf attributed to the revolutionary French 
state the origin of modern statistics. It is perhaps 
significant that several of our histories of statistics 
overlook this period, as their concern is with 
individuals. In this period, the initiative was very 
much with a state that sought to consciously monopolise 
statistics. 
The or7g7ns of modern statistics can be found in 
revolutionary-Napoleonic France. At the level of 
mathematical theory it can be objected that 
statistics, in a recognisable modern form, only 
begins with later, with Quetelet (although 
Quetelet's own interest in the field would seem to 
be linked to later Napoleonic experiences). But in 
its practical application, statistics and 
Napoleonic France outgrew political arithmetic and 
statistical topography to acquire its modern 
function- the systematic and periodic collection 
of economic data on economic activities and social 
problems for the purpose of providing a reliable 
quantitative basis for policy and public 
discussion. Under Napoleon, the role of statistics 
was to reveal the power of the state,' in the anti-
state reaction of the restoration, its focal point 
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shifted to the 'discovery' and administration of 
society. But there was no discontinuity in 
purpose, nor the assumption by the ruling groups 
that they had both had the power and the right to 
collect such information from subordinate members 
of civil society. In this sense too, as a 
discourse of power
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modern statistics originate in 
Napoleonic France. 
Even, if we may want to temper Woolf's case for making 
revolutionary France the birth of modern statistics, it 
is clear a qualitative break through was made. 43 Despite 
the defeat of the Napoleonic Armies in 1815 there was no 
real way which Europe could turn back the clock, 
statistics included. Indeed the state making process was 
entrenched and its statistical implications followed 
suit. 
~ The Statistical Revolution as an Aspect of the Era 
of Bourgeois Revolution 
The statistical revolution from the political 
arithmeticians to the statistical societies cannot be 
explained alone by either the intellectual upheaval or 
the feats of individuals. We might propose an analysis 
which links the statistical revolution to the epoch of 
the European bourgeois revolution. This era began with 
the Dutch War of Independence, subsiding and rising to 
the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the 
European Revolutions of 1848 and German and Italian 
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Unification. This process generalised a new form of 
society across the world. 
On a number of counts, this thesis is able 
the explosions of statistical measurement 





Firstly, in terms of the timing and pattern of 
statistical origins, the political arithmetic emerged in 
the wake of the English Civil War and the Commonwealth. 
Statistics is firmly established with the consolidation 
of capitalism. The technological and material progress 
enabled modern statistical apparatuses on a scale never 
before possible. Previous to the statistical revolution 
scattered examples of enumeration exist, but with its 
inception statistical methods were systematically 
employed and periodically upgraded, the statistical 
output improved in quality and yield. 
Secondly, the rise of the bourgeoisie involved the 
challenging of old ideas, science, culture by new forms. 
The scientific revolution, the enlightenment, classical 
economics and statistical thinking were the intellectual 
shock waves of explosive social conflicts. 
Thirdly, class relations can be seen to have acted as a 
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stimulus to statistical development. Political 
Arithmetic had its heyday in the turbulent aftermath of 
the English Civil War, subsiding in the seventeenth 
century, as Buck pointed out, with the settlement of the 
large capitalist landlords and the protestant 
monarchy.44 The statistical societies emerged during and 
declined with Chartist and Corn Law agitation; on the 
continent statistical societies arose in the aftermath 
of the 1830 revolutions. The bourgeoisie shaped itself 
during these conflicts, and shaped its own agenda which 
it attempted to establish by various ideological 
methods, one of which was statistics. The sociological 
investigations of the statistical societies, 
members and concerns bare this out. 45 
their 
Fourthly, the era of the European bourgeois revolution 
brought about profound changes in social and economic 
development. Commodification of production introduced 
quantification into all aspects of work and consumption. 
Accounting, insurance, pensions, taxes and the monied 
economy required elementary figures. The balance of 
trade and financial statistics needed greater 
sophistication, ultimately national income itself became 
quantified. Urbanisation and industrialisation were 
accompanied by new social problems of a mass character. 
Finally, states were required by these new conditions, 
55 
modern warfare, centralised state machinery, social 
policy and democracy, to accelerate the rise of 
statistics. In particular, the state bureaucracy bore 
statistics on its back; recasting it in its own image 
through professionalisation, monopoly and control. 
~ The Development of Modern Official Statistics 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, official 
statistics were taking off in a whole series of states 
particularly in Britain, France, Scandinavian countries 
and the United States. For that reason the relationship 
between individuals and statistics underwent a dramatic 
transformation. A growing professionalisation and 
institutionalisation took place as can be seen with the 
relationship between the London Statistical Society and 
the Board of Trade, the American Statistical Society and 
the American Census. Eastwood identified this 
relationship developing with the British parliamentary 
commissions of the Poor Law Amendment and Factory Acts 
of the 1830s, 
By 
The collection of annual data which clearly 
revealed secular trends in social problems added a 
new dimension to social inquiry, and one which 
became the stock in trade af reforming commissions 
of the eighteen-thirties. 4b 
this time, with the institutionalisation of 
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statistics, the statistical process became identified 
with the state. The state gave new substance to and 
nourished statistics. The efforts of the statistical 
movement might otherwise have been looked upon by 
history as meaningless and unsustainable vanities of 
middle class amateurs. However, with the growth of the 
state the fulcrum of statistical development shifted. 
The early development of official statistics was 
closely related to the process of state formation. 
The attempts of the absolutist state to mobilise 
resources for sustaining a standing army and a 
professional civil service in the context of a 
mercantilist economic policy, continuously 
increased the need for statistical information. 
Later, with the extension of the suffrage and the 
institutionalisation of mass democracy, government 
intervention in the economy and society grew even 
more rapidly, assuming new forms and which in turn 
required statistical information on new areas in 
order to detect problems, des~~n improvements, and 
control their implementation. 
As the state grew so it revolutionised statistics, which 
in turn revolutionised the state. Woolf made the point 
about France but this pattern was to repeat itself 
elsewhere. 
The repeated demands made on departmental 
administrations for accurate factual information 
over the long-run enhanced the level of expertise, 
led to the elaboration of more sophisticated 
administrative techniques and prepared the ground 
for the professionalisation of the bureau~racy. Of 
course, statistics alone was not respons7ble for 
these developments. But it was of the ~ssen~e . of 
statistical inquiry to present a un7form7s7ng, 
apparently impartial and modernising role to which 
bureaucrats at all levels were expected to 
conform. And the importance attributed by 
government to statistics, particularly in the 
early and final phases (1798-1804, 1811-14), 
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confirmed the deepseated expectations of French 
notables that the state should play the
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'eading 
role as the motor of change and progress. 
Indeed, the contours of statistical development were 
transformed by the state in a number of ways as the 
process of nation state formation became entrenched. The 
growth and interaction of the state and statistics 
expressed itself on a number of levels. 
First statistics was affected by and affected the 
professionalisation and growth of a state bureaucracy of 
experts, Eastwood described this process, 
Fundamentally, of course, it was information which 
constituted the currency of expertise, and as 
information became more specia7ised and extensive 
so the experts who would claim intel7ectua7 
mastery over it became more important to 
government. Gradually, centra7 government 
exchanged a partnership with 70ca7ities for a 
partnership with experts. And thus, the 
aristocratic principle in government gave way to 
the imperialism of the bureaucracy, and with it 
the flow of information was diverted ins~ channels 
created by professional administrators. 
Professionalisation and its relation to the state was 
not restricted to statistics. State-formation played a 
critical role in the creation and legitimation of the 
professions. Hence the historical sociology of the 
professions points to this relationship as key to 
understanding how certain aspects of the division of 
labour crystallise out and undergo the process of 
professionalisation, as was the case with statistics ln 
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the mid-nineteenth century.50 
Secondly, the institutionalisation of statisticians 
added to the development of a certain statistical 
ethos. This statistical consciousness is not uniform, we 
might characterise it in two variants. Firstly, there is 
what we have called the statistical utopianism. This 
permeated Koren's work on the history of statistics and 
the more extravagant claims of the statistical 
societies. This statistical utopianism was expressed in 
startling form by North, particularly as this was 
written in the year of the Russian Revolution. 
The world has long been obsessed with the dread of 
an impending struggle between capital and labour -
a titanic conflict involving our entire social 
system and leading to another French revolution. 
And 10, the solution is at hand; for the 
statistician has appeared, and behind him is an 
educated public opinion, which demands that equity 
shall be the basis of compromise, and trusts the 
s~ati~iician to prove mathematically where equity 
l7es. 
However, this utopianism still exists, as J.Keane, no 
less a person than the Director of the US Bureau of 
Census, showed in 1988, 
People across nations share bonds of family, 
friendship, community and knowledge Bonding 
encourages and enhances harmony Despite 
acknowledged countervailing stresses - sometimes 
severe and protracted - global interdependen~y 
among nations increases. Therefore, there 1S 
commensurate need for global harmony. Here 'global 
harmony' simply refers to the existence of 
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essential accord among mo~t nations most of the 
time. Statistics can help.b2 ' 
A more sophisticated version was elaborated in the 
Declaration of Professional Ethics adopted by the 
International Statistical Institute in 1985. 53 
While statisticians operate within the value 
system of their societies, they should attempt to 
uphold their professional integrity without fear 
or favour ... Science can never be entirely 
objective, and statistics is no exception ... Even 
so, the statistician is never free of 
responsibility to pursue objectivity and to be 
open about known barriers to this achievement. In 
particular, statisticians are bound by a 
professional obligation to resist approaches to 
data collection, analysis, interpretation and 
publication that are likely (implicitly or 
explicitly) to mi5~nform or mislead rather than 
advance knowledge. 
This consciousness sees statistics as neutral and the 
production of knowledge as an unambiguous good. It 
promotes the professional consciousness in statistics, 
that all statisticians have a common interest. However, 
the Government Statisticians Collective ln Britain 
pointed out the contradictions that emerge in official 
statistical production. 
At the base of both the process and of the 
hierarchy, subordinate staff perform routine 
clerical and data processing tasks of many kinds, 
such as form-filling, coding and card-punching. 
The end results of their work, in the form of 
computer output are analysed and interpreted by 
statisticians, and used by administrator~, 
mandarins and ministers in the department, and 7n 
other departments, to develop and justify policies 
... By 'professionalism' is meant the ~tho~ by 
which professional workers try to ma7nta7n a 
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certain independence, and standards of competence, 
accuracy, and integrity within their narrow 
technical sphere, while carefully abstaining or 
questioning, o~ taking .responsibility for, the 
ends to wh7ch the7r skills are used. 
Sta tis tic ians, work ing in closer contac t wi th the 
admi~istrators than most other professional staff, 
reta7n only an attenuated professional ethos, and 
par~l~ shareS the attitudes of the 
adm7n7strators. b 
The third level on which the state affected the 
development of statistics was the unprecedented growth 
in state expenditure, staff and function. The state 
evolved . two principals ways, towards the welfare ln 
state and state capitalism. 56 The welfare state implied 
the statistical measurement of the social condition of 
the population. The tendency to state capitalism 
reinforced tendencies towards statistical measurement of 
the national economy, the development of national 
economic policy with its ultimate expression 
Keynesian demand management, nationalised industries and 
state planning. 
Interestingly, the economic orthodoxy which replaced 
Keynesianism during the 1980s, monetarism, despite its 
criticism of planning and state intervention, did not 
represent a backlash against economic statistics. If 
anything monetarism confirmed tendencies of increasingly 
sophisticated economic indicators being yardsticks to 
government policy. Hence various elaborate measures of 
the money supply from MO to M4 where adopted by the 
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Thatcher government to track the volume of money within 
the economy.57 
However, increasingly since the Second World War a 
further development in the pattern of the world economy 
has imposed itself on the pattern of statistical 
development, that is the internationalisation of the 
world economy. Trade, finance, manufacturing, 
communication networks and firms operate to an 
increasing extent beyond their former national 
boundaries. This changing pattern of capitalist 
development has brought forth an increased 
internationalisation of statistical measurement as the 
need to regulate the system transcends frontiers. Hence, 
post-Second World War we have seen a growth in the 
number of international official organisations that 
collect, publish and attempt to regulate statistics of 
different nation states, United Nations, Eurostat, 
Comecon, and the International Labour Organisation (both 
the latter and the League of Nations being inter-war 
forerunners of this). This has involved increasing 
co-operation amongst statisticians and attempts to 
commonly define and harmonise social statistics. It is 
this that leads Keane to talk of the globalisation of 
statistics. 58 
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This internationalisation in the context of economic 
crisis is another feature that has countered the 
tendency there may have been for the withering of 
statistics with the end of the Keynesian/planning 
heydays of the post war boom. Vast quantities of data, 
or warning signals, are judged to be essential in order 
to regulate threats to economic stability in a world 
economy in which it is increasing difficult to 
co-ordinate effective responses (due to international-
isation and the waning of the power of the dollar). 
Hence the IMF has provided debt rescheduling and macro-
economic management plans for countries with large debt 
burdens in particular in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. These conditions make events such as the crash 
of 1987, currency crises such as the Black Wednesday ERM 
crisis in September 1992 more likely. 
However, some authors have exaggerated the extent of and 
potential for globalisation, ignoring the continuing 
significance of the state in the process of capitalist 
accumulation. Harman replied to those who argue that 
states are becoming economically redundant in the face 
of global firms, finance and markets, 
The trend towards internationalisation is there 
but the great majority of manufacturing companies 
still operate mainly within one national state 
from which they branch out .... We can say that 
the state-business relationship does not disappear 
with multinationalisation. The giant company does 
not end its links with the state, but rather 
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multiplies the number of states -Sand capitalist 
networks - to which it is linked. !:J 
This tension between the state and international 
organisations applies to statistics. Neither are about 
to disappear, indeed, they are mutually reliant. Thus, 
the international publications, databases and studies of 
statistics from official bodies, rely in the main for 
their raw data on nation states. Conversely, in order to 
compete effectively on world markets states need to be 
able to assess those markets in internationally 
comparative terms, they themselves could not necessarily 
obtain meaningful and comparable information without 
official international organisations. 
~ Conclusions on the Modern Statistical Revolution 
We set ourselves the task of establishing a historical 
understanding of the origins and logic of the modern 
statistical revolution, and the uncontroversial 
observation that statistics has expanded prolifically 
the past two centuries. 
The literature survey and historical discussion lead us 
to say three things about the modern 
revolution. Firstly, we identified two 




arithmetic and the birth of the modern nation-state 
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(particularly in revolutionary France). Secondly, we 
identified various connections in the international 
development of statistics in the realm of the 
intellectual climate, state-formation (mercantilism, 
war, absolutism, professionalisation of the 
bureaucracy), class (liberal reform, social background 
and attitude of statisticians) and the spread of 
capitalist relations of production (transformations ln 
the quantification, accounting, and planning of economic 
activity). Thirdly, we characterised the origins of the 
statistical revolution as being an aspect of the epoch 
of European bourgeois revolution. 
From that starting point we established the centrality 
of the role of the state in the production of 
statistics. However, the expansion of statistics in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century cannot be explained 
with reference to the state alone. Understanding the 
contours of the development of the world economy is 
essential. In this regard the aspects of statistical 
measurement multiplied with the widening functions of 
the state and was accelerated by professionalisation of 
the state bureaucracy. However, statistics in the course 
of the twentieth century were no longer limited to the 
nation state. They assumed an international dimension. 
Despite, this internationalisation, statistics 
has 
retained a seemingly inseverable link with the state. 
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Therefore statistics, whilst effectively monopolised by 
the state, are not simply a function of state 
development, they are also conditioned by wider economic 
and social development. 
The current trends of the economic system do not seem to 
have diminished the role of statistics with prolonged 
economic stagnation and crises. Indeed, in a number of 
senses, statistics are more important than at the height 
of the vogue for bureaucratic planning and keynesianism. 
Despite the crisis the statistical revolution continues. 
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Chapter Two: The Origins and Development of 
Unemployment 
This chapter deals with the development and origins of 
unemployment. The timing and causes of unemployment can 
shed light onto the process of development or the logic 
of unemployment. The origins of unemployment are found 
to be rooted in the development of industrial capitalism 
with the generalisation of wage labour, the increasing 
division of labour and the cyclical pattern of 
accumulation. Where the pattern of unemployment is 
concerned, particular attention needs to be paid to the 
role of women. Secondly, we aim to investigate the 
ideological aspect to the construction of the idea of 
unemployment and the paradox of the late 
conceptualisation of unemployment. Thirdly, state 
intervention into the labour market is considered as its 
role is fundamental to the social construction of 
unemployment. These issues, the economic and social 
origin of unemployment, it's ideology and the role of 
the state within its development, are considered in 
order to proceed to the next stage of our study, an 
attempt to apply this theoretical framework to 
contemporary Western Europe. 
The labour process underwent a series of crucial changes 
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in the making of industrial capitalism. The predominant 
form of labour became waged work. Even though this form 
of labour relation had existed from antiquity it 
acquired an increasingly important role from the 
seventeenth century within Western Europe. Here, wage 
labour outstripped agricultural small holding and urban 
self-employment. Consequently, today the labour market 
is conventionally divided into three categories 
inactive, employed, and unemployed, categories 
corresponding to generalised wage-labour. These 
categories are presented as objective universal criteria 
and, implicitly at least, as timeless categories. 1 
But unemployment in particular has neither existed 
forever, nor is it an universally applicable and 
unambiguous category. We cannot therefore take the 
history of unemployment for granted. Indeed, the 
historical construction of unemployment is dialectically 
linked to the statistical process in the 'invention' of 
measured unemployment. 
2.1 The Historical Development of Unemployment -- -
Most histories of unemployment agree that unemployment 
as we know it today arose out of the emergence of 
industrial capitalism. 2 However, a simple acceptance of 
73 
this notion would skip an important part in the process 
of understanding unemployment. Unemployment was linked 
to the development of modern wage labour. Feudal and 
slave relations of production became eclipsed by wage 
labour with the rise of capitalism. It is the 
characteristics of generalised wage labour which gave 
rise unemployment. However, the existence of wage labour 
itself is not sufficient to explain unemployment, 
therefore we need to consider the case of pre-industrial 
wage-labour. It was the particular manner in which wage-
labour under industrial capitalism separated work from 
non-work which was crucial to the emergence of 
unemployment. In the 1960s social historians scrutinised 
this separation. As E.P. Thompson described it, time was 
no longer one's own with the expansion of wage-labour. 
Work evolved from being task-oriented to time-oriented 
and time-disciplined. This defined the boundaries of 
work and non-work in a manner that never previously 
existed. 3 The point was also made by K.Thomas in his 
study of work and leisure in pre-industrial societies. 
Here the distinction between work and leisure is 
not one which is easy to draw. Life in such a 
world follows a pre-determined pattern in which 
work and non-work are inextricably confused ..... 
Work is not regulated by the clock, but by the 
requirements of the task. It seems there are a 
number of respects in which the agrarian life of 
medieva7 Western Europe continued to disp7ay some 
of these more primitive features. The c70se 
re7ationship between the agricu7tural cyc7e and 
the 7 iturgica 1 year, with its b 7ess ings and 
processions s~ows the .association ~etween 
technique and r7tual was st717 very close, Just as 
do the ceremonies of the craft gui7d with their 
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oa ths and in it ia t ions. Work 
discontinuous, for the agrarian 
punctuated by the feasts of the church 
climatic reasons, virtually all 




industries had a seasonal character. 4 
However wage labour did precede industrial capitalism 
and so too did a social layer that lacked work. This 
layer widened between 1500-1800 with urbanisation and 
the social dislocations caused by wars, plagues, 
enclosure and famines. The social layer without work was 
of an indeterminate character as historians of the 
period concur. For a number of reasons this layer could 
not be quantified or neatly pigeon-holed into modern 
labour market categories. K.Snell identified the problem 
in his study of seasonal 'unemployment' in agriculture 
in Britain between 1690 and 1860. The dilemma for 
historians is that the lack of waged work did affect 
labourers' lives but clearly defined unemployment had 
not emerged. 
Historians working on the changes in the standard 
of living and real wage trends have acknowledged 
the importance and intractability of the problem 
of the changing level of unemployment. Questjons 
relating to the extent, regionality , and changes 
over time of yearly or seasonal unemployments have 
almost invariably been seen as unanswerable. 
This presents us with a fundamental conceptual problem -
how is it that wage labour was transformed with the rise 
of capitalism ? Or, what are the characteristics of 
unemployment that distinguish it from other forms of 
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non-work? 
Contemporary thought in pre-industrial societies 
considered that there was work for all those that sought 
it. But begging became widespread. From the seventeenth 
to nineteenth century the workhouse and physical 
punishment of able-bodied paupers was the growing 
response of municipal authorities in much of Western 
Europe. However, difficulties did exist in distinguish-
ing for the purposes of the Poor Law between the 
deserving and the undeserving poor. 
It has been estimated that in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and for most of the eighteenth 
centuries the labouring poor made up at least 50 
to 60 percent of the total population, and, at 
var ious times and places, the proport ion cou ld 
rise three quarters. The rea lly poor, those more 
or less permanent lyon re I ief and so be low the 
status of the wage-earner, constituted at anyone 
time between a quarter and a third of the 
population. But it has to be emphasised that in 
practice the distinction between the independeng 
labourer and the dependent pauper was never firm. 
Also, the evolution of wage-labour played a leading role 
in the prologue to unemployment. Wage-labour itself 
changed its character with the rise of industrial 
capitalism. However the internal nature of wage-labour 
was transformed over the centuries. Thus Perroy in his 
study of wage-labour in the middle ages in France, noted 
three features of wage labour then which were to be 
eroded over time. 7 
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Firstly, the wage itself often constituted only part of 
the remuneration by the employer, other aspects of 
payment might include lodging, food, wine, or payment ln 
kind. Secondly, wage-labour was mainly of seasonal 
character and restricted to certain trades, such as 
construction or grape-picking. Thirdly, the wage-
labourer was an elusive figure to the historian of the 
middle ages. Indeed, most wage-labourers also combined 
wage-labour with other forms of economic activity. 
Hence, Perroy concluded his study by connecting the 
three aspects of pre-modern wage-labour thus, 
Even granted that all these wages had a low 
purchasing value, we must not,conclude that their 
earners led a miserable life ... Material accounts 
tell us of the considerable amount of meat bought 
to feed the harvesters, and that was no doubt 
washed down with gallons of free wine. Besides 
none of these workers were regular wage earners 
and it would be a mistake to multiply their daily 
pay by the approximate number of working days in 
order to obtain t~e yearly earnings of 
agricultural labourers. 
Braudel made a similar point about early wage-labour and 
its relation to 'unemployment' which is indeterminate 
because of the partial nature of money wages and 
interconnection of work, non-work, leisure and the 
routine of life. 
The sources of wage movements are not as easy to 
analyse, nor as helpful as those for prices. The 
data for wages are not always to be trusted. Even 
more, it is hard to separate money wages clearly 
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from wages which are more than half lost in the 
barter economy. Few wages were paid completely in 
money.... A lthough wage rates were known, the 
number of days worked - and so the level of 
unemployment - is not. The change from the routine 
of life under the pre-industrial economies to the 
machine age regularly created difficult problems 
of adaptation, just because the regular notion of 
work was unknown or almost unknown up to that 
time, a s we I I as the I a c k 0 f wo r k and pub 1 i c 
holidays, we have to take into account 
unemployment because of the economic situation or 
because of the whims of the worker himself; or in 
more precise tegcms; the backward bending supply 
curve of labour. 
Custom not the working day governed the division between 
work and non-work. Festivals, saint lundi (long 
weekends), and workers choosing more leisure as wages 
increased, all confound our attempts to apply the modern 
concept of unemployment to wage-labour in pre-industrial 
society. 
The impact of the protracted crisis of feudalism (in 
particular during the fifteenth and seventeenth 
centuries) led to an uneven and complex pattern of 
social relations of production across Europe. The 
social structure of the seventeenth century was still 
dominated by the countryside. However, Europe was no 
longer divided into serfs and feudal lords. Goodman and 
Honeyman summed up some of the complexity and 
distinctions that were bequeathed by feudalism, 
France is the country of the peasant and seigneur; 
England of the tenant and absentee landlord; 
Holland of the independent farmer; southern Italy 
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of the sharecropper and Prussia of the serf and 
feudal lord. 1U 
Different areas of Europe had experienced different 
reactions to the crisis. Absolutism, or an intensifica-
tion of feudalism (the 'second serfdom' as it is 
sometimes called) or bourgeois revolution resulted from 
the positions, strategies and struggles of various 
classes throughout Europe. This affected the degree of 
commodification that took place within economic life. 
Kriedte described the resulting uneveness that emerged. 
There emerged a process of capitalist 
commercialisation. It took the form either of 
peasant cap ita I ism, I ike Ho lland, or of large 
sea Ie landowners cap ita I ism, I ike in Eng land. As a 
consequence, the feuda I mode of product ion began 
to disintegrate. East-Central and Eastern Europe, 
on the other hand, moved in the opposite 
direct ion. There the refeuda lisa t ion of agrar ian 
structures prevented the emergence of agrarian 
capitalism. It was only the agrarian reforms of 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which 
created the preconditions of what we might call 
the 'Pruss ian' variant on the path towards 
capitalism in the countryside. Its basis was the 
large-scale agriculturallinterprise which evolved 
from the Vorwerk system. 
It was from this starting point that industry and wage 
labour developed. The second point is that industry and 
market relations did not immediately give rise to wage-
labour as we would recognise it today, or, for that 
matter unemployment. Indeed, cities had grown ln the 
middle ages and trade and industry did develop through 
guild production. The rigid hold of the guild systems 
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weakened over time but their existence might explain the 
reason for the dynamic of industrialisation from around 
1600-1800 principally coming from the countryside. It 
was the combination of putting out systems, cheap 
underutilised labour, and growth in population that gave 
rise to rural industrialisation across Europe, in 
particular Western Europe. So wage labour and market 
relations not only developed in the countryside as well 
as the towns but so too did they in agriculture as well 
as industry. Kriedte explained how the two processes fed 
into each other. 
The more the process of specialisation advanced, 
the more the people who were captured by this 
process were under pressure to become dependent on 
the market. The more these same people were under 
pressure to concentrate their labour effort on 
production for a market, the less they were able 
to avoid covering a growing percentage of their 
needs through purchases on the market. The marki~ 
principle asserted itself; the markets expanded. 
In the course of the slow development of markets and the 
rise of capitalism, the nature of wage-labour was 
transformed as was the role it played in society. The 
partial nature of wage labour was gradually widened and 
in doing so it passed through various hybrid and 
transitory forms. I.Blanchard charted this process in 
relation to the mining industry in England from 1400-
1600. 13 At the beginning of this period the wage-
labourer (the 'professional miner') was marginal and 
the 'farmer-miner' dominated. By the Elizabethan age the 
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wage-labourer was in the ascendancy, the process was 
mediated by the hybrid, the 'cottar miner'. By this 
time, the farmer-miners had withered in numbers. Kumar 
noted the advanced nature of British wage labour early 
in the process of European capitalist development. 
Certainly, there is no question that wage labour 
was the predominant form of labour in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century in England ... 
Most workers, moreover, were dependent on wages 
for the essential part of their subsistence 
But we do nothing for the understanding of 
unemployment today by resurrecting the old 
sociological myth of a pre-industrial subsistence 
economy of self-emplof$d peasants and craftsmen 
at least for England. 
This process was mirrored in the development of proto-
industrialisation where aspects of wage-labour combined 
with features of craft production and pre-capitalist 
forms. Braverman focused on the role of the labour 
process in the development of capitalism, according to 
him, 
The early domestic and subcontracting systems 
represented a transitional form, a phase during 
which the capitalist had not yet assumed the 
essential function of management in industrial 
capitalism, control over the labour process; for 
this reason it was incompatible with the overall 
development of capitalist prod~5tion, and survives 
only in specialised instances. 
Proto-industrialisation had become widespread from 1650. 
It had spurred capitalist development in three senses. 
Firstly, it had expanded the numbers of propertyless 
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wage earners. Secondly, it had added to demographic 
pressures as work was put out to family units of 
production. Thirdly, although units of production were 
small capital accumulation did take place. Proto-
industrialisation was therefore responsible for the 
industrialisation of the European countryside. 
As time progressed the dependence upon wage labour 
increased not only in the towns but also in agriculture. 
However, important aspects of this still distinguished 
it from the modern proletariat. The most significant was 
that the mass of wage labour was based in the 
countryside. Again the complete erosion of the charact-
eristics that Perroy described of wage labour in the 
late middle ages had not yet been achieved. Hence by the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many families still 
combined agricultural and industrial waged work and 
small holding, piece rates were commonplace, the radical 
separation of town and countryside, work and non-work, 
and working and non-working populations had not taken 
place. This led De Vries to talk of a massive 'near 
proletariat' in Europe. 
In the social stratification attained by the end 
of the ancien regime both the guild system and the 
peasant agricultural sector have expelled vast 
numbers of people to call into being a large 
propertyless ( and nearly propertyless) class .... 
There are, after a", very poor artisans and 
marginal farmers. Indeed, a clear demarcation 
cannot be reasonably be made between marginal 
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farmers and 19roletarians: hence, ... the "near 
proletariat". 
Hence this near proletariat was by the time of the 
industrial revolution widespread throughout Western 
Europe and was key to the subsequent expansion of the 
cities. 
The rural proletariat was also very large: about 
40% of the French agricultural population at the 
end of the eighteenth century, with a higher 
proportion in England, and a higher proportion 
still in the 19w1ands of Northern, Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
This rural near proletariat as we have noted still had 
not assumed the characteristics of wage-labour under 
modern capitalism. Its urban counterpart too had swelled 
in numbers. 
A proletariat already had existed before the 
industrial revolution. The body of dependent 
artisans or journeymen in the towns had already 
constituted a part of the working population in 
many cases a large one. The number of wage 
earners in Paris in 1791 has been estimated at 
75,000, i.e. around 280,000 to 300,000 if we were 
to i9B'ude their wives and children - half the 
town. 
However, like those working for wages i n the 
countryside, the urban poor had decisively taken on the 
characteristics of future generations of wage labourers, 
dependent on work outside the home, on an employer for 
tools and income, separated from the countryside, with 
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its opportunities for petty commercial activity and 
family production. The development of the urban and 
rural near proletariat also laid the foundations for the 
rapid transition to a modern proletariat. 
Therefore, the social relations bequeathed by the anClen 
regime to industrial capitalism were contradictory. 
Patterns of landownership and wage-labour differed from 
one region to the next, and underwent different stages 
of development. A confusing picture emerged of trends 
and counter-trends with rural industrialisation, 
proletarisation of the countryside, urbanisation of 
population and industry, rural 
peasantisation of the countryside. 
deindustrialisation, 
However by the nineteenth century, two of the principal 
components we have established for the emergence of 
modern wage labour were flourishing, urbanisation and 
the factory. It is these features rather than 
technological advance or industrialisation which 
characterised the industrial revolution. The 'industrial 




change, but not from agricultural 
society. Charles Tilly explained 
to 
its 
The phrase the industrial revolution gives a 
misleading account of what changed. The account 7S 
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misleading because it emphasises technological 
changes, and draws attention away from the 
redeployment of capital. Nevertheless, the 
dramatic words signal that something drastic did 
happen in Europe during the nineteenth century. 
What was it? ... These changes amounted to an 
HimplosionH of industrial production into cj$ies, 
and its radical separation from agriculture. 
Proto-industrial stages of the merchant capitalist 
putting out to the spinner and the handloom weaver was 
replaced by factory production by the industrial 
capitalist. 20 
Indeed, the 'industrial revolution' combined rural 
deindustrialisation and the urbanisation of industry. 
This contradiction led to a new complexity of social 
relations. The factory itself did not dominate 
industrial production in Europe until the late 
nineteenth century. 
The 
Yet the move to factory production was less 
universal than it is commonly held to have been. 
In some industria 1 sectors and (especia "y) in 
some regions, home work, often part-time (i.e. as 
an extra to farming) continued t~lexist and has 
survived down to the present day. 
process of urbanisation again added to this 
uneveness, as is implied in the last quotation. The 
industrial revolution, in other words the urbanisation 
of industry, was of a partial character even if it was a 
Europe-wide phenomenon. 
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Inevitably this process of urbanisation was 
uneven. By the twentieth century 77% of the 
population of the UK, 56.1% of Germany, 41% of 
France, 40.5% of the Netherlands but only 22% of 
Switzerland and
2
21.5% of the population of Sweden 
were urbanised. 2 
Wage labour in the context of greater accumulations of 
capital required, and developed over time, control over 
the labour process by the employer. In the long run, as 
its suitability for a higher level of productivity and 
division of labour became clear, the modern workplace 
undermined the putting out and subcontracting systems. 
Despite this, the persistence of putting out should not 
be ignored. 23 
The factory revolutionised the nature of wage labour. 
Task-orientation was broken by time-discipline. This was 
not immediately achieved and took considerable efforts 
on the part of employers. The early factories, as 
Pollard described them, were characterised by a struggle 
to recruit a stable workforce, to impose intensive 
effort over the course of the working day through 
supervision, 
punctuality.24 
to achieve good attendance and 
The construction of unemployment as a specific labour 
market state therefore arose not as a consequence of the 
development of capitalism in general but as a result of 
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the particular development of industrial capitalism. 
What gave rise to the phenomenon? 
Essentially there are three sources of unemployment. A 
number of features of the economy of the nineteenth 
century in the industrially advanced nations gave rise 
to the existence of the distinctive phenomenon of modern 
unemployment. 
The first factor was the increasing division of labour. 
This was happening on a global scale, certain areas of 
the world were transformed into producers of raw 
materials such as the Southern States of America, India, 
Africa others into the 'workshops of the world'. It is 
in those areas that were advancing industrially that 
unemployment emerged. 
Domestically, the increasingly narrow division of labour 
cut work options. In earlier times people could find 
several sources of work, consumption or income in 
agricultural or commercial activities. M.Poire described 
the way in which a wider base of economic activities 
prevented or disguised unemployment. 
In agriculture and in a variety of different 
family enterprises in industry and commerce, 
market and household activities were so 
intermingled that the line between them was 
difficult to draw and adjustments to the 
variations in economic conditions were made 
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through changes in the distribution of time 
between various tasks .... In rural areas and small 
towns, workers frequently moved back and forth 
between their own farms and industrial employment 
in small enterprises with an ease and frequency 
that also ~5caped conventional measures of 
unemployment. 
The new methods that replaced them also signified a more 
rapid adoption of new technology, one consequence of 
which is the elimination of certain trades or skills due 
to mechanisation, one early example of this is the fate 
of the handloom weavers in Lancashire. 26 
The second was the cyclical pattern of capitalist 
accumulation which has been endemic to the world economy 
since about the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Previous to this the agricultural sector dominated the 
local economies, a poor harvest would rise food prices 
and thus reduce demand for manufactured goods. As a 
general rule, it was the harvest that dominated the 
character of business fluctuations. Wallerstein 
described the situation up to the industrial revolution 
thus, 
Unlike the period after the industrial revolution, 
fixed capital played a small role in the 
industrial economy and hence fluctuations in the 
national economy were not caused by excess 
capacity nor were they intensified by fluctuations 
of a capital goods industry. Fluctuations of 
credit also were less of a factor than later. 
Hence the prosperity of the home market was 
largely a function of harvest fluctuations ( 











From the mid-nineteenth century, the world economy 
developed a tendency to synchronise different parts of 
the globe along the lines of the business cycle. 28 1847 
and 1873 there were slumps general to the world economy. 
Periodic over-production, characteristic of the boom 
recession cycle, is the major source of unemployment. 
The final institution that has been posited as 
fundamental to the character of modern unemployment is 
the large firm. Integral to this, Salais et al identify 
the work contract as an important element in the 
institutionalisation of unemployment as it formalised 
the work relationship clarifying the link between 
employer and employee or the severance of that link. 
This not only seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
unemployment hit Germany and the United States the 
hardest in the Depression of the thirties but also 
Salais subjected French unemployment data to detailed 
examination and found that there was a strong 
correlation between areas dominated by bigger firms and 
unemployment and a correlation between urbanisation and 
unemployment. 
We understand why the number of homeworkers hardly 
fell between 1931 and 1936 and why the workforces 
of small establishments fell less than those of 
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large establishments in the same period. 
Fluctuations in the volume of work are more widely 
externa I ised as unemp loyment in large firms I 
translated as a more2y ignificant break between the employer and worker. 
Concentration has been a fact of life in industrially 
advanced countries for some time. In France, for 
example, in 1987 the top four companies account for more 
than 90 ~ o in the following industries coa 1 , sol i d 
minerals and coke, electricity, gas, tobacco, synthetic 
and man-made fibres, steel. 30 In Britain the share of 
the hundred largest firms in manufacturing output had 
moved from 16% in 1909 to 46% in 1970. 31 
The way in which this new division of labour came into 
effect has to be dealt with sensitively. The degree to 
which employment became dominated by Taylorism and the 
modern firm took place at different speeds between 
regions and industries. As this question is dealt with 
by Braverman, for example, we could be forgiven for 
believing that the forward march of Taylorism and the 
giant monopoly corporation was to inevitably spread to 
all branches of industry in all industrial countries, as 
the sole logic of modern capitalism. Reality is more 
complex. Even at the height of the so-called fordist 
phase there was an interconnection between those 
tendencies associated with fordism and other seemingly 
contradictory phenomena. 
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Firstly, this complexity operated between industries. 
Many economic activities were unsuited to concentrations 
of labour and capital: hairdressing, window cleaning and 
other personal services are a simple example. Secondly 
there are the cases were industries combined old systems 
of employment with new. Construction has always been 
dependent to a large extent on subcontracted labour. The 
garments industry, in terms of its concentrations of 
labour, has altered very little in the last century, it 
could be argued that apart from the retail and 
distribution activities it has more in common with the 
putting out system or family working than the fordist 
mode of employment. 
At the beginning of the century in France the 
average size of a production unit in the garment 
industry was 6 workers. Forty years later, 
according to the population census of 1946, the 
majority of the garment plants in the Parisian 
area employed fewer than five persons, most of 
them one or two only. There was a high proportion 
of plants for which the number of employed persons 
was not indicated and Klatzman associated it with 
reliance on homeworkers in this industry .... The 
average plant size is in Paris is now 9.8 workers. 
Other studies show a that the tendency is more 
towards dispersion and the creati~~ of many small 
units than towards concentration. 
However other forms, which slowed the emergence of 
unemployment (craft work, putting out and homework and 
the extended family) were eroded. Various studies have 
been made of hybrid forms of social production or 
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organisation of labour which delayed or disguised 
unemployed. One example was the tramping traditions of 
groups of artisans who would collectively subsidise the 
search for work. 33 Another was the 'penny capitalism' 
of many working class families. Penny capitalism 
signifies petty commercial, service and manufacturing 
activities undertaken in the black economy. 
Part-time penny capitalism was essentially 
defensive. It was one of the strategies adopted by 
working people to meet the immediate financial 
needs and cope with persistent, nagging poverty 
brought about by under- employment ... 
Consequently part-time penny capitalism was always 
most common amongst the most disadvantaged. Like 
petty crime, with which it is most often linked, 
it was typically the resort of women and3~hildren, 
the casually employed and the unskilled. 
It would certainly be nonsense to argue that the modern 
corporation and Taylorism didn't emerge as one of the 
most powerful tendencies shaping the labour market 
transforming even the newest and seemingly indivisible 
work processes such as computing but it has to be 
realised that even before we enter the crisis of 
seventies that there are substantial limitations 
constraining it due ultimately to the diversity of the 
labour process. 
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~ Women. the family and the development of modern 
wage-labour 
Modern categories of economic activity have shown to be 
inadequate in explaining the long run development of the 
relation of individuals to production. Essentially, they 
reflect the form of society within which they were 
constructed, that is, advanced capitalist society. 
However, another aspect which should be considered is 
gender. The question of gender poses particular problems 
to modern labour market categories and their 
quantification. 
Social relations of production contributed to the 
complexity of the origins of unemployment. We have 
demonstrated this by the previous section. From this 
starting point we can derive methodological insight in 
our approach to the case studies in the measurement of 
unemployment. We now know that the complexity of social 
relations across Europe was likely to give rise to 
unemployment more slowly or rapidly in some areas than 
others. 
However, this alone is unable to account for the 
totality of the experience of unemployment. Connected to 
the social relations of production are the social 
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relations of reproduction, or the role of women and the 
family. Generations of historians have approached the 
question of the family and the industrial revolution, 
and there is by no means a consensus. However, a 
discussion is necessary of the role of wage-labour, 
economic activity and women to understand unemployment 
from the point of view of the dominant form of 
interpersonal relationships under capitalism: the 
family. 
Discussion of participation rates in the transition to 
industrial capitalism, has centred especially on the 
changing economic position of women, and to a lesser 
extent children. There are two hypotheses what we might 
call a 'U' and 'JI hypothesis. The first argued that 
women were heavily involved in production before the 
transition and as a result of it were displaced from the 
economy, only to recover a significant level of economic 
participation by the middle decades of the twentieth 
century. The second hypothesis argued that industrialis-
ation opened up employment opportunities for women from 
the earliest times of protoindustria1isation and factory 
employment and that industrial society in the long term 
draws a greater and greater proportion of women into the 
economic participation. 
Without a clear definition of economic activity, or 
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without clarity about the issues raised by the problem 
of its definition, the door is opened to confusion. 
Conventional measures of activity centre on the notion 
of wage earning market activities. This presents 
difficulties when we consider the level of activity in 
the industrial revolution. 
Firstly, some non-market activities are not quantified 
or considered as part of activity; others are. Millions 
were engaged in subsistence agriculture nobody suggests 
that these should be considered economically inactive 
yet women engaged in household activities in the 
informal economy, washing, child-minding, clothes making 
and nursing are often ignored. Activity rate hypotheses 
should be aware of the question of non-market 
activities, to what extent was the labour of women and 
children necessary for production and the reproduction 
of labour power. 
In the transition of the pre-industrial economy to 
the world of the mid-twentieth century, women have 
been an inconstant proportion, a markedly variable 
component within the total labour force. This 
proposition, of course relates to the labour force 
as conventionally defined-tha 3S is the lncome earning part of the population. 
Secondly, the transition to industrial capitalism 
involved intermediate relations other than wage-labour. 
The role of women and the family within these inter-
mediary stages should not be ignored. Often the family 
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was the organising principle of work, in gu i 1 d 
production, peasant small holding, cottage industry and 
some commercial activity, such as shop-keeping. In 
cottage industry wages could be paid as piece rates to 
heads of households rather than as wages to individual 
workers. This was sometimes repeated in the factory or 
mine, where wages would be paid to the man who would be 
expected to engage members of his family.36 
Therefore our notions of long term activity rate 
evolution are contingent on definitional criteria. The 
danger is that we apply our notions of present economic 
activity into the past. Comparisons between the activity 
rate evolution of Britain of this era and the developing 
world of today should strike warning bells. By modern 
criteria, it is almost unquestionable that activity 
rates developed in line with the J-hypothesis. This is 
little more than self-fulfilling prophesy. If our 
criterion of activity is wage labour it is obvious that 
industrialisation brought an activity rate that 
progressively gathered pace throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. In this case, we cannot 
pretend that like is being compared with like. The 
relation of labour to land and capital, the sexual and 
age division of labour, the intensity of work define the 
specific historical contexts within which economic 
activity takes place. Distinctions need to be drawn 
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between factory production, domestic 
feudalism, and independent farming. 
manufacturing, 
Our contention is not that a long term thesis of 
increasing activity is not valid but it has to have a 
strong theoretical grounding. A major problem emerges in 
terms of regional diversity and commonalty in these 
transformations. The uneveness is apparent across Europe 
both in the pace of development but also in the 
localised combinations of contexts of production. 
This theoretical perspective is outlined in Figure 2.1 
which classifies women's work according to relation to 
the market, wage and mode of production. It demonstrates 
that various forms of work were significant at differed 
over time in activity classification and in intensity, 
discipline and non-work. 
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Table 2.1: Women and Economic Activity Categorisation 
Mode Period 
of work 
Typical occupations Characteristics 
of activity 
-----------------------------------------------------------------







durables, light engineering 






















child minding, laundry work irregular 

















a) Women, the family and the agricultural economy. 
In order to understand the evolution of women's work we 
shall break down the period of transition to industrial 
capitalism into agricultural, proto-industrial, and 
industrialised forms. Some historians argue that there 
was a rigid division of labour between the sexes before 
industrial capitalism. Shorter argued this point using 
evidence from seventeenth and eighteenth century France 
and Germany.37 The women were prescribed a series of 
tasks which were entirely their domain. This, in his 
example of a Basque woman, comprised of childrearing, 
cooking, cleaning, household accounts, wood gleaning, 
cottage industrial work, water-carrying, poultry, 
larding hay-tossing and weeding. It was only at harvest 
that partially broke down the segregation of tasks. 
Unlike Shorter, Hudson and Lee distinguished between 
different forms of ownership of the land. For Shorter 
there was no distinction made or acknowledged between 
feudal, subsistence and commercial land use. Hudson and 
Lee argued that the spread of commercial farming and 
agricultural labouring brought about a division of 
labour, but one that was far from as rigid as in 
Shorter's account. 
There were close ljnks between non-market gender 
roles and those whjch emerged wjth the development 
of commercjal farmjng, but commercjaljsatjon also 
produced patterns of restructurjng of the sex-
specjfjc djvjsjon of labour whjch varjed from one 
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region to another depending on the sorts of 
commercial crops, labour supply conditions and the 
availability of alternative work for women and for 
men. In medieval times the sexual division of 
labour in agriculture remained very flexible, 
partly because the prevalence of peasant 
landholding precluded extensive occupational 
specialisatj~n among the mass of the labouring 
population. 
Indeed Richards, again was of the opinion that the 
sexual division of labour was not as strict as otherwise 
thought. 39 
Historians also disagree over the intensity of work. 
Many historians are of the view that this period 
involved very high participation rate of the population 
as a whole, men, women and children. 
Nevertheless high participation rates for women 
(and indeed for children) in virtually all aspects 
of the economy may be the general characteristics 
of the underdeveloped, labour intensive, 
agriculture-dominated economy before about 
1750 .... It could hardly have been otherwise in an 
economy where in Stuart England between a quarter 
and a half of the active population were 
chronically below what con$5mporaries regarded as 
the official poverty line. 
Shorter agreed with this hypothesis. Subsistence as a 
fact of life compelled all hands into activity. However, 
Cunningham surveying reports from poor law commission-
ers, parishes, charity schools and schools of industry 
in Britain concluded that there was widespread 
underemployment of children. Opportunities that did 
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exist seemed to come from the emergence of cottage and 
factory manufacturing. 
As to agriculture, the evidence amounts to little 
more than plausible but undocumented references to 
scare-crowing and other tasks of a like kind, 
suggested that the employment of children was at 
most casual and intermittent; and this is 
confirmed by analysis of age of leaving home. 41 
The probability of widespread rural underemployment in 
the eighteenth century Europe undermines the notion of 
naturally high participation rates. Domestic industry 
began to offer opportunities for wage earning 
employment. 
b) proto-industrialisation. 
Proto-industrialisation had a profound effect on the 
economy which was dominated by agriculture; it paved the 
way for industrial domination. At its height it is 
estimated that employment in domestic industry accounted 
for a third of the rural population of Germany and 
France. It brought about radical changes in the 
employment and the extent of wage-earning. Opportunities 
opened up particularly for women and children as the 
wages were generally low. It soaked up rural under-
employment. The composition in the active population 
changed as did the sexual division of labour. In some 
areas it meant localised very high participation rates 
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for women. Lace-making in Bedfordshire, linen in 
Flanders or cotton-spinning in Auffay produced very high 
activity rates for women by the late eighteenth century. 
The ratio of female to male in the workforce might be as 
much as eight to one. Shorter noted that in the weaving 
villages of the Zurich uplands labour became non-gender 
specific, Hudson and Lee use the example of women 
cutlers and nailmakers in Germany to say very much the 
same thing. In Russia, extensive proto-industrialisation 
took place without any such changes in gender relations. 
Domestic industry was eventually superseded by factory 
production. However, the danger is that this process is 
telescoped. Although domestic industry was probably at 
its height in the 1830s it persisted in some industries 
up to the turn of the century. 
Given sectorial lags in mechanisation and the 
application of new technology, the dynamic of 
capitalist development in the nineteenth century 
tended to generate an increased emphasis on cheap 
production methods in the form of domestic 
outwork. Regions which were characterised by a 
rapid development of consumer goods industries 
dependent on non-mechanised, non-factory labour, 
as well as those where men's wages low (as in the 
eastern counties of England) or irregular (as in 
the case of dock-related employment), witnessed a 
dramatic rise in female domestic production. The 
number of women employed in this area was 
substantial, and always 4~uch higher than the 
official records indicate. 
Despite accepted wisdom, the proto-industrial economy 
ultimately didn't disappear but collapsed into 'modern ' 
homeworking and sweated labour. 
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In the period before the First World War 
homeworking was the subject of public 
investigation and legislation in the United 
States, in Britain and several countries in 
Western Europe. But then it became virtually 
invisible until the 1970s. EV$j now its existence 
is usually denied or ignored. 
It retains a number of characteristics in common with 
its predecessor. It often doesn1t involve the formal 
wage relation, as it relies on piece rates or unpaid 
family labour. Such industries evade the regulatory 
legislation (social security contributions, trade union 
rights, and health and safety standards) applied to the 
modern industry. 
The invisibility of homework was, and continued to 
be, constructed partly by the methods of 
collecting statistical data used by official 
bodies. Their methods of recording and measuring 
statistical economic activity not only allow but 
give credence to the belief that homeworking, if 
it exists at a", is an activity peripheral to the 
modern industrial economy .... This lack of 
statistical records is one of the symptoms of the 
dominant ideological constructions of work and 
production relations found on the common-sense 
lev~l and4~n the major theories of economics and 
soc7010gy. 
c) industrialisation. 
Industrialisation brought contradictory pressures to 
bear upon women1s activity. Certain industries attracted 
female labour such as the new textile factories. As 
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industrialisation gathered place industries tended to 
rely on mainly male workforces. Secondly, 
industrialisation put pressure on domestic industries 
reducing opportunities for female employment in the hand 
trades. In Britain, factory legislation was introduced 
to exclude women from certain industries. The rise of 
craft unionism guarded certain trades as a male preserve 
not to be 'diluted ' by lower paid female workers or 
other unskilled workers. The decline of women in the 
process of industrialisation was ineffectively 
counterbalanced by growth in domestic service. Richards 
argued that the growth in domestic service can be 
explained mainly in terms of the narrowing of other 
employment opportunities especially in agriculture and 
domestic industry.45 The new sexual division of labour 
was reflected in ideological terms by the Victorian cult 
of domesticity and the notion of the man being the 
breadwinner. 
Women were discouraged for ideological reasons from 
entering the labour market in greater numbers. However 
there has always been a gap between ideology and labour 
market reality, it is not enough to explain historical 
changes in women's labour market participation. 
To understand women in traditional 
must sharply distinguish between 
division of labour and the sexual 
roles, between 4gow one did, and 





how one was 
Ideology also interferes with the data that we receive. 
Persistent under-recording of women's work 
occurred because of the prejudices of the 
enumerators, male household heads and those who 
designed the schedules and reports. The British 
census of 1881, for example, excluded women's 
household manufacturing from the definition of 
those economically active and much seasonal and 
part-time work by women was not declared. 
It was a striking figure feature of the capitalist 
economy of Victorian Britain that something like 
one third of the potential labour force was not 
normally employed .... But for the overwhelming 
majority of women this particular benefit 
[employment outside the home] did not 4~ccrue 
until the middle of the twentieth century. 
Child birth and rearing can restrict women from economic 
activity. In the period of transition to capitalism the 
marrying age was largely the determinant of family size. 
Infant mortality was high, there was no effective 
contraception. 48 The effect of these circumstances is 
likely to have impeded married women from industrial 
wage labour. In fact, during the nineteenth century the 
majority of women who did work in industry were single. 
Domestic hand trades may have been more compatible with 
child care. When these began to decline many married 
women engaged in non-wage market activities, such as 
child-minding, laundry work, taking in lodgers and so 
on. The growth of education culminating in compulsory 
primary and secondary education alleviated the burden of 
looking after older children. More recently, women 
have been able exert greater control over child birth 
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through the extensive use of contraceptives. This has 
been of particular importance in the increase in women's 
activity rates since the second world war. 
Indeed, it is the considerable 'inactivity' by women of 
the nineteenth century that is the cause of the 
controversy over the long term activity rates. For some, 
women's activity, which had increased during proto-
industrialisation, stagnates then declines with 
industrialisation. Others argue that high levels 
of pre-industrial activity gave way to a reduction of 
women's employment only to be corrected in the mid-
twentieth century. 
In reality, it is necessary to distinguish between 
different forms of activity and the characteristics 
particular to each form. Using this method we can avoid 
some of the problems discussed at the previously arising 
from the transformation of wage labour and the market to 
the world of work. 
As we have demonstrated, the importance of the role of 
women and the family is undeniable to the construction 
of unemployment. As in the historically intermediary 
stage in the development towards modern capitalist 
production, women continue to engage in intermediary 
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forms of activity which do not fit into the norm of 
modern wage labour. In so much as this is true then the 
relationship between unemployment and the family is of 
real significance. The fact that the burden of childcare 
and rearing rest on women mean that there has been 
pressure on women to be more home centred than men. As 
we noted, one of the aspects of modern wage labour was 
the separation of home and workplace. With the 
persistence of privatised childcare this separation can 




forms of intermediary wage or market activities 
and will be taken up by women. This limits the 
to which the modern norm of alienated 
labour, and thus the basis for unemployment, can 
wage 
be a 
universal condition within capitalist society. These 
forms of activity have obviously varied and will vary in 
the future. The state can make moves towards the 
socialisation of childcare through maternity and nursery 
provision or schooling. Crisis can make the intermediary 
forms of activity attractive cheap alternatives to wage 
labour. 
The pattern of social and economic development across 
Europe was not regular or uniform, but of kaleidoscopic 
complexity. The objective criterion for the emergence of 
unemployment, the transformation of wage labour by 
capital accumulation, the factory and the town occurred 
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in uneven manner. The implications of this are twofold: 








suggests that an 
of the origins of 
unemployment requires a comparative study of 
unemployment within Europe which must incorporate an 
appreciation of the process of modern economic and 
social development. Historically, two tendencies are at 
odds with each other, that is, the tendency towards the 
generalisation of wage labour, and conversely the 
counteracting tendency, the persistent partial 
transformation to modern generalised wage-labour. 
Finally, we need to consider the subjective level. 
Unless it has achieved a certain ideological or 
institutional maturity unemployment cannot be measured, 
it cannot be part of public debate and consciousness. It 
would be a mistake to ignore or gloss over the 
subjective or ideological-institutional aspect of 
unemployment, indeed, this is fundamental to its 
historical development, particularly when we consider 
that the definition and ideology of unemployment has 
been so hotly contested. We are therefore drawn to the 
conclusion that unemployment was born out the 
objective 
and, at 
conditions of modern capitalist 




contested and defined. It had to be fixed in the 
consciousness of men and women, in other words, it needed 
to come to ideological maturity. But the 
conceptualisation of unemployment poses us with a 
paradox. Generalised industrial wage-labour, the 
division of labour and the cycle of accumulation 
preceded the conceptualisation of unemployment. The 
manner in which the ideology lagged behind material 
reality needs explanation and in this process we can 
draw conclusions about the ideology of unemployment in 
general. 
2.3 Ideological Origins :the Late Conceptualisation of 
Unemployment 
Unemployment gestated as an idea for a long period, it 
took decades to enter common discourse. Eventually, it 
became a statistical category. Ideologically, this 
required a transformation in social attitudes to being 
out of work . 
... The conviction that to live by the sweat of 
one's brow was the fate of humankind after Adam's 
fall was ingrained. Since a society that did not 
need the labour of everyone seemed beyond the 
imagination, it followed that an idle person ~~s 
not so much mora"y inadequate but anti-social. 
This was expressed at the level of economic theory by 
109 
Say's Law which stated that output creates its own 
demand. Logically speaking then, unemployment should not 
ex i st. 50 For th is and other reasons, the idea of 
unemployment was ideologically resisted by those in 
favour of the capitalist development. Raymond Williams 
described this state of affairs in the nineteenth 
century, commenting on the argument between Young and 
Thompson on the linguistic existence of unemployment, 
Clearly the modern sense of unemployment depends 
on its separation from associations of idle,. it 
describes a social situation rather than a 
persona I condit ion (id leness). There has been a 
steady resistance to this necessary distinction . 
.. The resistance is still active, and in relation 
to the words is especially evident in the use of 
idle, in news reporting, to d5]cribe workers laid off, locked out or on strike. 
Indeed, the late conceptualisation of unemployment is 
remarkable. 
It was not until the mid-1890s that unemployment came 
into general use in the English language and the French 
word chomeur, meaning someone who is unemployed was a 
creation of the 1870s. 52 Obviously unemployment preceded 
its official recognition, the delay can perhaps be 
explained by the continued existence of old ideas about 
work and idleness. 
In the French census unemployment was not recorded until 
1896. 
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In 1891, [the previous census] the unemployed did 
not constitute a specific category, neither in 
those 'without occupation' of which they were a 
component, called the 'acrobats, bohemians, 
vagabonds and prostitutes' nor in the 
'unclassified population', an undifferentiated 
mass for which gje statistician could only give a 
general figure. 
In the British census of 1881 the 'unoccupied class ' was 
not an equivalent to unemployment or a even partial 
recognition of the phenomenon. The 'unoccupied ' , 
were managing their estates and property; 
directing charitable institutions; prosecuti~g 
literary or scientific researches, or engaged 7n 
other of the multifarious channels by which unpaid 
energy finds vent. If these were deducted from the 
182,282 unoccupied males, and a further deduction 
were also made for those who were incapacitated 
for work by physical defects, the remainder, 
constituting the really idle
S4
Portion of the 
community, would be very small. 
In the USA, it wasn't until the 1910 census that 
enumerators were instructed on the question of the 
unemployment, and even then it was not quantified. 
On the other hand, persons out of employment when 
visited by the enumerator may state that they have 
no occupation, when the fact is they have an 
occupation, but merely happen to be idle or 
unemployed at the time of the visit. In such cases 
the return shouldSSbe the occupation when the 
person is employed. 
Clearly, if unemployment was to be recognised this 
'common sensei had to be challenged. The task of doing 
this was enhanced by the existence of working class 
organisation which became generalised to the industrial 
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world at around the period we are talking about. Working 
class consciousness, protest and organisation could 
challenge the accepted notions of work in society. 
Indeed this can be illustrated by a number of points. 
Firstly, the first statistics of unemployment in Britain 
were collected by trade unions which organised insurance 
funds for their members when they were laid off. 
Secondly, Keyssar, in his study of unemployment in 
Massachusetts, pointed to the connection between the 
understanding of unemployment as a social problem with 
the demonstrations, protests and 
unemployed. 56 The right to work was 
rioting of the 
one of the demands 
made during the French revolution of 1848 which lead to 
the establishment of the national workshops. M.L?nglan 
argued that working class militancy over the issue of 
unemployment and the Right to Work campaign in 
particular was a spur to action for the Board of Trade 
in Britain to recognise and act on the issue in the late 
nineteenth century.57 
Thirdly, as E.P.Thompson noted the modern word, 
unemployment, emerged in the 1820s and 1830s ln the 
trade union, radical and Owenite writing even though as 
yet it had not entered the discourse of the early 
Victorian reformers. 58 The acceptance of unemployment 
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as a social problem coincided with the emergence of mass 
socialist parties in a number European countries and the 
political threat they represented. In Britain for 
example, the Board of Trade, 
... now sought to use the labour bureaucracy to 
integrate the working class as a whole around 
unemployment measures. Second were the swelling 
ranks of socialists, organised in the Independent 
Labour Party and the Social Democratic Federation 
(sic). Their increasing influence on all sections 
of the working class was viewed with panic by the 
dominant classes. Local links between the ILP and 
the SDF proliferated, especially on the issues of 
unemployment and the demand for work. Strikes and 
demonstrations displayed a militant challenge both 
to the established order and to the authority 5~f 
the trade union leaders over the working class. 
'The European socialist parties as a whole espoused ideas 
that criticised the status quo and attempted an 
alternative explanation of the working of society and 
the economy. Marx's economic analysis of capitalism 
played perhaps the most important role here. Marx had 
argued in volume one of Capital that a relative surplus 
population is a condition of modern industry. Without 
this condition rapid expansion could not take place, it 
is an essential condition of accumulation but also it 
acts as a threat to the worker, who could be replaced by 
lower paid or less skilled groups from the reserve army 
i.e. women, youth, or immigrants. 
The indus tr ia 1 reserve army, dur ing per iods of 
stagnation and average prosp~rity, ~eighs down the 
active army of workers; dur7ng per70ds of over-
production and feverish activity, it .puts a curb 
on their pretensions. The relat7ve surplus 
113 
population is therefore the background against 
which the law of supply and demand does its work. 
It confines the field of action of this law to the 
limits absolutely convenient 53 capital's drive to 
exploit and dominate workers. 
In his discussion of 'The Discovery of Unemployment' 
Garraty argued that in, 
.. his reserve army thesis, Marx put the question 
of unemployment in a new context. Whether they 
blamed the joblessness on the laziness or 
incompetence of the idle, or on society, or on 
fate, earlier writers had treated the problem as 
an aberration. Marx saw unemployment as an 
entirely normal and necessary aspect of 
capitalism, and once examined, his view of the 
role of the industrial reserve army seemed self-
evidently correct ..... The broad effect of his 
argument, therefore, was to increase the 
willingness of people to tolerate unemployment, or 
better, the effect was to channel the efforts of 
those troubled by the human and social costs of 
unemployment into trying to lessen its effects 
rather than into attempting 51e apparently 
impossible task of eliminating it. 
This perhaps overstated the importance and influence of 
Marx on contemporary debates, but what it points to is 
the way in which he profoundly challenged existing 
attitudes to unemployment. The notion of a reserve was 
taken up by the influential liberal reformer Charles 
Booth in his 'Life and Labour of the People of London' 
of 1902 and by the unorthodox liberal J.A.Hobson. 
Booth's work was significant because it viewed 
unemployment as a social problem - one that was morally 
degenerating but which was not simply reducible to 
personal character. He divided the working class into 
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categories according to levels of skill, regularity of 
work and moral standards. At one end of the scale was 
the respectable working class engaged in regular skilled 
work whose opposite was the unskilled, casual labourer 
infected with criminality and alcoholism. Irregular 
work, casual labour and bouts of unemployment, 
classically associated with the East End of London, 
threatened to blur the divisions within the working 
class; unemployment if it spread to the respectable 
working class would have a deteriorating effect on the 
morality and quality of labour. Booth proposed labour 
colonies which had already been established in Belgium 
and Switzerland to resolve the problem. 
Booth's central objective was to restore a clear 
demarcation between the residuum and the 
respectable working class. If the residuum were 
isolated, the discipline of the labour market 
could be relied upon to preserve the 
respectability of the rest. He thus recommended 
that class B be removed to labour colonies where 
it would be isolated from the labo~2 market and 
from the active working population. 
Beveridge subsequently adopted Booth's definition of the 
working class and unemployment. However in these pre-
1914 debates unemployment was conceptualised in a much 
narrower fashion than it would be after 1918. A 
consensus emerged that unemployment was a problem 
principally concerned with casual labour. Beveridge's 
solution of decasualisation therefore flowed from this 
understanding. In the inter-war period even though 
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casual labour certainly did not disappear the spotlight 
shifted to the staple industries that were suffering 
unemployment. 
Ideological reasons alone could not account for the 
existence of unemployment, but without the ideological 
challenge the notion of unemployment and the statistical 
category could not have emerged. 
Indeed, even during the thirties the concept of 
unemployment was confused. By this time governments 
generally counted unemployment. Most had some kind of 
social insurance. However, the figures were not 
comparable internationally and the International Labour 
Organisation complained repeatedly about this during the 
thirties. Government estimates would often be 
contradicted by census figures. 
The depression years of the 1930s made unemployment the 
most important economic and political issue of the day. 
It rose to heights never before imagined. But still much 
of the economlC orthodoxy of the time denied that 
unemployment was inherent to the system, believing that 
it was an aberration. The two leading British economists 
on the subject Beveridge and Pigou both were of this 
opinion. 63 According to their approach, wages were too 
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high and thus priced workers out of jobs. The economy 
tended naturally to an equilibrium of supply and demand 
for goods and services through the price mechanism thus 
bringing a general equilibrium to the economy. The 
continued existence of neo-classical ideas ideologically 
impeded the development of unemployment as a mature 
statistically consistent category. Analysis neither 
focused on the business cycle or on the possibility of 
generalised disequilibrium having deeper causes than a 
limited wages fund. 
The 'Keynesian Revolution' was the ideological broom 
with which the debris was swept aside. A number of 
economists rejected the neo-classical approach to 
recession. Keynes' followers argued that recessionary 
crises were the result of under-consumption. Therefore 
government stimulation of the economy could counter the 
effects of slump. Indeed, Kahn argued the government 
borrowing not only could encourage recovery but also had 
a 'multiplier effect' so that the impact of government 
spending in time of economic lull was magnified by those 
very conditions. 
J.A.Hobson, writing 
first developed an 
unemployment, but he 
Underconsumptionism was not new. 
at the turn of the century, had 
under-consumptionist approach to 
was considered a heretic. The most 
important work in this tradition was Keynes' General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money published in 
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1936. The 'Keynesian Revolution' accorded a number of 
statistical categories an importance that was 
unanticipated. Unemployment, national product, inflation 
were now key indicators which allowed the management of 
an economy through co-ordinating interest rates and the 
balance of government spending. 64 Recessions could be 
averted by government budget deficit-spending. Whether 
or not this theory was successful or consistently 
implemented is disputable. What is clear is that it led 
to governments taking statistical indicators more 
seriously, in particular mesasured unemployment. 
The third ideological source of unemployment and its 
recognition was institutional. Several institutional 
forms evolved which defined the development of 
unemployment. The social insurance of the unemployed was 
initiated in many cases by self-organisation of workers, 
through trade unions or through co-operative societies. 
Unemployment insurance provided an obvious method by 
which unemployment could be drawn out of the uncertainty 
of a debate clouded by ideological concerns and economic 
convention into daylight of quantification. Increasingly 
unemployment insurance systems were taken over as a 
responsibility of the state. 
In Britain the first unemployment insurance scheme was 
introduced in 1911. It was extended in 1920 as a 
118 
compulsory system involving all workers except those in 
domestic or agricultural work. 
Often labour exchanges developed alongside social 
insurance. Germany was the most advanced . this , n 
respect, by the 1890s every major city had a labour 
exchange. In the early years of the century, 
governments established labour exchanges in other parts 
of Western Europe, in Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and 
Norway. In France by 1904 an estimated million jobs a 
year were 
government, 
filled by exchanges that were run by 
union, and private sector. 65 By 1925 there 
were 15 national unemployment-insurance schemes. 
Of course the sources of unemployment are connected. 
Institutional structures are established due to economic 
changes, those economic changes create an industrial 
working class dependent solely on wage labour and so on. 
However, unemployment did not emerge as a coherent 
concept except through a process of ideological and 
institutional contingency. 
We can locate the origins of unemployment with the rise 
of industrial capitalism. This is not simply a question 
of semantics. Unemployment can either have broad or 
narrow definitions. In the sense of a narrow definition, 
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for example the ILO definition only came to make sense 
in the context of a developed labour market. Even if we 
broaden our definition, unemployment cannot be projected 
back into pre-capitalist history. It was the radical 
separation of work and non-work, home and workplace, 
industry and agriculture, town and country, the direct 
producers and the means of production, that the 
industrial revolution brought, which gives unemployment 
its meaning. Unemployment did not therefore explain the 
experience of the poor nor the logic of production . 1 n 
pre-capitalist Europe. It is only if the notion of 
unemployment is stretched to breaking point, to mean the 
undersupply of work, that it can be applied to pre-
capitalist economy. Obviously, this is too loose a 
definition of unemployment; it robs unemployment of its 
historical essence, the dynamic that we have established 
in the emergence of the phenomenon. 
2.4 How has the State affected the labour force since 
1800? 
It may not seem obvious' at first sight but state action 
in the labour market is crucial to the discussion of 
unemployment measurement. Regulation of the labour 
market by the state and official labour market policies 
has an impact on the definition, characteristics and 
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measurement of employment and unemployment. 
The nature of this regulation has to be explored on 
three levels. Firstly, the historical process has to be 
examined by which the state began to regulate the modern 
labour force. Secondly, account has to be taken of the 
comparative dimension which allows us to assess the 
extent and limits of the welfare state and locate its 
importance as a determinant of the economic process. 
Thirdly, our study has to gauge the relationship between 
the state and labour market categories in statistical 
and historical terms. 
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Effect upon the Labour Force 
takes children out of LF, where 
persists informalisation; 
rises productivity of labour 
through education; 
undermines use of cheap labour 
by capital; 
confirms/defines sexual division 
of labour; 
reinforces family and 
homecentredness of women, 
component of life cycle of 
other family members; 
informalises areas of women's 
work; 
limits physical deterioration 
involved in work process; 
improves long term productivity 
of labour; 
defines work day as a unit of 
labour allows comparability; 
attempt to create labour market 
of free wage labour, but leaves 
poor and an undifferentiated mass 
(as 3.above) differentiates 
ill from the mass of urban 
poor. 
differentiates old from the mass 
of urban poor; 
begins to take old out of the 
labour force, defines age limits 
of the labour force; 
differentiates the unemployed 
from the mass of urban poor, 
defines unemployment; 
universalises the components 
established in period of social 
insurance; 
process of differentiation 
of life cycle strengthened. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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II The Poor Law - -
The first aspect of state legislation that has had an 
enormous impact on the labour market has been the 
treatment of poverty and the poor. The Poor Law was the 
generalised form of relief in Western Europe from the 
early sixteenth century. It could take two forms indoor 
(i.e. the workhouse) and outdoor relief. It was 
administered on at the level of local government or the 
parish. The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Britain which 
aimed to abolish outdoor relief was an attempt to force 
people into waged work in the labour market. Outdoor 
relief had allowed some to rely on casual, seasonal 
agricultural work which accounted for continued labour 
shortages 
of outdoor 
in industrial areas. The Speenhamland system 
relief, which had operated in parts of 
Britain, paid recipients according to family size so 
that for many families the margin between wage and 
relief was small. The stigma of the workhouse, segmented 
by sex and age, made indoor relief punitive in 
character. Such restrictions were made to establish a 
modern labour market of mobile wage-labourers but they 
were ultimately incompatible with the new dynamics of 
poverty created by that very labour market. The 
workhouse remained as a stick to beat workers into the 
factories, but, it had to be complemented by the last 
resort of outdoor relief. 
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Poor relief was only given after task work had 
been completed in the labour or stone yard of the 
workhouse. The labour test was an acknowledgement 
that the workhouse was inapplicable to the 
conditions of industrial recession, since the 
number of male applicants would have exceeded the 
capacity of the workhouse to give indoor relief. 
By 1852 the prohibition of outdoor relief to 
able-bodied men in urban agd industrial areas had 
effectively been abandoned. 5 
In Germany, home town qualification eligibility had to 
be abandoned as it encouraged unwanted rigidity in the 
labour market. 
Paupers traditionally had been eligible for relief 
only in their "home town"- defined primarily by 
birth or marriage- and many German states retained 
the home town principle until well into the age of 
capitalist industrialisation. The "Pruss ian" Poor 
Law was significant in conjunction with the 
appearance of a national labour market, since the 
needy unemployed were often those who had arrived 
from "outside" in search of work and had no local 
support networks. By making relief available 
almost universally within the Empire, the Poor Law 
facilitated worker's geographical mobility and 
helped employers re&~in their core labor force 
during slack periods. 
Initially then, the state in countries like Britain and 
Germany attempted to mould existing institutions of 
poverty relief to the interest of creating an industrial 
labour force. 
Ql Factory Legislation 
The first steps states took in attempting to regulate 
the modern labour market was factory legislation. This 
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was not simply true of the first industrial nation, 
Britain, factory legislation predated other forms of 
social policy in most industrialising countries. 
However, if we compare, the development of factory 
legislation in Britain and France with that of Japan or 
Russia it is clear that a process that took several 
decades for the first industrial states is compressed in 
their later competitors. The prohibition of chi 1 d 
labour under the age of twelve came in Russia's first 
factory law, in Britain it came ninety nine years after 
the Apprentices Act. 
Factory legislation was a means by which the employment 
of women and children was restricted with a view to 
keeping the working class family together. This was 
objected to by those who employed large amounts of women 
and children particularly in the textile mills, and some 
successfully evaded the legislation or at least the 
earlier acts. The motivation behind the legislation is 
often seen in terms of concern about the conditions of 
the labouring poor from reformers such as Shaftesbury. 
Thus, until very recently at any rate, in the 
majority of interpretations offered of 'decline of 
la issez-fa ire I it was sti 11 changing currents of 
articulate opinion and sentiment which figured 
most prominently, and the names which were most 
frequently encountered were those of the 
intellectual heroes themselves - Bentham, John 
Stuart Mill, Owen, Kingsley, Southey, T.H.Green, 
- or men such as Chadwick or Lord Shaftesbury who 
were treated as being virtual incarnations of a 
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philosophy. The way in which any discussions of 
changing economic and social structure of Britain 
entered into such accounts was usually as a kind 
of backdrop against which the thought and actions 
of these giants could be displayed. 58 
But their concerns were contradictory, on the one hand 
they were appalled by the reports of the factory 
inspectors and poor law commissioners, but on the other 
they were hostile to working class organisations and 
struggle. Through reforms, they hoped for an abstemious, 
literate, healthy, hard working and consenting poor. The 
family was thought to be a central mechanism for 
establishing this. Conditions in Britain at the time 
were believed to be forcing the working class family 
apart with unregulated factories employing women and 
children, unsanitary conditions, high infant mortality 
rates and the threat of the workhouse. 
Great Britain's population had doubled in the 
first half of the nineteenth century and the rate 
of growth of many urban areas was even higher; the 
inhabitants of Leeds and Birmingham increased 
threefold; Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool 
fourfold; and Bradford eightfold. The impact of 
this demographic revolution on very limited water 
supplies, drains and sewers was to produce an 
overcrowded, unsanitary urban g~vironment with 
appallingly high mortality rates. 
These laws went some way towards the legal establishment 
of the concept of 'male as breadwinner' nuclear family. 
Consequently, the participation of married women, though 
subject to important regional and occupational 
differences, would be very low in the formal wage labour 
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section of the economy for the next century in Britain 
and in other countries that followed at a later date. 
Therborn has theorised this aspect of social policy 
arguing that it is derived from the state's need to 
ensure the reproduction of the worker's life and 
labour. 70 The state needs to ensure a life-cycle of 
workers within which the productive years are only one 
aspect. The others, child birth and rearing, childhood 
(and education), unemployment, and old age, have an 
impact on the productive years. Unless the authorities 
can stabilise this life-cycle the productive capacity 
or potential of the working class will be adversely 
affected. Indeed Polyani, as Marx had earlier, went 
further in this regard arguing that the emerging factory 
system, without state regulation, 'would have physically 
destroyed man and destroyed his surrounding environment 
into a wilderness,.71 If the state does in fact aim to 
regulate this life cycle in the modern labour market 
through social policy, then, factory legislation 1S 
historically the first method by which it attempts to do 
so. The principal concern of early factory legislation 
was the employment of children. 
The extensive use of child labour had two damaging 
affects on the life cycle of labour from the point of 
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view of the state. Firstly, it was a means by which 
employers could stay in the market without introducing 
new technology and without high levels of investment 
because of cheap child labour. The state has an interest 
in aiding the most technologically advanced section of 
the economy in the interests of international 
competition and growth. As Marx put it, 
It is evident that the British Parliament, which 
no one will reproach with being excessively 
endowed with genius, has been led by experience to 
the conclusion that a simple compulsory law is 
sufficient to enact away all the so-called 
impediments opposed by the nature and restriction 
of the working day. Hence the introduction of the 
Factory Act into a given industry, a period of 
six to eighteen months is fixed within which it is 
incumbent on the manufacturers to remove all 
technical impediments to the act ... But though the 
Factory Acts thus artificially ripen the material 
elements necessary for the conversion of the 
manufacturing system into the factory system, yet 
at the same time, because they make it necessary 
to layout greater amount of capital, they hasten 
the decline of smal}2 masters, and the 
concentration of capital. 
Secondly, child labour becomes a fetter upon improved 
educational attainment and therefore, in the long run, 
on the productivity of labour. Ultimately, what tends to 
happen is that the prohibition of child labour and the 
development of compulsory education converge until a 
point emerges when the age restriction of working 
coincides with the leaving age of compulsory education. 
Often factory legislation itself contained an 
educational element as with the educational test in the 
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French 1892 Factory Law or the education clauses of the 
British Factory Acts. 
The effect of the prohibition of child labour and the 
extension of compulsory education was to alter the 
nature and definition of the working population. Modern 
definitions of economic activity exclude children, 
activity rates are measured amongst the population 
between 15-65 years. One element of the life cycle of 
the modern labour force was formalised through these two 
measures. This perhaps was the first way in which state 
regulation defined the labour force. Child labour, which 
was widespread in previous generations, was eliminated 
despite difficulties and reluctance . 1 n enforcing 
legislation in its early days. Factory legislation was 
the pioneer of social policy in general and of state 
labour market regulation in particular. However factory 
legislation, particularly in its latter stages, came to 
define the limits of activity of all employees through 
the regulation of the working day. Not only then was the 
working population defined as a result of factory 
legislation, but so too were the characteristics of 
workers' activity. Consequently, at least in part, when 
we talk of economic activity we can be beginning to be 
comparing like with like. The working day and week 
becomes regulated and thus we are dealing with more 
meaningful and comparable units of quantification. 
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£1 The Era of Social Insurance 
The era of social insurance began with the Bismarckian 
reforms of the 1880s in Imperial Germany. Sickness 
insurance, industrial compensation, old age and sickness 
pensions were introduced through three major pieces of 
legislation so that by 1890 12 million workers were 
covered by the first two schemes. 73 Other capitalist 
states followed suit and introduced similar legislation. 
However, classical economics favoured a laissez-faire 
attitude from the state. This contradiction between 
policy and ideas is the source of controversy as regards 
the origins of the welfare legislation. 
Goldthorpe in the early 1960s reviewing the British 
controversy, rejected both the crude Whig and 
functionalist views of the development of the welfare 
state. The first is unable to explain the mechanism or 
alliance of interest by which orthodoxy was broken. If 
the emergence of the welfare state was due to an 
intellectual sea change why were its exponents so 
lacking in intellectual common ground. 
One has here still further proof that the creation 
of an effective social policy is a necessary 
process in an advanced society,- and by the same 
token, that this is not ultimately dependent upon 
any particular political or ideological 
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configuration. 74 
The functionalist view, on the other hand, which sees 
policy as a response to the needs of modernisation is , 
unable to convincingly describe how different states 
arrived at the modern welfare state by different roads. 
The blind forces of urbanisation and industrialisation 
are too narrow a view of history for the actions of 
individuals or classes, or the role of ideas, or 
conflict and interaction between these factors. 
In an attempt to overcome these problems Steinmetz has 
tried to empirically evaluate which factors influenced 
the origins of unemployment insurance in particular. 
Amongst German elites he identified three views: a 
traditionalist view of the poor which divided them into 
a deserving and undeserving 'poorl to be dealt with by 
the poor relief without participation by working class 
organisations; a Bismarckian attitude which attempted to 
formulate state social policy with a view to undermining 
militant working class organisation; a 'proto-
corporative l view which aimed to integrate working class 
organisation in the running of social policy. He 
attempted regression of a whole series of variables to 
establish the connection of elite thinking, working 
class organisation and protest and modernisation to test 
the various theories of welfare state origins. The 
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methods by which he constructed his variables and his 
periodisation are open to criticism but the value of the 
research is that three conclusions can be drawn from it. 
Firstly, a crude modernisation case is not supported by 
the evidence. Secondly, the shifting policy and 
attitudes are not due to any single factor but an 
interaction of ideology, class organisation and struggle 
and the state. Thirdly, that the existence of the 
working class its ability to organise confronted the 
German ruling class and state with a new set of 
problems, the question of integration or ostracism of 
the organisations was central to state policy formation. 
The era of social insurance initially redefined the poor 
along the lines of age and ill health, later 
distinguishing the unemployed as a specific component. 
The impact of this on the labour force was to clarify 
the boundaries of the active population. An out of work 
seventy year old suffering from industrial injury could 
now be formally excluded from the labour market. 
Previously it would be very difficult to distinguish him 
from an unemployed twenty year old brick layer. The 
emergence of pension insurance set the upper limits on 
the labour force in the same way that compulsory 
education and the factory laws set the lower limits of 
the active population. Pension insurance or benefits 
established a regulated upper end of the life cycle. 
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Sickness insurance maintained workers at times when ill 
health prevented them from work. Both measures 
negatively define employment and allow for the 
withdrawal of less productive individuals from the 
labour market. Unemployment insurance which was the most 
radical break with orthodox economic and poverty relief 
thinking, was the final element that was distilled out 
of the previously undifferentiated mass of urban poor. 
Obviously, this had important implications for the 
definition and measurement of the labour force. It 
allowed for those who became unemployed during the 
productive aspect of their life cycle to be sustained in 
periods of recession ready to return to work when the 
economy picked up. 
Ql The Era of the Welfare State 
The era of the welfare state denotes the period in which 
most industrialised countries moved towards universal 
welfare systems. Typically, social policy spending had 
evolved from around 2% in the early 1880s to around 30% 
a hundred years later. The universality has been 
resisted in some countries such as the U.S. but even 
here welfare expenditure has risen massively. The major 
transformation is the process of general ising welfare 
provision. 
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During this period the process of differentiation of the 
poor which began with the era of social insurance was 
completed. The post 1945 Keynesian-welfare consensus 
informed state regulation of the labour market and 
economy to an extent it had never done before. The 
differentiated aspects of welfare provided the 
categories of social indicators. These indicators became 
guides to social policy. 
The very completeness of the categories of state 
regulation has posed its own problems. State definition 
is not simply a reflection of economic and social 
realities over which it has no control. Its intervention 
can redraw or manipulate the boundaries between 
different categories, not only in terms of measurement 
but also in terms of policy. For example, this has led 
to divergent responses to the emergence of mass 
unemployment. The definition and resourcing of 
disability pensions in the Netherlands does not alter 
the real size of the population with disabilities but it 
does alter its measured size. 76 Likewise, active labour 
market policies in Sweden of job creation, subsidies, 
and training restrict unemployment. Despite the nature 
of both Swedish and Dutch policy being very different 
their superficial effects on unemployment could be 
similar. 77 
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The state passed through three phases of social 
legislation in the process of industrialisation. 
Classically, a pattern emerged where factory legislation 
was followed by social insurance which developed into an 
universalist welfare state. As time progressed this 
process became compressed with the divisions between the 
various stages became less clear. 
Social legislation replaced Poor Law provisions which 
were unsuited to establishing a mobile wage labour 
market or clearly defining the life cycle. that labour 
market. The vicissitudes of the business cycle 




Unemployment became a new source of poverty 
new measures. Usually, states attempted to 
those who were unable to enter employment 
through old age or injury before tackling unemployment. 
Partly, this was due to the difficulties to isolate 
unemployment from other causes of poverty, partly due to 
the alienation of the policy-makers from the working 
class. Indeed, the true level of unemployment was 
unknown. Eventually, the various elements of social 
insurance differentiated the elements of the poor from 
one another. 
There is clearly then a connection between the 
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regulation of the labour market by the state and the 
emergence of our modern labour market categories. The 
process by which this takes place is simultaneously 
cause and effect. The state is able to define features 
of the new industrial economy but its intervention is 
crucial to the precise nature, shaping and measurement 
of those features. 
Conclusions on the Historical Development 
Unemployment 
Our study has attempted to investigate the origins and 
development of unemployment for the particular purpose 
of getting to grips with the measurement of 
unemployment. This chapter has raised several issues for 
the case studies of France, Britain and Poland and it 
has contributed considerably to our understanding of 
measured unemployment. 
Firstly, the notion of unemployment as a timeless and 
universally applicable category has been rejected. 
Unemployment has its historical roots firmly fixed 1 n 
the soil of industrial capitalism. It was the 
transformation of wage labour with the rise of 
industrial capitalism which should be pin-pointed as the 
crucial determinant of unemployment. Hence, the manner 
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in which this process affected different parts of the 
globe on different timescales and intensities . 1 S 
critical to understanding unemployment. 
Secondly, limits to wage labour are not reducible to 
questions of development. Wage labour is generalised 
under modern capitalism but it is not a universal form. 
The distinction is important. This is particularly the 
case when we consider the role of women in the economy. 
Privatised childcare and the burden for it falling upon 
women implies that hybrid forms of social relations 
continue. This presents difficulties for the concept of 
unemployment and measurement of economic activity. 
Thirdly, the ideological progress of unemployment is 
important to our analysis. Conceptualisation of 
unemployment has changed and is changing over time, this 
cannot be conceived as simply a reflection of the 
changing nature of unemployment, although this is a 
component within it. 
Fourthly, when considering the historical development of 
unemployment it would be a mistake to ignore the state 
as an active participant in the construction of 
unemployment. The importance of state activity in 
constructing unemployment is historically greatest in 
the period of the universal welfare state, when its 
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categorisation of the labour market is most developed. 
Finally, the conclusions of this chapter have serious 
consequences of the measurement of unemployment. 
Unemployment is a multi-dimensional social phenomena 
whose reality and ideological representation evolve over 
time and have a degree of relative autonomy. As regards 
the measurement of unemployment in contemporary Europe 
we shall have to bear this in mind and adapt a 
methodological approach accordingly. 
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~hapt~r 3: Government responses to mass unemployment and 
ltS lmpact on statistics with particular reference to 
contemporary Western Europe 
On a theoretical level, we have argued the measurement 
of unemployment has to be seen as the product of two 
social processes, the construction of unemployment and 
the measurement of soc i a 1 phenomena. Th i s theoret i ca 1 
framework can now be tested at the empirical level with 
a study of the measurement of unemployment 
contemporary Western Europe. 
. 
1 n 
Unemployment has in the past twenty years assumed an 
importance in economic debate that has made the issue of 
its measurement of great significance. Unemployment 1S 
an indicator of economic well-being not only from a 
national perspective but also as an indicator of 
international comparison, of international competitive-
ness and the state of labour markets. 
However, because unemployment statistics do not exist in 
a vacuum, they are subject to a whole series of 
institutional, conceptual and policy determinants. These 
influences upon the size of unemployment figures may 
distort comparison when using unemployment as a 
yardstick. 
The state since 1973 has been forced to respond to 
chronic unemployment (the 1980-8 rate being over twice 
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that of 1960-7 for the G7 countries) and to respond to 
acute rises of unemployment in the recessions of 1974-5, 
1979-80 and 1990-3. 1 These problems have transformed the 
labour market, migration patterns, industrial activity 
and the welfare state. In general terms, this crisis has 
put governments in the position of needing to reorganise 
their activities. This reorganisation reflects a series 
of political choices. Once the commitment to full 
employment was officially withdrawn, the industrialised 
West entered new territory. It is from this starting 
point that we should assess the changes that the labour 
market and unemployment have undergone. 
The aim therefore of this chapter is to outline and 
assess the impact of some determinants of unemployment 
on its measurement. These determinants can be divided 
into two categories, statistical and policy factors. 
~ Technical difficulties of comparative unemployment 
measurement 
Technical difficulties are perhaps more straightforward 
than policy factors. Over a period of time unemployment 
definitions have become harmonised. 2 The current 
definition was adopted by the International Labour 
Office and was agreed upon at the 13th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians ln 1982. Most 
national labour force surveys follow these guidelines. 
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However, even official statisticians have challenged the 
notion that a single definition is capable of 
identifying unemployment. 3 Three organisations conduct 
international comparisons of unemployment rates, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(DECO), Eurostat or as it is otherwise known, the 
Statistical Office of the European Community, and the 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Each of 
these has its own coverage and history. It was the 
latter programme that predated the others. The BLS 
series began in 1961, and approximated unemployment 
figures of different countries to the US concept of 
unemployment. At present it covers the GIO: Canada, 
United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and Australia. It 
follows its own convention but these are very close to 
those of the ILO concept. The DECO covers 14 countries 
adding Belgium, Finland, Norway, and Spain to those 
studied by the BLS. The BLS is closer to ILO 
recommendations in its series than the OECD. For the 
European Community, Eurostat collects and publishes 
labour force survey results from the 12 member 
countries, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. 4 The emphasis is on cross-
national comparability, as a result, wherever the case 
arises of an adjustment cross national comparability 
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overrides the historical consistency.5 The Eurostat 
series differs from the two others as it is not based 
upon adjustments to national figures but upon a 
Community-wide labour force survey carried out by the 
various national statistical offices. 6 
Greater difficulties arise when we turn to registered 
unemployment figures which are used in most countries to 
provide data that is more rapidly and regularly 
available than the labour force surveys.7 The figures 
for claimants of unemployment benefits can include 
people who should, according to the official definition, 
not be considered unemployed, such as those entitled to 
benefits but not seeking work, or can exclude those who 
are unemployed but do not register for unemployment 
benefit because they are not eligible. Therefore, social 
security systems require investigation, in terms of how 
they allocate entitlement to benefits. Other 
considerations of social security policy also affect the 
size of unemployment figures such as entitlement to 
pensions, redundancy payments, and invalidity/sickness 
benefits. 
Eurostat has demonstrated stark differences 1 n 
registration across the European Community.8 Registered 
counts are produced by most governments as the most up-
to-date unemployment rates. It lS often these series 
that attract controversy. Being an administrative by-
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product of unemployment insurance, they are 
subordinated to the needs of a social security system. 
Therefore, changes in the administrative system such as 
computerisation of records, alteration in signing on 
schedules and changes in entitlement to benefit, will 
alter the count. 
More detailed work (in Britain and France) on the effect 
of these changes in the national registration counts are 
laid out in the chapters dealing with individual 
countries. Here we are concerned with the wider 
comparative issues they raise. As an Eurostat report 
showed there are quite significant differences between 
countries in terms of the type of work sought. 9 France 
and Ireland do not include in their claimant counts 
those who are seeking part-time but not full-time work. 
At the other extreme Italy, Portugal, Greece and Belgium 
include those who are seeking work of any hours 
duration. Other major discrepancies arise between social 
security systems when it comes to the eligibility to 
benefit of those seeking their first job. Also the 
accuracy of figures will vary quite considerably because 
of the fact that different countries require the 
unemployed to register at different intervals, from 
daily to 3 monthly intervals. The extent to which these 
discrepancies affect the count varies from year to year. 
For example in Britain the labour force survey and 
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registered unemployment show little difference for some 
years, in 1988 the registered count is only 1.2% greater 
than the labour force count. However in other years the 
two counts diverge, in 1989 the LFS was 11.2% greater 
than the claimant count. 10 
There is considerable variation in registered and labour 
force survey unemployment levels across the European 
Community. Italy which includes those on training 
schemes on the register shows the most pronounced 
discrepancy between registered unemployment and LFS 
unemployment. In general it can be said that there are 
differences between the counts of varying degrees for 
all countries and that these are not constant over time. 
~ Labour market flows and unemployment 
It is not simply statistical aspects that can distort 
comparability of unemployment figures. Broadly speaking, 
other problems can fall into two categories, policy 
effects and conjunctural features. Our starting point 
should focus upon the labour market as a dynamic and 
contradictory phenomenon. People are in a constant flow 
into and out of employment, from activity to inactivity. 
Essentially, within the population of working age, there 
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and inactive. The labour force 
unemployed and the employed. 
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From the diagram, a number of subjects emerge to which 
we have to pay particular attention. Age, migration, 
health and disability, government training, education, 
job creation and retirement schemes should be 
investigated as to whether they effect the statistics of 
measured unemployment. 
The various categories indicated by this flow diagram 
will be discussed below, categories will be selected 
according to their significance and suitability for 
Europe-wide study. In practice, there are three 
considerations in terms of comparability from this 
perspective. Economies will differ according to the 
extent of disequilibrium between inputs and outputs, 
such as for example age structure. Secondly, the 
changing political situation. In the fifties and 
sixties, near full employment shaped macro-economic 
policy, the institutions of the welfare state, even the 
political objectives of governments. However, the crisis 
of the seventies meant that these were out of step with 
the institutional needs of the system. This chapter 
attempts to describe various ways in which government 
responded. The institutional framework has changed, and 
thus, the context in which unemployment exists has 
profoundly changed. Finally, governments have purposely 
manipulated the flows between the three labour market 
states for economic or political reasons. 
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~ Migration and unemployment 
The specific characteristics of the different groups 
entering or leaving employment or the labour market can 
have significant effects upon the level of unemployment. 
The first group that we shall consider is immigrant 
workers. In terms of international comparison, the 
policy towards immigrant labour has been approached in 
starkly contrasting ways by governments in the post-war 
period. 11 
Firstly, flows of labour migration can be seen as a 
function of the international division of labour. Areas 
of dynamism and growth within the world economy become 
subject to labour or skill shortages. This was 
particularly true of the years of the post war boom, 
when the major industrial nations, to varying extents, 
relied on immigration drawn from a less developed 
periphery or from former colonies. The exhaustion of the 
post-war boom has forced governments to rethink their 
attitude to immigration and has also changed 
perceptions of potential immigrant workers themselves. 
Secondly, immigration, nationality, work permits and so 
on are a question of government policy. These legal 
structures have a bearing on the amount of state control 
over the flow of migrant labour. 
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The third point is that migration should be thought of 
as a two-sided coin. Emigration can have as profound an 
influence on levels of unemployment as immigration, 
which is given much more political attention. 
Within the major economies we can distinguish between 
countries on the basis of their patterns of migration 
from the sixties onwards. Firstly, it would seem that 
there were a number of economies that pulled in labour 
and had long periods of net immigration. Within this 
group are West Germany, France, United States and 
Switzerland. At the other extreme are countries that 
(especially in the sixties) were net suppliers of labour 
to other countries, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, 
the former Yugoslavia and Portugal. 12 
Perhaps the most significant question as regards 
migration and unemployment levels is how did rising 
unemployment of the mid-seventies onwards affect the 
pattern of migration. 13 This has two components- how did 
migration rates react in the short term to turning-
points in the economic cycle and how was migration 
affected in the longer term. The first major shock to 
the developed economies since the Second World War came 
in 1974. It was a decisive turning point ln the world 
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economy from which the developed countries have never 
really recovered to pre-1974 levels of growth and 
unemployment. 
Firstly, there are those countries that moved sharply 
away from net immigration in relative if not in absolute 
terms. West Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark 
fall into this category. During the early 1970s 
Switzerland had been a net immigrant country. This 
turned around in 1974 and in 1975 it had a net 
emigration rate of a 10.4% (net migration / working 
population). The greatest flexibility 1 n this respect 
came about in countries where guestworkers were kept on 
short term contracts, were isolated from trade union 
representation, had few political rights and then 
replaced after a year or so by other migrant workers. 
Austria, Switzerland and West Germany operated these 
systems. Although it was West Germany which acted first, 
closing down 7 recruitment offices ln Mediterranean 
countries and imposing restrictions on non-EEC 
immigrants in late 1973, within a year others had 
followed suit, including France, the Netherlands and 
Belgium whose policies did not cause the dramatic 
reversal of migrant flows that did occur in the 
countries mentioned above. 14 
The experience of other countries was the absolute 
opposite, a sharp shift towards net immigration. This is 
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particularly true of Greece and Portugal but also to a 
lesser extent Ireland, Italy and Spain. Intermediary 
countries showed no clear short-term trend. The second 
major recession arrived in 1979. Although the rise ln 
unemployment was certainly not synchronised, most of the 
countries were experiencing rising unemployment within a 
year. Significantly, the same countries that responded 
sharply to the first recession of the seventies, West 
Germany, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, acted likewise 
in the second. In all these countries net emigration had 
turned into net immigration by the second recession. The 
sharpest turn around was that of Austria which, having 
already 
continued 
experienced two years of recession 
immigration, moved dramatically to 
with 
net 
emigration with a swing in the net migration rate from 
1981-82 of 8.4%.15 
In more generalised terms, the seventies saw a marked 
divergence in the flows of net migration. The pattern 
that emerged was that those countries that moved from 
immigration to emigration most rapidly were also those 
with the greatest cyclical fluctuations in migration 
figures; other countries have had a more stable pattern 
of immigration, usually a general decline, i.e. France, 
UK, USA and Japan. 
In all the West European newly industrialising nations, 
except Ireland, which were exporters of labour during 
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the sixties ( Portugal, Spain, and Greece ) an 
increasing migration stability has emerged after 
volatility in the 1970s. The conclusion that must be 
drawn from this is that the levels of unemployment of 
some countries are affected more than others by 
migration. Those which are particularly affected are 
those countries with highly volatile or sensitive net 
migration, that is, Switzerland, West Germany, Austria 
and to a lesser extent Denmark. In these cases the 
immigration policy- usually the guest worker system- has 
a restrictive effect upon unemployment as guest workers 
are expelled but also leads to labour market shortages 
as the economy recovers, this accounts for the sharp 
shifts from net immigration to net emigration. 16 The 
other category of economies subject to volatility are 
those countries that had traditionally been labour 
exporters. With these countries especially during the 
1970s, the cyclical tendency of migration would have 
aggravated national levels of unemployment when it was 
rising elsewhere. In other words, Portuguese or Greek 
figures would include those put out of work by German or 
Swiss industry. This has become less significant through 
the course of the eighties. 
However, there are some quite significant aspects of 
migration that these figures alone are 




labour migration. This has, of course, gone on since the 
first immigration laws were passed. It is estimated that 
clandestine immigration has been growing in a number of 
developed countries, notably Austria, Italy, Belgium, 
and France in the course of the eighties, with its 
associated practices of sub-contracting, labour 
trafficking and appalling working conditions. 1? 
In France in 1989 INSEE, Institut National de 
Statistique et Etudes Economique, stated that the most 
significant component of the black economy was 
occasional jobs employing foreign migrants. The scale of 
the black economy operations were estimated at 1% of GOP 
or 50 billion francs. It estimated that public works and 
construction made up 53% of such practices. The level of 
clandestine (often sweated labour) was also common in 
the leather and garment industry.18 Italy, which had 
formerly been an exporter of labour now has significant 
immigration. The Minister of the Interior estimated that 
there were as many as 1 million illegal immigrants in 
1990. Belgium strengthened legislation against labour 
trafficking in 1989 because of the marked increase 
especially with Portuguese and Spanish construction sub-
contractors over the previous decade. 19 In 1990 it was 
estimated that between forty thousand and one hundred 
and forty thousand clandestine workers were resident in 
Austria. 20 
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Both the Italian and Austrian government's have 
attempted amnesties for clandestine workers in order to 
regularise immigrant labour but, as in the case of 
Austria, this only qualifies the worker for a one-year 
work permit for those having worked in Austria for at 
least 14 months and a 5-year permit for those having 
worked for 5 years. The amnesty schemes have not been a 
great success. Both of these amnesty arrangements were 
backed up by stricter immigration inspection and 
controls. 
Levels of clandestine immigration and the black economy 
are therefore very difficult to quantify.21 They do not 
enter official employment figures, neither would they 
enter registered unemployment. As such it is very 
difficult to draw firm conclusions on the issue, but the 
existence of clandestine migration can be an important 
factor confusing international comparisons. 
It also has been noticed in a number of countries that 
immigration has undergone a qualitative change in 
content. Immigration ln the eighties has been 
conditioned by the character of earlier immigration. 
Settlement and family reunion of those split by the 
search for work in the sixties and seventies has become 
a significant motivating factor in recent immigration. 
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The extent to which this can happen legally is dependent 
upon immigration policy of the various states. The other 
source of immigration has been from political asylum 
seekers. These tendencies in immigration have 
implications for the age and gender composition of 
immigration and, as a result, for the relationship of 
migration flows to labour market conditions. 22 
Developments with the Single European Act have brought 
the question of labour migration into sharper focus. 
Under the terms of the Act free passage is permitted 
between the countries of the EEe. Previously, some moves 
towards harmonisation of migration had taken place 
under the 1985 Schengen accord. The Benelux countries, 
France, and West Germany co-ordinated immigration and 
asylum laws and have abolished internal border controls. 
If a foreigner seeking residence from one of these 
countries was rejected then he or she is rejected by 
all. Also, co-ordination takes place through the 
secretive EEe-wide Trevi group. Its brief is to deal 
with immigration, drugs and terrorism. Its aim is to 
formulate rules for the treatment of non-EEe nationals 
as regards visa requirements, conditions of entry, 
repatriation and deportation arrangements and dealing 
with rejecting political asylum seekers. 23 
There do, however, seem to be important limits beyond 
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which individual states want to retain control over 
immigration policy. In 1988 the Single European Act was 
appended by the member states confirming the right of 
member states to determine the admission of non-EEC 
nationals. This would include some of the major sources 
of migrant workers such as Turkey and the former 
Yugoslavia. 
The future of migration patterns is uncertain. In 
Europe, the possibility of large-scale migration from 
Eastern Europe exist. What does seem certain is that the 
regulation of immigration will take place at the 
national and community level and that there will be a 
level of unofficially tolerated illegal immigration. 
Migration 
allowing 
may continue to be a significant factor in 
unemployment rates to differ internationally 
and over time. For example, Biffl et al estimate that, 
in Austria, had it not been for the foreign worker 
effect, unemployment in 1985 would have been 5.7% rather 
than the observed 4.2%.24 Fluckiger et al demonstrated 
the importance of exported unemployment as regards 
Switzerland. In 1974-6, they stated 305,000 jobs were 
lost whilst at the same time 180,000 migrant workers 
left by choice or because their permits were not 
renewed. 25 
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Migration therefore affects different states in 
different ways, from those states in which it is used as 
a buffer against higher levels of unemployment to those 
countries whose domestic unemployment levels can be 
aggravated by returning migrants. 
3.4 The underground economy 
The underground or black economy, as with the other 
aspects of the labour market, has been transformed by 
the experience of the seventies. The history of the 
black economy has been inversely related to stability 
and health of the formal economy. Wars, emergencies and 
crises tend to lead to a surge in the underground 
economy, when the legal and institutional framework is 
no longer able to satisfy entrepreneurs, workers and 
consumers. There has been a noticeable growth in the 
underground economy in a number of 
countries. 26 
industrialised 
The underground economy's scope can be divided into 
three areas. The first and most obvious is criminal 
activity. The second is tax evasion by the self-
employed. The third is workers in forms of employment 
that are undeclared, so that employers can avoid paying 
tax t rade unlon organisation and social , security 
contributions. This is often connected to moonlighting, 
163 
work by illegal immigrants, labour trafficking, home 
working and sub-contracting. Essentially, these forms of 
concealed employment introduce all sorts of problems in 
trying to assess the state of the labour market. 
The size of the underground economy and irregular forms 
of employment are dependent on particular circumstances. 
They are concentrated in certain industries and have 
evolved at different paces because of the state of the 
formal economy. The underground economy has expanded 
with the loss of traditional forms of employment whether 
this be peasant farming, construction, or manufacturing. 
Many of the irregular practices could not survive within 
the established institutional framework due to taxation, 
social security, regulation, union or state determined 
wage rates and health and safety regulations. The 
underground economy tends to be concentrated in areas of 
high labour intensity, low or stagnant productivity and 
technology, in decentra1ised activities where it is 
difficult for the regulators to supervise, and those 
areas involving large amounts of unpaid family work. 
Construction and clothing are two good examples. 
Since the crisis the irregular economy has spread to 
other sectors. In Southern Europe, there is widespread 
moonlighting amongst school-teachers, civil servants, 
local government employees, and bank clerks. 
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In some cases complementarity has been so 
pronounced as to be interpreted as an hidden 
agreement between employers and employees, the 
former turn a blind eye on the practice of 
moonl~ghting: the latter renounce claiming 
salar7es comparable to those of equal occupatianal 
categories in other industrialised countries.~/ 
At its heart, certain tendencies come together to give 
rise to the particular expansion in irregular employment 
that we have witnessed: the aim on the part of employers 
of finding a cheaper and more flexible workforce, the 
shift from traditional forms of production, the crisis 
in public services and the welfare state, a growing 
tendency of firms to sub-contract, the growth of 
personal services, and proliferation of 1 i g h t 
technology. 
In overall terms, concealed employment accounts for 
between 2-8% of all hours worked in the OEeD. Its 
contribution to GNP is substantial enough at around 2-4% 
but it can also interfere with our notion of labour 
market categories. For example 38% of the young 
unemployed surveyed in the UK admitted to having worked 
from time to time. 28 Research seems to suggest that some 
countries are more prone to irregular work than others. 
One study suggested that countries which mix traditional 
forms with new industrialisation and tertiarisation are 
mo s t s t ron g 1 Y e f f e c ted. 29 I tal y , Spa in, Po r tug a 1 , 
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Greece, and Ireland would be included in this category. 
In these countries the legal and institutional system of 
regulation had only partially developed by the end of 
the post war boom. Italy, it is argued, is a special 
case as the breakdown in the system of regulation 
occurred a decade before other countries because of the 
strain of uneven regional development. As a result, it 
is widely accepted that Italy has the largest sector of 
concealed and irregular employment. Other countries, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Denmark, with highly 
developed regulatory systems, have moved least towards 
irregular work, which has been restricted to certain 
sectors of the economy such as personal and family 
services. 
~ Government activity and comparative unemployment 
measurement 
Another of the considerations as regards a critical 
assessment of the levels of unemployment is the relative 
weight of official intervention into the labour market 
by way of government schemes. 
All community member states apply employment 
measures to a greater or lesser extent. This has 
been one of the factors leading to the emergence 
of population groups whose occupational status 7S 
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no longer sufficiently clear to allow a simple 
breakdown into three categories that have namely 
been unemployed, employed, and inactive .... With 
the advent of different types of employment, e.g. 
the various forms of part-time employment and 
e~tensive government schemes, and the priority 
g7ven to the employed in statistics no longer 
accuratel~ reflects the situation in the labour 
market. 3v 
Formerly governments' primary labour market practice was 
that of Keynesian demand management. Periodically fiscal 
pol icy lead to a boost in the demand for labour. 31 Once 
this was abandoned different methods were needed. One 
alternative to this approach is reducing the supply of 
labour through schemes ( and migration control or 
education for that matter). 
The effect of these schemes is particularly difficult to 
deal with. Firstly, their use is generally counter-
cyclical, that is, they not only vary over time but 
governments expand these programmes as unemployment 
grows. Secondly, international comparability of schemes 
problematic. The figures of those on schemes are often 
sketchy and irregular. Their statistical treatment 
differs from country to country. Italy and the 
Netherlands include those on schemes (aimed at the 
unemployed) in the registered unemployment count, whilst 
most other EEC countries do not. Also there exist 
various categories of schemes which make cross-country 
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comparison difficult as some measures seem to fall 
between categories. Other policies are aimed at the 
young such as the age of school-leaving age being raised 
at times of high unemployment, as in Spain, or in 
Britain and Belgium by making those under eighteen 
ineligible for unemployment benefit, giving the sixteen 
years old school leaver the choice of either a 
government scheme or work. One of the major areas of 
government policy has been that of early retirement 
schemes. 
It is therefore necessary to try to assess the scale of 
government intervention of this type as one of the 
criteria of comparability. Schemes are not included in 
the ILO definition of unemployment and thus introduce a 
variable which may confuse comparison. 
The extensive use of labour market schemes is a 
relatively recent phenomenon but a further question has 
to be asked that is the relative weight of this kind of 
intervention between countries. 32 The data from Eurostat 
reflects the weaknesses of the information produced by 
governments about their schemes. Some of the reference 
periods are not be strictly comparable, and some of the 
minor schemes do not have figures available for them. 
The Eurostat data does give a crude guide to the extent 
to which governments employ such forms of intervention. 
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Some quite astonishing results are given. Belgium and 
Spain are by far the most prone to use labour market 
schemes, with schemes affecting 29% and 20% respectively 
as a proportion of civilian employment. Most of the EEC 
countries are grouped around 6-9%. Greece, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the U.K. have low levels of 
intervention of this kind at around 3-4%. Even at this 
level, however, schemes can and do have an impact on the 
level of unemployment. 
It has also been noticed that the divisions between the 
various spheres of social security system can become 
blurred at times of rising unemployment: qualification 
for disability benefits are relaxed and there is 
increased use of early retirement. Both of these means 
people are taken out of the active population. Pfaff in 
his study of unemployment's relationship with social 
security and early retirement systems for the 
International Social Security Association, noted, 
........ official (registered) unemployment 
figures, when compared cross-nationally, do not 
correctly state the cyclically-determined Hhidden 
reserve H of discouraged workers. Furthermore, 
registered unemployment does not reflect 
adequately the Hpermanently discharged H i.e. those 
persons who have left the labour force via early 
reti~e~ent 2~rogrammes or more liberal disability 
prov7s7ons. 
The West German case illustrates the point. In 1969, the 
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Federal Social Court made moves to tailor eligibility 
for disability benefit to the state of the labour 
market. As a result those who were only able to do part-
time jobs could qualify for disability benefit if only 
full-time employment was available. According to Walter 
Huber, by the end of 1977 the cumulative number having 
left the labour force was 260,773. Disability criteria 
had relaxed by 1979 to the extent that 50% of male and 
53% of female new pensions were disability pensions. It 
had become the single most important way of leaving the 
labour market. 34 In 1973 in the Netherlands, the 
criterion for the awarding of full disability benefit 
became the lack of suitable employment, again allowing 
for the relaxation of entitlement if unemployment began 
to rise. Between 1970 and 1984 those on disability 
pensions as a percentage of the labour force nearly 
trebled (from 4.4% to 12.2%). In a 1982 report by the 
Social Security Council and the University of Leyden it 
was stated that this produced a 71% hidden unemployment 
component of those on disability benefits. 35 In Sweden, 
since 1970, labour market conditions, in addition to 
medical reasons, have been taken into account for older 
persons disability pensions (those 63 and over). In 1974 
this age restriction was dropped to 60. 36 
Pension rights and benefits is another area of social 
policy which has influenced the numbers unemployed. 
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Many countries have introduced early retirement schemes 
or a reduction in the retirement age in the course of 
the last two decades which has had the result of 
reducing the numbers of older unemployed people. Such 
schemes are operated in Belgium, Germany, France, 
Finland, Austria and the Netherlands. Retirement ages 
themselves vary from country to country.37 
One of the most marked features of the labour market in 
the past twenty years has been the reduction in activity 
rates of older workers, particularly older men. It can 
quite clearly be seen in the changes in activity rates 
for a number of countries between 1975 and 1988. 38 
Firstly the higher levels of unemployment have led to a 
discouraged older worker effect, where many drop out of 
the labour market. Older workers can find particular 
difficulty finding work because of changing technologies 
reducing the need for certain skills and the slender 
likelihood of employers retraining them. Thus, they are 
prone to discouragement by job search which they are 
likely to abandon after a while. 
Secondly, pensions have also undergone institutional 
changes. There has been an expansion of private pension, 
redundancy and early retirement arrangements at the 
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industry, company and individual level, especially in 
the US and UK.39 However, if we compare countries with 
extensive state schemes with those with more developed 
private pensions, it is clear the former has had a 
greater impact on the labour market. 40 
Thirdly, the state has encouraged early retirement as a 
labour market policy. The tendency predated the turning 
point of 1974-5. Initially, the introduction of early 
retirement, as with the extension of disability 
benefit/pensions, was one aspect of the long-run growth 
of the welfare state. The measures that predated the 
recession of 1974 were expanded. Additional measures 
were formulated in a number of countries. Early 
retirement was proposed in a number of countries as a 
method of combating youth unemployment, some of the 
schemes stipulated that retirees should be replaced by 
younger unemployed workers, as in Belgium and France. 
Not only was there the practice of offering early 
retirement to employees through government schemes but a 
number of countries offered older unemployed persons the 
option of withdrawing from the labour force. In most 
cases, they drew short of lowering the official 
retirement age (the exception being France) as this 
would be too an inflexible a measure. The alternative is 
to drop registration requirements for older unemployed 
people. 
172 
Belgium provides an example of an early retirement 
policy as a labour market tool to respond to economic 
crisis. The first early retirement scheme (the 
Contractual Early Retirement Benefit) was implemented in 
1975. Dismissed workers aged 60 or over were entitled to 
this benefit (earlier in several industries and 
companies). By early 1984 101,061 had drawn benefits 
under the scheme, 78,502 of whom where still drawing it. 
It aimed to deal with those made redundant at times of 
large scale job loss. 
The second scheme, the Statutory Early Retirement 
Benefit (1976-82) extended the former scheme to public 
employment, dismissal was not necessary and it attempted 
to make employment of a young person a criterion of each 
early retirement. In February 1984 39,377 people were 
still drawing the benefit despite the fact that there 
had been no new applicants for two years. 
Special Early Retirement Benefit (1978-82) was offered 
to long term unemployed older workers (from 60 for men 
and 55 for women) in order that they withdrew from the 
labour market. The scheme that superseded the Statutory 
Early Retirement Benefit was the Early Retirement 
Pension (1983-). There were certain minor differences 
with the older schemes. For example, those on this 
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scheme were entitled to the same amount of money as 
those on the state pension scheme. It continued features 
such as the replacement requirement, but this no longer 
had to be someone under 30. 41 
Finally, 
introduced 
in January 1991, the Belgian 
another scheme which again 
government 
relaxed 
eligibility for early retirement. Under it there is no 
cut in the level of pension if the individual retires 
before 65 and the obligation upon employers to find a 
replacement was lifted. 42 
Belgium illustrated how a government has used early 
retirement to engineer a reduction in the labour force. 
Officially, early retirement was a means to combat youth 
unemployment through replacement criteria. However over 
time these criteria were relaxed then dropped, 
suggesting that reduction of the unemployment figures is 
seen as an end in itself. Belgium has witnessed the 
greatest decrease in activity rates for older workers, 
beginning earlier in the working life than other 
countries. Male activity of those 55-59 in Belgium 
dropped from 82% in 1975 to 51.4% in 1988, that is, 
early retirement of up to 10 years. In no other country 
have activity rates fallen to these levels from such an 
early age; equivalent activity figures for the European 
174 
12 in 1988 were 72%.43 
Early retirement elsewhere has concentrated on the 60-64 
age range, and it is here that the most significant 
reductions in activity has occurred. Those countries 
with extensive early retirement schemes have achieved 
the largest drops in activity, France, Belgium, UK, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. Other countries have 
experienced continuing high activity amongst this age 
group, Portugal, Denmark, UK (despite a considerable 
fall in activity), Ireland and Greece. The drop in 
activity amongst older workers is strongly related to 
early retirement policy and a significant variable when 
considering national levels of unemployment. For 
example, if Belgium's activity rate were that of the 
European 12 for the ages 55-64 it would have introduced 
approximately an extra 194,000 onto the labour market in 
1988. 44 
There are a number of pressures on government 
formulation of labour market policy for the aged. The 
focus is here upon unemployment, but it is not there 
sole consideration. Cost is another. The uneveness of 
financial strain on governments goes some way to 
explaining the extent to which they are likely to 
undertake an extensive early retirement schemes. What 
becomes clear from the figures of social security 
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expenditure is that those countries that have favoured 
early retirement as a method of tackling unemployment 
are not highly burdened in social spending for the 
aged. 45 For example Belgium and West Germany, whilst 
having extensive schemes for early retirement and high 
relative pension levels, have below average social 
security expenditure on the elderly. The UK, on the 
other hand, has one of the lowest rates of pension but 
has very high expenditure on the elderly. High spending 
on the elderly might make early retirement schemes seem 
less attractive. However, considerations other than cost 
have a bearing upon labour market policy towards the 
old. 
The first is a question of gender, of attempting to move 
more towards a sexual equality in retirement ages. The 
increase in labour market activity amongst women has 
obviously been central to this development, but also 
international organisations such as the European 
Commission have pushed for equality of retirement ages. 
The European Commission issued a directive on equal 
treatment for men and women within social security to be 
progressively implemented with a 1993 deadline. Now only 
five of the European 12 have state pension ages that 
differ for men and women. These five are under pressure 
to comply, Belgium and Britain have announced their 
intentions to equalise ages. A number of cases in the 
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European court have prompted such action, for example, 
Barber versus Royal Exchange 1990 and Clarke versus Clay 
Precision Engineering Ltd. 1989. 46 It has been suggested 
by the British government ministers that a retirement 
age of 63 for both sexes is the most suitable option. 47 
Another consideration is that of the industrialised 
world's ageing population. The knowledge that the future 
is one of growing numbers of elderly has deterred some 
governments from adopting early retirement schemes or 
lowering the age of retirement. Japan, which had 
traditionally a low retirement age, has recently 
attempted to encourage older workers to stay in the 
labour market. 48 
Population ageing has important implications for 
the size and structure of the potential workforce. 
The number of young people entering the 7abour 
market is already tapering off in many countries 
and by the end of the century the working age 
population (15-64) will be shrinking in some 
European countries and Japan .... By 2020, an 
average of around 43% of the working age 
population in the seven largest OEeD countries 
will be aged 45 or over, compared to just over 30% 
today. 4y 
At the other end of the spectrum is the impact of 
education policy upon the labour market. Education can 
both reduce the active population and qualitatively 
improve the supply of labour. In their different ways, 
both are ways of dealing with high unemployment 
177 
especially when youth unemployment is such a problem 
amongst the industrialised world. Education forms an 
important part of the institutional framework within 
which unemployment exists. School leaving ages, 
enrolment rates, higher education and vocational 
training differ from country to country, but also the 
state has had to re-examine the role of education since 
the seventies. This leads to difficulties of 
comparability. 
Educational expansion, the standard response to 
reduced demand for young people's labour, has the 
added advantage of constituting in human capital, 
with beneficial effects on productivity and 
competitiveness. But this expansion now seems to 
have reached a stage of diminishing returns in 
most OEeD countries and has even had unwelcome 
side effects such as the emergence of a new 
educational underclass who simply put up with 
their years of compulsory ggucation, without being 
able to reap its rewards. 
Despite the weaknesses of the data, what is clear is 
that enrolment rates have by and large increased for 
those over school-leaving age. 51 Spain has increased its 
school-leaving age. Belgium in 1983 adopted the German 
model where a component of compulsory education or 
training became necessary up to the age of 18. This has 
the effect of increasing the number of young people who 
will not enter the labour market core of full-time jobs. 
When we compare the enrolment rates by age and sex of 
the early seventies and early eighties there are some 
trends common to most of the countries for which we have 
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figures. 52 First, enrolment has risen generally 
particularly amongst 15-18 year olds. The rise in 
average enrolment rates in the European 10 between 
1970/1 and 1981/2 was 18.3% (unweighted average). The 
rise in enrolment was greatest in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. The second trend common to the 
states is the increase in female enrolment from 15-24. 
The most marked increases coming in Italy, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. The change in enrolment rate 
for Denmark for example, is 20.8 percentage points for 
15-23 year olds, between 1975/6-1982/3. This is the 
equivalent of approximately 160,000 people being taken 
out of the labour market. 53 This is a large figure when 
we consider that Danish unemployment in 1982 was 
254,000. 
The question then becomes to what extent has this 
expansion of the education system affected the numbers 
of unemployed? If we refer back to activity rates for EC 
members what is striking is the extent to which 
inactivity at the older end of the labour market is 
more significant than the younger end. Early retirement 
and relaxed disability playa greater role in taking 
people out of the active population than does the 
expansion of education and training. This is not to say 
that the latter has no effect. Indeed for the European 
10 the 18.3 percentage points increase in enrolment 
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rates (1970/1-1981/2, for 15-24 year olds) adds up to 
around 3% of the labour force. Its significance however 
relates more to other fields of study, especially coping 
with the specific problem of youth unemployment. 
Conclusions 
From our perspective, a number of general conclusions 
can now be drawn. First the onset of the economic crisis 
at the time of the first oil shock profoundly affected 
government policy as regards the labour market, the 
welfare state and the economy. Crisis led to attempts to 
reorganise how the system was regulated and this is 
increasingly taking place on the national and inter-
national level (in particular in Europe). The response 
of governments to this crisis and particularly the rapid 
growth of job losses within the economies has 
significantly influenced the measurement and meaning of 
unemployment. At the most obvious level, i.e. on the 
level of definition there are still differences between 
countries in terms of registered unemployment. Beyond 
this, government action has moulded the labour market to 
make real comparability of unemployment an onerous task. 
As Mirkin states, these actions have blurred the former 
meanings of our labour market categories. 54 Government 
policy has juggled people from one labour market state 
to another. 
180 
The limits upon such engineering is being set by a 
number of tendencies within the world economy, the 
ageing populations of the first world, the crisis of 
welfare spending, and the economic stagnation and 
political instability of the periphery, particularly 
Eastern Europe. A country by country approach is 
therefore the only satisfactory method to begin to 
estimate real comparability, but even then uncertain-
ties, gaps and incompatibility in the data about the 
labour market will limit the possibilities of true 
comparison. However, it is possible to give an outline 
of the major ways in which government policy has 
effected the levels of unemployment, activity and 
employment and the relative importance of such measures 
between countries. 
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Table 3.2: Comparative use of labour market poli5~es by various 
countries that affect the level of unemployment. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3.2 has attempted to show where specific policies 
have had a significant effect upon the level of 
unemployment. The ordering also indicates an attempted 
ranking in terms of relative scale of impact. If a 
country does not appear under a certain heading it is 
considered that this policy has not had a significant 
effect on unemployment levels in that country. Obviously 
this can only be provisional, to act as a rough guide 
when considering such things. A more meaningful and 
through discussion can only e with our studies of 
individual countries, Britain, France and Poland. 
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Chapter Four ~ The Measurement of British Unemployment: 
Political and Social Controversies 
The study of the measurement of unemployment i n 
contemporary Western Europe reveals that difficulties 
exist on more than simply a technical level. From the 
investigation the key question of flows between labour 
market states was identified. These flows could be 
understood by examination of labour market categories 
such as migration, old age, youth, disability and women. 
In each of the individual country studies, starting here 
with Britain, we shall focus on those categories that 
have an impact on measured unemployment . 1 n that 
individual country. As a consequence of these 
difficulties of unemployment measurement, in many of the 
countries of Western Europe unemployment figures have 
been the subject of political controversy, none more so 
than in Britain. This controversy is our starting point 
in the study of Britain. 
4.1 Contemporary Political Controversies of Unemployment 
Measurement 
The measurement of unemployment in Britain over the past 
two decades has sparked considerable controversy.1 This 
controversy, which emerged hand in hand with mass 
unemployment, has taken place on two levels: the 
technical and the political. However, difficulties are 
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not restricted to this period; a cursory glance at long 
run measurement of unemployment reveals a confusing mass 
of contradictory data. Britain provides a good example 
of the problems of the measurement of unemployment and 
government manipulation. Not only is there no country 
that has unemployment series that start earlier than the 
British trade union series, but unemployment in Britain 
has provided a general discourse of historical 
importance. 2 We have only to think, for example, of the 
internationally important works of Marx and Booth, the 
centrality of the conflict between the Treasury and 
Keynes in the 1930s to the formulation of post-war 
consensus, and the more recent accusations of massaging 
of the unemployment figures under Margaret Thatcher. 3 
Moreover, the industrial and sectorial changes which 
brought modern unemployment occurred earlier and have 
perhaps gone further in Britain than in any other 
country in Europe. 4 
The long-run measurement of unemployment has been 
revised and contested from its outset. These figures 
raise important questions as to the measurement of 
unemployment today. If it is true that, even today, 
there are contradictory results from statistical 
inquiries into unemployment, then it is necessary to 
understand the practical and theoretical implications of 
this. In part, this was dealt with in Chapters 2 & 3 
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which attempted to demonstrate how unemployment is an 
institutional and policy construct. However, here the 
British case is used to demonstrate, more concretely and 
with greater precision, some of the general propositions 
drawn from Chapters 2 and 3. 
During the 1970s unemployment in Britain more than 
doubled. For thirty years there had been very little 
unemployment, the rate of unemployment oscillating 
around 3 ~· o , however by the end of the decade it was 
rising towards 10%, a figure which would have seemed 
inconceivable and politically unacceptable only ten 
years earlier. The rise in unemployment was accompanied 
by a growing controversy as to its measurement. Our aim 
is to deal with the conceptual problems that this growth 
of unemployment created and the implications for its 
measurement. 
The break-down of the post war boom reopened the debate 
on the causes and nature of unemployment. This debate 
initially focused on the Phillips Curve but broadened 
out to a generalised questioning of the unemployment 
statistics themselves. The discussion of unemployment 
measurement took place in newspapers, political 
journals, bank reviews and economic journals. 5 On the 
one hand, it was argued that registered unemployment 
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figures significantly underestimated true levels of 
unemployment and that considerable levels of hidden 
unemployment had developed. Both the American Bureau of 
Labour Statistics and the National Institute Economic 
Review criticised the British government1s registered 
unemployment figures from this point of view. 6 Guy 
Standing drew the following conclusion from this 
critique of unemployment statistics, 
The evidence suggests that the downturn in the 
labour market since 1966 has been generally 
underestimated by policy makers. This is suggested 
by the comparison between the evidence on 
unemployment and 7that on employment and 
participation rates. 
The critique of Standing, Meacher and Cairncross amongst 
others was connected to the defence of social democratic 
policy goals established during the long boom years. 
On the other hand, several politicians and economists of 
the right argued that the statistics exaggerated the 
level of unemployment and that this exaggeration led to 
policy errors. In 1972, John Wood argued that 
unemployment could be only considered a real indicator 
if it excluded the ill, older unemployed and disabled. 
He suggested that underlying unemployment would at that 
time rather than being in excess of 450,000 would more 
reasonably be something in the order of 160,000. 8 Wood 
was writing for the right-wing think-tank, the Institute 
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for Economic Affairs, which played a considerable role 
in constructing the ideas of the British New Right, of 
Thatcherism. Indeed, Sir Keith Joseph weighed in on the 
argument in the run-up to the general election of 1974 
criticising the bipartisan approach of the post-war era 
which, due to a misinterpretation the unemployment 
figures, was aimed at 'fuller than full employment ' or 
'negative real unemployment'. He argued that various 
categories should be deducted to establish a meaningful 
yardstick of unemployment, these included those who had 
been unemployed under 8 weeks, the 'actual scroungers ' , 
and those difficult to place due to ill health or age. 
The favourable reception by the Times of Sir Keith 
Joseph's Preston speech indicated that the argument of 
the New Right, was not the ramblings of mavericks 
destined for the political wilderness for the rest of 
their careers, but people who were to gain political 
ascendancy in the Conservative Party in the course of 
the seventies. 
Sir Keith Joseph is ___ right in regarding the 
whole post war economic policy in Britain as 
having been overinfluenced by the fear of 
unemployment, partly because of the statistical 
misrepresentation of the unemployment figures 
consistently exaggerated ~he true levels of 
unemployment in the economy_ 
However, by the eighties the argument had been turned on 
its head. The criticism of government statistics now 
centred on official reductions in the figures and claims 
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that unemployment was officially underestimated. As a 
result of 30 changes to the monthly claimant count of 
unemployment, between October 1979 and September 1989 
numerous articles found their way into newspapers, 
public confidence in the figures plummeted, and an 
alternative index was established by a independent 
research organisation, the Unemployment Unit. 10 These 
changes were introduced in the name of increased 
accuracy or administrative efficiency. Official 
explanations of this nature were unable to quell 
controversy . 
.•.. Because all the changes but one minor one have 
operated in the direction of reducing published 
unemployment totals by a cumulative 424,000, as 
well as 1.4 points in percentage terms, the 
suspicion lingers that the motive behind them was 
to reduce the damaging political effect of high 
unemployment. After a", accuracy would have been 
improved by adding to the count some of those not 
claiming benefit who are defined 11 unemployed in 
the UK's own Labour Force Survey. 
To get to grips with the controversy, closer inspection 
of the principal disagreements over the measurement of 
unemployment is required. 
The definition of unemployment is usually not the source 
of disagreement. The problem is the different ways of 
calculating the unemployment rate once a broad 
definition is agreed. The official figures reflect this, 
the Labour Force Survey and claimant count contradict 
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one another and measure different categories of 
unemployment. The claimant count has been subject to the 
severest criticism as it comes out monthly and is 
produced with the shorter time lag, figures coming out 
on the third Thursday of the following month, whereas 
the lag for the LFS even in its improved present form 
entails a three month lag on quarterly data. The method 
by which the basic statistics are collected is one 
reason for discrepancy. The claimant count is an 
administrative figure derived from those signing on at 
unemployment offices. The LFS takes the form of a 
questionnaire sent to a sample of the population. The 
claimant count includes a number of people not 
considered by the ILO to be unemployed. In Spring 1991 
there were 660,000 on the claimant count but not 
considered unemployed by the ILO, of which 400,000 were 
not available for or seeking a job and 890,000 had had 
an hour or more paid work in the reference week. On the 
other hand, 750,000 were unemployed but not on the 
claimant count. 12 For Christopher Johnson there was an 
obvious solution, 
Since both the benefit claimant definition and 
the Labour Force Survey definition cover people 
who might be regarded as unemployed for different 
reasons, it would seem logical to merge them. We 
then find that there were 4 million unemp70yed or 
14.3 q3r cent of the working popu7ation, in Spring 
1986. 
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Further claims of government manipulation of 
unemployment statistics have arisen. Between 1983 and 
1989 the government claimed that employment had risen by 
3.4 million. However, it was pointed out by Henry 
McLeish MPI4 that this figure included several 
components that are highly questionable. He identified 
the ambiguities of part-time working, training schemes 
and self-employment as reasons to suspect the official 
labour market statistics. 
The debate over the level of unemployment has 
tended to focus on the impact of changes to the 
way statistics have been calculated over recent 
years. Since taking office in 1979, the 
Conservatives have shown little h1S itation in manipulating to tell their own story. 
This is relevant to our discussion of unemployment for 
three reasons. The first reason is the press coverage 
and political impact of the report relates to the 
general discussion and attitudes to unemployment 
statistics. 16 Secondly, the ongoing argument about the 
integrity of government statistics led to calls for a 
national statistics council independent of the 
ministries. 17 Thirdly, inactivity, employment and 
unemployment, the three labour market states, are locked 
into a dynamic and dependent relationship. As McLeish 
pointed out, changes in the level and nature of 
employment affect unemployment and inactivity. 
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If we examine the deeper issues then we can see that 
part-time work raises two related questions. Firstly, to 
what extent has the rise in employment been due to a 
rise in full-time employment? Secondly, has a change in 
the scale of part-time employment given rise to an 
increase in the number of those taking on two jobs? 
McLeish found that 1,462,000 of the 3.4 million, or 
43%, of the new employment figure was due to part-time 
working: a ratio much greater than the ratio of part-
time to full-time in the economy as a whole. If this 
surge in part-time work had taken place on a full-time 
basis the effect on the numbers in employment would have 
been approximately half of the actual increase (assum-
ing that two part-time jobs can be replaced by one full-
time post.) On the second point the number of double 
jobbers have risen faster than employment in general. 
Those double-jobbing rose by 352,000 in this period, it 
should remembered that those having two jobs are counted 
twice in the employed population. 
The second set of difficulties arise with self-
employment figures. These are questionable because of 
the gap that widened between those defining themselves 
as self-employed according to the yearly labour force 
survey and the numbers registered as paying national 
insurance contributions appropriate to self-employment. 
In 1983, the LFS estimate for self-employment stood at 
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2,209,000 whilst the NI registration of self-employment 
stood at only 1,600,000. By 1987 the Labour Force Survey 
recorded 2.8 million whilst the National Insurance 
figures showed 1.9 million. 18 This obviously raises a 
question mark over the nature of the evolution in self-
employment. 
Thirdly, training and employment schemes need scrutiny. 
The Youth Training Scheme, Restart, and Employment 
Training were all products of the 1980s and involved 
numbers of those affected by unemployment. Hundreds of 
thousands of places on YTS and ET were created and 
these went onto the employed population. However the 
degree to which this was genuine training or even 
genuine job creation was questioned. Bill Jordan, 
President of the then AEU, and certainly not a left or 
radical trade union leader, said that the work 
experience scheme was, 
.. Nothing more than a palliative, designed 
fiddle the unemployment figures ... If adopted 
will take people out of thel~nemployment count 




Furthermore, the Restart interviews which started in 
1986 became a method by which the unemployed would be 
taken off the unemployment register, as this was 
combined with stricter eligibility for work tests. It is 
thought that these two factors have significantly 
reduced the figures of unemployed. Most long-term 
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unemployed Restart interviewees re-enter the 
unemployment figures as newly unemployed. A Bank of 
England report estimated that Restart accounted for 
a 750,000 reduction in unemployment figures. Considering 
Restart has conducted 6 million interviews it has been 
very unsuccessful in its declared intention, as a bridge 
between unemployment and employment. 20 Internal Civil 
Service figures published by the Unemployment Unit 
reveal that of those interviewed only 13% were submitted 
for jobs but less than 1% were actually taken up. 
However, a later study found that Restart did reduce the 
time of claiming benefit by about 5%.21 
As a result of the controversies of the eighties 
Professor Benjamin noted, in a report for the Economic 
and Social Research Council that unemployment, 
.. is now the classic example of the damage that 
can be done to trend analysis by frequent changes 
in definitions, especially when there is no way of 
translating one base to another. The tragedy is 
that more damage is done to credibility than any 
gain to political advantage and genuinely non-
political motivated social and economic scienti2~s 
are denied the means to observe the real trend. 
The controversies of the unemployment statistics in 
Britain therefore have led to a serious challenging of 
the credibility of the data. But the issue is not one of 
simple political manipulation; to leave the argument at 
this level would imply that there can be 'unprocessed ' 
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data which would accord the measurement and definition 
of unemployment an asocial and ahistorical objectivity. 
To shed light onto the controversies it is therefore 
necessary to go deeper, to establish the social 
processes that have affected the underlying construction 
of unemployment measurement in the last two decades. 
Our focus will be upon three key categories, suggested 
by Chapter 3, to be of particular significance in the 
British case: women, life-cycle (in particular youth and 
old age) and disability. 
4.2 Women and the measurement of unemployment 
The issue of women and unemployment is commonly linked 
to the 'reserve armyl thesis. Marx developed the notion 
to describe sections of the population which could be 
mobilised during economic upswing, only to be discarded 
with recession. 23 Women, it is argued, are drawn into 
the labour market at times of labour shortage to vanish 
back into the family or join dole queues when that 
demand slackens. 24 
In Britain, it is difficult to place women's experience 
of unemployment in this category. The fundamental reason 
for this is that women's unemployment has been generally 
lower than men's although the participation rate 
differential has narrowed. There are two explanations of 
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this. The first is that this is a statistical myth, a 
distortion due to definitional and accounting proced-
ures. The second is that the 'reserve armyl thesis is no 
longer tenable where British women are concerned. 
Interestingly, John Wood of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs argued that women, along with the youth, should 
be excluded from the unemployment figures in the early 
seventies, which might give credibility that the lower 
rates of unemployment for women are statistically 
artificial. 25 Samuel Brittan of the Financial Times 
echoed Woodis arguments that unemployment levels were 
statistically inflated. 26 Hence, there would seem to be 
ideological pressure to statistically minimise women's 
unemployment, supporting the notion that relatively low 
female unemployment is artifically created. 
Indeed, several writers have noted the inadequacy of 
registered unemployment or claimant count unemployment 
in recording women's unemployment. 27 
Non-working women are a very heterogeneous group 
exhibiting various degrees of current attachment 
to the labour market. Some want jobs and may be 
broadly defined by economically active, while 
others have withdrawn either temporarily or 
permanently from the labour market to look after 
their families or have retired form paid work 
through illness or injury. Deciding which non-
work ing women are unemp loyed is difficu lt, for as 
we anticipated, the usual registered or unregister 
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-ed meas~8es are not straightforwardly applicable 
to women. 
When the 1971 Census of Population and the registered 
unemployment figures were compared it was found that a 
relatively small number of men and larger number of 
women were unemployed but not on the official registered 
count. There are essentially two reasons for this 
discrepancy. 
Firstly, for numbers of married women their husband's 
income makes them ineligible for unemployment benefit. 
Therefore, wage and social security structures combine 
to remove women from the figures. Before 1982 women who 
were unemployed but ineligible for benefit could join 
the register so not all were discounted, but with the 
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Chapter Four ~ The Measurement of British Unemployment: 
Political and Social Controversies 
The study of the measurement of unemployment in 
contemporary Western Europe reveals that difficulties 
exist on more than simply a technical level. From the 
investigation the key question of flows between labour 
market states was identified. These flows could be 
understood by examination of labour market categories 
such as migration, old age, youth, disability and women. 
In each of the individual country studies, starting here 
with Britain, we shall focus on those categories that 
have an impact on measured unemployment in that 
individual country. As a consequence of these 
difficulties of unemployment measurement, in many of the 
countries of Western Europe unemployment figures have 
been the subject of political controversy, none more so 
than in Britain. This controversy is our starting point 
in the study of Britain. 
~ Contemporary Political Controversies of Unemployment 
Measurement 
The measurement of unemployment in Britain over the past 
two decades has sparked considerable controversy.1 This 
controversy, which emerged hand in hand with mass 
unemployment, has taken place on two levels: the 
technical and the political. However, difficulties are 
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not restricted to this period; a cursory glance at long 
run measurement of unemployment reveals a confusing mass 
of contradictory data. Britain provides a good example 
of the problems of the measurement of unemployment and 
government manipulation. Not only is there no country 
that has unemployment series that start earlier than the 
British trade union series, but unemployment in Britain 
has provided a general discourse of historical 
importance. 2 We have only to think, for example, of the 
internationally important works of Marx and Booth, the 
centrality of the conflict between the Treasury and 
Keynes in the 1930s to the formulation of post-war 
consensus, and the more recent accusations of . massaglng 
of the unemployment figures under Margaret Thatcher. 3 
Moreover, the industrial and sectorial changes which 
brought modern unemployment occurred earlier and have 
perhaps gone further in Britain than in any other 
country in Europe. 4 
~ 
The long-run measurement of unemployment has been 
revised and contested from its outset. These figures 
raise important questions as to the measurement of 
unemployment today. If it is true that, even today, 
there are contradictory results from statistical 
inquiries into unemployment, then it is necessary to 
understand the practical and theoretical implications of 
this. In part, this was dealt with in Chapters 2 & 3 
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which attempted to demonstrate how unemployment is an 
institutional and policy construct. However, here the 
British case is used to demonstrate, more concretely and 
with greater precision, some of the general propositions 
drawn from Chapters 2 and 3. 
During the 1970s unemployment in Britain more than 
doubled. For thirty years there had been very little 
unemployment, the rate of unemployment oscillating 
around 3 ~· o , however by the end of the decade it was 
rising towards 10%, a figure which would have seemed 
inconceivable and politically unacceptable only ten 
years earlier. The rise in unemployment was accompanied 
by a growing controversy as to its measurement. Our aim 
is to deal with the conceptual problems that this growth 
of unemployment created and the implications for its 
measurement. 
The break-down of the post war boom reopened the debate 
on the causes and nature of unemployment. This debate 
initially focused on the Phillips Curve but broadened 
out to a generalised questioning of the unemployment 
statistics themselves. The discussion of unemployment 
measurement took place in newspapers, political 
journals, bank reviews and economic journals. 5 On the 
one hand, it was argued that registered unemployment 
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figures significantly underestimated true levels of 
unemployment and that considerable levels of hidden 
unemployment had developed. Both the American Bureau of 
Labour Statistics and the National Institute Economic 
Review criticised the British government's registered 
unemployment figures from this point of view. 6 Guy 
Standing drew the following conclusion from this 
critique of unemployment statistics, 
The evidence suggests that the downturn in the 
labour market since 1966 has been generally 
underestimated by policy makers. This is suggested 
by the comparison between the evidence on 
unemployment and ,that on employment and 
participation rates. 
The critique of Standing, Meacher and Cairncross amongst 
others was connected to the defence of social democratic 
policy goals established during the long boom years. 
On the other hand, several politicians and economists of 
the right argued that the statistics exaggerated the 
level of unemployment and that this exaggeration led to 
policy errors. In 1972, John Wood argued that 
unemployment could be only considered a real indicator 
if it excluded the ill, older unemployed and disabled. 
He suggested that underlying unemployment would at that 
time rather than being in excess of 450,000 would more 
reasonably be something in the order of 160,000. 8 Wood 
was writing for the right-wing think-tank, the Institute 
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for Economic Affairs, which played a considerable role 
in constructing the ideas of the British New Right, of 
Thatcherism. Indeed, Sir Keith Joseph weighed in on the 
argument in the run-up to the general election of 1974 
criticising the bipartisan approach of the post-war era 
which, due to a misinterpretation the unemployment 
figures, was aimed at 'fuller than full employment' or 
'negative real unemployment'. He argued that various 
categories should be deducted to establish a meaningful 
yardstick of unemployment, these included those who had 
been unemployed under 8 weeks, the 'actual scroungers', 
and those difficult to place due to ill health or age. 
The favourable reception by the Times of Sir Keith 
Joseph's Preston speech indicated that the argument of 
the New Right, was not the ramblings of mavericks 
destined for the political wilderness for the rest of 
their careers, but people who were to gain political 
ascendancy in the Conservative Party in the course of 
the seventies. 
Sir Keith Joseph is ... right in regarding the 
whole post war economic policy in Britain as 
having been overinfluenced by the fear of 
unemployment, partly because of the statistical 
misrepresentation of the unemployment figures 
consistently exaggerated ghe true levels of 
unemployment in the economy. 
However, by the eighties the argument had been turned on 
its head. The criticism of government statistics now 
centred on official reductions in the figures and claims 
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that unemployment was officially underestimated. As a 
result of 30 changes to the monthly claimant count of 
unemployment, between October 1979 and September 1989 
numerous articles found their way into newspapers, 
public confidence in the figures plummeted, and an 
alternative index was established by a independent 
research organisation, the Unemployment Unit. IO These 
changes were introduced in the name of increased 
accuracy or administrative efficiency. Official 
explanations of this nature were unable to quell 
controversy • 
•..• Because all the changes but one minor one have 
operated in the direction of reducing publjshed 
unemployment totals by a cumulative 424,000, as 
well as 1.4 points in percentage terms, the 
suspicion lingers that the motive behind them was 
to reduce the damaging political effect of high 
unemployment. After all, accuracy would have been 
improved by adding to the count some of those not 
claiming benefit who are defined 11 unemployed in 
the UK's own Labour Force Survey. 
To get to grips with the controversy, closer inspection 
of the principal disagreements over the measurement of 
unemployment is required. 
The definition of unemployment is usually not the source 
of disagreement. The problem is the different ways of 
calculating the unemployment rate once a broad 
definition is agreed. The official figures reflect this, 
the Labour Force Survey and claimant count contradict 
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one another and measure different categories of 
unemployment. The claimant count has been subject to the 
severest criticism as it comes out monthly and is 
produced with the shorter time lag, figures coming out 
on the third Thursday of the following month, whereas 
the lag for the LFS even in its improved present form 
entails a three month lag on quarterly data. The method 
by which the basic statistics are collected is one 
reason for discrepancy. The claimant count is an 
administrative figure derived from those signing on at 
unemployment offices. The LFS takes the form of a 
questionnaire sent to a sample of the population. The 
claimant count includes a number of people not 
considered by the ILO to be unemployed. In Spring 1991 
there were 660,000 on the claimant count but not 
considered unemployed by the ILO, of which 400,000 were 
not available for or seeking a job and 890,000 had had 
an hour or more paid work in the reference week. On the 
other hand, 750,000 were unemployed but not on the 
claimant count. 12 For Christopher Johnson there was an 
obvious solution, 
Since both the benefit claimant definition and 
the Labour Force Survey definition cover people 
who might be regarded as unemployed for different 
reasons, it would seem logical to merge them. We 
then find that there were 4 million unemployed or 
14.3 q3r cent of the working population, in Spring 
1986. 
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Further claims of government manipulation of 
unemployment statistics have arisen. Between 1983 and 
1989 the government claimed that employment had risen by 
3.4 million. However, it was pointed out by Henry 
McLeish MP14 that this figure included several 
components that are highly questionable. He identified 
the ambiguities of part-time working, training schemes 
and self-employment as reasons to suspect the official 
labour market statistics. 
The debate over the level of unemployment has 
tended to focus on the impact of changes to the 
way statistics have been calculated over recent 
years. Since taking office in 1979, the 
Conservatives have shown little hi§itation in 
manipulating to tell their own story. 
This is relevant to our discussion of unemployment for 
three reasons. The first reason is the press coverage 
and political impact of the report relates to the 
general discussion and attitudes to unemployment 
statistics. 16 Secondly, the ongoing argument about the 
integrity of government statistics led to calls for a 
national statistics council independent of the 
ministries. I7 Thirdly, inactivity, employment and 
unemployment, the three labour market states, are locked 
into a dynamic and dependent relationship. As McLeish 
pointed out, changes in the level and nature of 
employment affect unemployment and inactivity. 
196 
If we examine the deeper issues then we can see that 
part-time work raises two related questions. Firstly, to 
what extent has the rise in employment been due to a 
rise in full-time employment? Secondly, has a change in 
the scale of part-time employment given rise to an 
increase in the number of those taking on two jobs? 
McLeish found that 1,462,000 of the 3.4 million, or 
43%, of the new employment figure was due to part-time 
working; a ratio much greater than the ratio of part-
time to full-time in the economy as a whole. If this 
surge in part-time work had taken place on a full-time 
basis the effect on the numbers in employment would have 
been approximately half of the actual increase (assum-
ing that two part-time jobs can be replaced by one full-
time post.) On the second point the number of double 
jobbers have risen faster than employment in general. 
Those double-jobbing rose by 352,000 in this period, it 
should remembered that those having two jobs are counted 
twice in the employed population. 
The second set of difficulties arise with self-
employment figures. These are questionable because of 
the gap that widened between those defining themselves 
as self-employed according to the yearly labour force 
survey and the numbers registered as paying national 
insurance contributions appropriate to self-employment. 
In 1983, the LFS estimate for self-employment stood at 
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2,209,000 whilst the NI registration of self-employment 
stood at only 1,600,000. By 1987 the Labour Force Survey 
recorded 2.8 million whilst the National Insurance 
figures showed 1.9 million. 18 This obviously raises a 
question mark over the nature of the evolution in self-
employment. 
Thirdly, training and employment schemes need scrutiny. 
The Youth Training Scheme, Restart, and Employment 
Training were all products of the 1980s and involved 
numbers of those affected by unemployment. Hundreds of 
thousands of places on YTS and ET were created and 
these went onto the employed population. However the 
degree to which this was genuine training or even 
genuine job creation was questioned. Bill Jordan, 
President of the then AEU, and certainly not a left or 
radical trade union leader, said that the work 
experience scheme was, 
.. Nothing more than a palliative, designed to 
fiddle the unemployment figures ... If adopted it 
will take people out of thel~nemployment count but 
not give them a proper job. 
Furthermore, the Restart interviews which started in 
1986 became a method by which the unemployed would be 
taken off the unemployment register, as this was 
combined with stricter eligibility for work tests. It is 
thought that these two factors have significantly 
reduced the figures of unemployed. Most long-term 
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unemployed Restart interviewees re-enter the 
unemployment figures as newly unemployed. A Bank of 
England report estimated that Restart accounted for 
a 750,000 reduction in unemployment figures. Considering 
Restart has conducted 6 million interviews it has been 
very unsuccessful in its declared intention, as a bridge 
between unemployment and employment. 20 Internal Civil 
Service figures published by the Unemployment Unit 
reveal that of those interviewed only 13% were submitted 
for jobs but less than 1% were actually taken up. 
However, a later study found that Restart did reduce the 
time of claiming benefit by about 5%.21 
As a result of the controversies of the eighties 
Professor Benjamin noted, in a report for the Economic 
and Social Research Council that unemployment, 
.. is now the classic example of the damage that 
can be done to trend analysis by frequent changes 
in definitions, especially when there is no way of 
translating one base to another. The tragedy is 
that more damage is done to credibility than any 
gain to political advantage and genuinely non-
political motivated social and economic scienti~2s 
are denied the means to observe the real trend. 
The controversies of the unemployment statistics in 
Britain therefore have led to a serious challenging of 
the credibility of the data. But the issue is not one of 
simple political manipulation; to leave the argument at 
this level would imply that there can be 'unprocessed I 
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data which would accord the measurement and definition 
of unemployment an asocial and ahistorical objectivity. 
To shed light onto the controversies it is therefore 
necessary to go deeper, to establish the social 
processes that have affected the underlying construction 
of unemployment measurement in the last two decades. 
Our focus will be upon three key categories, suggested 
by Chapter 3, to be of particular significance in the 
British case: women, life-cycle (in particular youth and 
old age) and disability. 
4.2 Women and the measurement of unemployment 
The issue of women and unemployment is commonly linked 
to the 'reserve armyl thesis. Marx developed the notion 
to describe sections of the population which could be 
mobilised during economic upswing, only to be discarded 
with recession. 23 Women, it is argued, are drawn into 
the labour market at times of labour shortage to vanish 
back into the family or join dole queues when that 
demand slackens. 24 
In Britain, it is difficult to place women's experience 
of unemployment in this category. The fundamental reason 
for this is that women's unemployment has been generally 
lower than men's although the participation rate 
differential has narrowed. There are two explanations of 
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this. The first is that this is a statistical myth, a 
distortion due to definitional and accounting proced-
ures. The second is that the 'reserve armyl thesis is no 
longer tenable where British women are concerned. 
Interestingly, John Wood of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs argued that women, along with the youth, should 
be excluded from the unemployment figures in the early 
seventies, which might give credibility that the lower 
rates of unemployment for women are statistically 
artificial. 25 Samuel Brittan of the Financial Times 
echoed Woodis arguments that unemployment levels were 
statistically inflated. 26 Hence, there would seem to be 
ideological pressure to statistically minimise women's 
unemployment, supporting the notion that relatively low 
female unemployment is artifically created. 
Indeed, several writers have noted the inadequacy of 
registered unemployment or claimant count unemployment 
in recording women's unemployment. 27 
Non-working women are a very heterogeneous group 
exhibiting various degrees of current attachment 
to the labour market. Some want jobs and may be 
broadly defined by economically active, while 
others have withdrawn either temporarily or 
permanently from the labour market to look after 
their families or have retired form paid work 
through illness or injury. Deciding which non-
working women are unemployed is difficult, for as 
we anticipated, the usual registered or unregister 
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-ed meas~8es are not straightforwardly applicable 
to women. 
When the 1971 Census of Population and the registered 
unemployment figures were compared it was found that a 
relatively small number of men and larger number of 
women were unemployed but not on the official registered 
count. There are essentially two reasons for this 
discrepancy. 
Firstly, for numbers of married women their husband's 
income makes them ineligible for unemployment benefit. 
Therefore, wage and social security structures combine 
to remove women from the figures. Before 1982 women who 
were unemployed but ineligible for benefit could join 
the register so not all were discounted, but with the 
discontinuation of the register and movement to a simple 
claimant count this was lost. Before the end of 
unemployment registration, the discrepancies between the 
General Household Survey and the official registered 
unemployment was stark. 29 
The move to a claimant count in 1982 did not undermine 
this relationship as the Unemployment Unit reported in 
1989, 
Whereas the claimant count for spring 1987 is 
composed of 69% men (2,050,000) and 31% women 
(910,000), the Labour Force Survey figures show 
202 
52% men (210,000) and 48% women (1,960,000). This 
underlines the frequently made point that the 
monthly unemployed figures drastically understates 
~omen's unemployment. These fb'gures suggest this 
7S done so by over a million. 3 
This is borne out by figures produced by the Employment 
Gazette from Labour Force Surveys and Claimant Counts. 31 
Non-claimant unemployment is a phenomenon which is 
predominantly female with a high proportion of whom are 
married (70% in 1987 and 1988; 62% in 1989; 59% in 1990, 
whereas only about 40% of unemployed claimants are 
married).32 
Secondly, social security arrangements have always 
viewed claimants according to family centred notions. 33 
It used to focus on the male head of the household. 
This concept blurred levels of women1s unemployment as 
it was assumed that family units contained a single 
wage-earner who was male. However, due to a 1979 EC 
directive either partner can now be nominated. But the 
fact that benefits are still centred on the notion of 
the family means that in reality a woman1s position may 
be distorted. Jane Millar described the inadequacy of 
the non-discrimination directives: 
Equal treatment should be taken further for 
example it should mean that in unemployed couples 
both the man and the woman have the same incentive 
to register as unemployed, the same individual 
benefit entitlement, the same access to training 
and other employment schemes - and, of course, the 
same conditions and penalties attached to 
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eligibility. 34 
Therefore, survey and census data in Britain should be 
considered a more reliable indicator of womenls 
unemployment. There are several such British sources; 
the Census of Population, the Labour Force Survey, the 
General Household Survey and the Family Expenditure 
Survey. 
Survey data is itself not perfect as regards womenls 
unemployment. Firstly, there is the possibility of the 
'contamination l by claimant count figures: as survey 
data depends on self-definition, an individual IS 
position within the social security regulations may 
affect their perception of their own employment status. 
Secondly, the ILO definition of unemployment is 
'dependent-blind l ; women may not be searching for work 
as they are engaged in search activities for alternative 
care arrangements for children or other dependent family 
members. Both of these factors are likely to disproport-
ionately affect women. For this reason the criteria of 
immediate availability imposes particular difficulties 
on women. Thus in the 1987 Labour Force Survey 641,000 
women stated that they would like a job but were not 
free 
men 
to begin work within a fortnight (the figure for 
was 363,000).35 It is likely a large proportion of 
these could not do so because of care responsibilities. 
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Indeed, two criteria take women out of the unemployed on 
this basis, both the seeking work criteria and 
availability for work. Thus, in 1990, 50,000 women were 
in the claimant count,( i.e. were not looking for work), 
in order to look after 'home/family' .36 
The Labour Force Survey is also unable to get to grips 
with the real levels of underemployment of women as its 
definition of employment is one hour a week for payor 
profit. 37 Here again, women are misrepresented by the 
definitional criteria. This can be demonstrated by 
figures from the 1990 LFS. 8.2% of women employees work 
less than 10 hours a week, compared to less than 2% of 
male employees; the contrast is more clear cut with the 
self-employed where 13.3% of women work less than 10 
hours, male self-employment is less than 2% again. In 
the 1991 LFS 5.4% of women employees worked 0-7 hours a 
week whilst only 1.1% of men did so.38 Women's 
underemployment is associated with homeworking, outwork, 
family work, employment banks, temporary work and other 
flexible practices that unemployment figures do not 
adequately explain. 39 
Therefore the measurement of women's unemployment is 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
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Firstly, definitional criteria centre around concepts 
ill-suited to certain aspects of women's economic 
activity. The first is the notion of the family, which 
assigns to women, a gender-specific role which is by no 
means the case for all women. Secondly, notions of 
employment centre around full-time, workplace, permanent 
jobs. 
Secondly, normal legal equality does not harmonise men 
and women's experience at work, with social security or 
in the home. It, therefore, should not blind us to the 
way in which these different experiences can be mis-
represented by measurement procedures that imply they 
are measuring like with like. 
Thirdly, childcare is a crucial question in the ability 
of women to take up work, how many hours they can work, 
where they can work, and what status they have at work. 
Employer and state strategies can mould the 
participation and labour market position of women ln 
ways in which we should be aware. 
In Britain, the official levels of women's unemployment 
underestimate the true nature of the problem. Women's 
employment and unemployment, because of the factors 
outlined above, are labour force categories that are 
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both dynamic and have a certain about of malleability. 
This is crucial, therefore, to our understanding of the 
social construction of unemployment measurement. Whilst 
a crude reserve army thesis is an inadequate explanation 
of the women's economic activity in Britain, in the 
1970s and 1980s, there is a sense of continuity between 
reserve aspects of women's relation to the labour market 
and the present flexibility of women's status. This 
transformation is obscured by simple unemployment 
figures. 
4.3 Unemployment and the Life Cycle 
The evolution of the labour force and therefore 
unemployment is a multi-dimensional process. 
Historically, economic activity is determined by the 
socially constructed life cycle. As economic development 
takes place, the economic activity of people of 
different ages tends to become increasingly structured 
and conditioned by the interaction of the labour market 
and state policy. 
The notion of the life cycle leads to an investigation 
of three aspects of the labour force of particular 
importance from this perspective: youth, old age and 
demographic-age factors in the population structure. Our 
starting point is the rise of unemployment from the mid 
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seventies to the present and it effect on economic 
activity. 
Firstly, activity changes are differentiated by gender, 
the most dramatic is the increase in female 
participation, which is particularly marked between 25 
and 54 year olds, for whom economic activity has risen 
by over 20 percentage points from 1971 to 1990. 40 In 
overall terms, male economic activity has declined while 
the figure for women has risen in the same period. 
Secondly, activity of the older sections of the labour 
force has declined. This is most pronounced amongst men, 
where decline begins at an earlier age and is of a 
greater magnitude than for women. For men, the decline 
begins in the 45-59 age group, but is clearest amongst 
the 60-64 age group, their decline from 1971 to 1990 was 
28.5 percentage points; for women the only decline was 
amongst those women aged 60 or over whose activity 
declined by 4.9 percentage points. 41 
The third dimension of the changing life cycle is the 
near stability of male participation from the age of 20 
to 44 years. Interestingly these are the only age-gender 
groups for which there is not a change in economic 
activity in one direction or another of more than 4 
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percentage points; in fact, the change is less than 1.5 
percentage points. 42 
Finally, There is a rise in youth (16-19 years) activity 
rates for both men and women, of 4.8 and 5.7 percentage 
points respectively. 
It is important to explore these changes and to analyse 
how they affect the measurement of unemployment. 
~ Youth: schemes, education, and unemployment 
The change in youth economic activity needs to be broken 
into its constituent parts. Firstly, education is 
obviously a feature which has a specific bearing on 
youth activity rates. Secondly, youth unemployment is 
considered a problem in its own right and governments 
have often responded with measures specifically geared 
towards the young, such as the Youth Training Scheme and 
Youth Opportunity Programme in Britain. 
The breakdown in youth activity gives rise to four key 
observations. 43 Firstly, employment has fallen 
dramatically from 65% of 16-18 year olds in 1976 to 42% 
in 1988. It continued to fall throughout the period for 
both men and women, but that fall slowed towards the end 
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of the period. 
Secondly, a shift occurred in education away from part-
time towards full-time, part-time numbers declined from 
22% to 7% of 16-18 year olds and those in full-time 
education rose from 26% to 33% {1976-1988}, the chief 
beneficiary of this was further education. The overall 
level of full-time educational enrolment has then been a 
factor in the changing activity of young people but one 
that does not explain the rise in youth economic 
activity, indeed a rise in educational enrolment leads 
to a countervailing trend. Neither the level of 
employment or education explain the changes, in fact 
both would suggest movement in the opposite to that 
experienced, i.e. of a declining youth economic 
activity. 
Thirdly, the introduction of the Youth Training Scheme 
has altered the composition of youth activity. The YTS 
accounted for 16% of 16-18 year olds by 1988, and has 
had a major effect on the patterns of youth activity. 
This factor would raise the level of economic activity. 
Training in the eighties has been complex due to the 
multiplicity of schemes. 44 
Fourthly, unemployment rose up to 1986 then began to 
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decline. Again this factor would maintain or raise the 
level of economically activity. So the rise in activity 
is due to the growth in YTS and unemployment. As to the 
decline in unemployment 1986-88, despite the fact that 
we cannot establish the precise relationship between 
employment, unemployment and YTS, a simple observation 
puts the fall of youth unemployment into perspective: 
the fall of unemployment was less than growth in YTS in 
1986-88. This may suggest that YTS growth was mopping up 
youth unemployment and the fall in unemployment was not 
a sign of improvement in the condition of the labour 
market for the young. 
The rise in YTS has had a dual impact: raising economic 
activity (equation 1) and reducing unemployment. Both 
these factors reduce the rate of youth unemployment as 
it increases a denominator and reduces a numerator in 
the equation of the unemployment rate (equation 2). 
1) economic activity = YTS + unemployed ~ employed 
total population 
2) unemployment rate = the unemployed 
(YTS + the unemployed + employed) 
The two formulae enable us to establish the impact of 
training schemes as a variable within the youth 
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population within the employment-unemployment-inactive 
schema. We can conclude that the treatment and growth of 
YTS has been a major factor in the levels of economic 
activity recorded amongst the young (equation 1). 
Moreover, several authors have drawn attention to the 
inadequacies of the YTS. They focus on the shift in 
emphasis from training to subsidising employers, the 
unclear relationship between YTS and enhancing job 
prospects and the impact on the measurement of 
unemployment. 
There is no denying that the YTS and simi lar 
training programmes have had a considerable impact 
on measured unemployment but critics of the scheme 
have suggested that it merely disguises 
unemployment or, worse, has shifted the emphasis 
away from the acquisiti~g of skills towards the 
social control of youth. 
Ql Old age: early retirement, falling participation and 
disability 
As we have seen the second crucial aspect of the 
evolving life cycle of economic activity is the fall . 1 n 
participation by older workers, particularly older men. 
The phenomenon of early retirement has to be considered 
as a product of changing labour market conditions, as a 
government strategy, and as an employer strategy. 
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Firstly, it is important to stress that early retirement 
cannot simply be reduced to state policy. The scale and 
timing of the decline in participation does not 
correspond to the Job Release Scheme and various 
alterations to the national insurance, the measures 
implemented by the British government. In part then, 
early retirement derives from employer strategies and 
in the general rise in job loss since the late sixties. 
Redundancy and early retirement has been a strategy of 
laying people off. Research has shown that workers who 
choose early retirement after job loss do so because of 
labour market conditions, health and disability.46 
Redundancy and the depressed labour market for older 
workers is the crucial factor in 'choosing' early 
retirement, particularly if structural considerations 
such as mobility, regional unemployment and 
manufacturing decline are accounted for, 
.... The life span is being socia"y redefined in 
a more complex fashion, with a variety of routes 
being constructed to assist the individual's 
transition from full time work to retirement ... We 
are talking about people who have left the labour 
force because of sickness or unemployment and who 
do not necessarily regard themselves in a 
subjective sense - as "retired" until45hey become 
eligible for a state old-age pension. 
The second aspect of the reduction of activity of older 
workers is early retirement through occupational pension 
schemes. Occupational pension schemes have increased 
from the sixties, but they have done so in an uneven 
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manner. Men rather than women, people with higher rather 
than lower incomes and those in the public rather than 
private sector are more likely to be covered by an 
occupational pension. According to an European 
Commission report, 51% of the UK workforce in 1987 were 
covered by an OPS.48 The significance of these schemes 
is that they offer employers a method of restructuring 
through early retirement when there is not a 
comprehensive scheme established by the state. In some 
of the schemes early retirement is an option for 
employees but often this is at the expense of lower 
rates of pension. 
Thirdly, we have to deal with government strategies. The 
1965 Redundancies Payments Act and the 1977 Job Release 
Scheme are the two pieces of legislation that have had a 
direct bearing on older workers. The RPA was introduced 
as a means to facilitate restructuring by firms, 
helping workers find other jobs and making lay-offs more 
palatable to a working class movement that had built up 
strong shop stewards organisation. The JRS was in part 
developed in a similar spirit. It differed in two 
respects. Firstly, it was an early retirement scheme 
and, secondly, it had the additional criterion of 
replacement of the retiree by an unemployed person, 
since by that time the level of unemployment had become 
a political problem, alongside that of restructuring of 
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British industry. These two pieces of government labour 
market intervention went hand in hand with an increasing 
marginalisation of older workers. As Lascko and 
Phillipson put it, 
.. from the 1970s onward, older workers became 
increasingly marginalised in the labour force. 
This arose through: 1) their concentration , in 
many cases, in contracting industries; 2) the 
operation of particular schemes to promote worker 
redeployment (eg. the RPA) or replacement (eg. the 
JRS); 3) the pressure of mass unemployment; and 4) 
changing attitudes among government, ~~siness, 
trade unions and older people themselves. 
The JRS was always selective, limited and, unlike other 
European early retirement schemes, not earnings related 
but flat rate. Thus it has not been as considerable a 
factor as early retirement schemes have been elsewhere 
in Europe. At its height, its take up rate was only 12% 
of those men eligible. 
The JRS is unable to account for much of the decline in 
economic activity. However, other government policies 
have influenced the decisions of older workers and their 
labour market status. 
The system of social security is a factor 1n the 
decisions that change people's economic activity status. 
Through social security, governments have a bearing upon 
the activity of older workers. Firstly, Invalidity 
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Benefit was made more attractive compared to Unemploy-
ment Benefit. In 1971, the two benefits were the same 
amount but by 1981 Invalidity Benefit was worth a third 
more than Unemployment Benefit, and Invalidity Benefit 
has the additional advantage of being paid to the age of 
70. The numbers receiving Invalidity Benefit has 
increased steadily in this period. There has been an age 
related shift from the category of unemployment to the 
category of disability, as a result of changes in the 
social security system. 
Although this is not official policy, an 
increasing number of older workers on invalidity 
benefit have been leaving the labour market early 
in recent years and a substantial part of the 
decrease in older men's activity rates is 
accounted for by the rise in the proporgbon of 
older men defining themselves as disabled. 
The social security system also has a bearing on the 
activity of older workers in terms of unemployment 
provisions. Several changes have taken place that either 
took older workers off the claimant count or gave them 
incentives not to claim as unemployed. These changes 
reduce the claimant count statistics, according to the 
Unemployment Unit the cumulative effect on the claimant 
count was a reduction of 221,800 by late 1989. 51 
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Figure 4.1: CHANGES lR REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT CRITERIA 






~ group change 
60+ men those unemployed for over a year 
do not have to register as 
unemployed if eligible for 
Supplementary Benefit if do so 
gain long term rate 
60+ men if not eligible to benefit no 
longer required to sign on in 
order to get National Insurance 
credits 
60+ men allowed long term SB rate straight 
away 
55-60 lowers age limit for abatement of 
UB to occupational & personal 
pensioners 
--------------------------------------------------------
source: Unemployment Unit Briefing, 'Creative 
Accounting', Unemployment Unit, 1989 
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The question of early exit from the labour market for 
older workers is clarified by establishing the 
dimensions of the various routes of exit. As we have 
already shown the phenomenon is most pronounced when 
older men are considered. It is worth reiterating that 
the decline in activity for older men aged 60-64 from 
1971 to 1990 was 28.5 percentage points. Several 
Government and employer policies are responsible for the 
decline: disability, state early retirement, social 
security system incentives, and occupational pensions. 
These are not necessarily causes, but may be different 
expressions of degenerating labour market conditions for 
older workers. The following figure shows the different 
benefit statuses of those aged 60-64 in 1983 and can 
give us some idea of the proportionality of different 
early exit routes in the 1980s as a whole. 
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Table 4.1: BENEFIT STATUS OF MEN AND WOMEN AGED 60-64 
NOT llt EMPLOYMENT I N1983 




ii) invalidity benefit 




iv) long term SB not 6 
v) 





vi) other (includes other SB 6 
and not registered 
as above) 
source: Lascko and Phillipson from DHSS 
219 
% had an 






The major routes out of the labour market are therefore 
disability and occupational pensions. The numbers of 
those unemployed after 1983 were reduced by the changes 
in the social security system of April and June 1983 and 
October 1988. Although this should have only altered the 
monthly claimant count figures, it would also possibly 
alter the individual's self-perception and therefore the 
labour force survey. 
4.4 Unemployment and Disability 
Certain studies have shown that in other countries 
definition of and social provision for the disabled has 
had a significant impact on the level of measured 
unemployment. 52 The question we have to ask ourselves 
then is, what is the relationship between unemployment 
and disability in Britain? The obvious starting point is 
to examine the measurement of and social security 
provision for the disabled. The basic measure of the 
disabled comes from registration under the terms of the 
1944 and 1958 Disabled Persons (Employment) Acts. The 
problem with this measure is that it is does not cover 
all those who are disabled. In fact, it accounts for 
only about half the total. 53 Nevertheless, the 
registered disabled series does demonstrate a number of 
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interesting points. The first is that there is the 
extent to which the numbers of disabled seemed to have 
declined since the Second World War. In part this may be 
connected to the shifting balance between war and 
industrial injuries; registration was involuntary for 
many of those disabled by war. This may suggest that the 
registration process itself is stigmatising, or that 
there are fewer prospects of employment as a result of 
registration, with the changing conditions and attitudes 
to disabled people's employment. P.Townsend tried to 
explain the decline, 
Yet to relate such an individualistic explanation 
to the uneven statistical decline is unconvincing 
... Two factors deserve to be given very serious 
attention. One is the rise in unemployment itself 
at the end of the 1960s, again in the early 1970s 
and especially in the late 1970s. Registration for 
the purpose of securing employment must have 
seemed increasingly unproductive both to the 
people with disabilities and employment office 
staff. But another factor must have been the 
willingness of Disablement Resettlement Officers 
and other emgJoyment office staff to invite people 
to register. 
Secondly, it is noticeable that unemployment figures 
among registered disabled people show greater stability 
than for the able bodied. Unemployment for disabled 
people is not subject to the same levels of cyclical 
pressure as amongst the able bodied. This may suggest 
that instead of unemployment, disabled people drop out 
of the labour market. It is not the case that disabled 
people's employment is less vulnerable during recession, 
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. indeed it 1 s generally more so: in the recession of 
1979-81 the employment of the disabled fell by 33% 
compared 20% for the population as a whole. 55 
In times of high unemployment generally 
... person who is unemployed is under 





Finally, there seems to be a significant fall in the 
number of registered disabled people who are unemployed 
in 1984, coinciding with the replacement of the Non-
Contributory Invalidity Benefit by the Severe Disability 
Allowance. In this case, revisions of the the social 
security system and shaping of the disability category 
combine to bring about a drop in the number unemployed. 
It would therefore seem that the figures derived from 
the registration of disabled people are unsatisfactory 
social indicators for three reasons. Firstly, the long 
term falling numbers on the register, which probably 
reflects the large proportion of disabled people who 
prefer not to register. Secondly, the unemployment rate 
of those on the disability register and the weak 
cyclicality seems to contradict all the established 
research into disability and unemployed people. Thirdly, 
there is the change from the Non-Contributory Invalidity 
Pension to Severe Disability Allowance which seems to 
account for a significant drop in the number of 
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unemployed disabled people on the registered count. 
Another source of statistical information on the 
relationship between disability and unemployment is from 
the benefit system which indicates the numbers on the 
various disability allowances. The treatment of the 
disabled is a complex matter as there are benefits that 
are either part of the National Insurance system (like 
Invalidity Benefit) or those supplementary to that 
system (like the Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension or 
the Severe Disability Allowance).57 In addition, there 
are the specific allowances that disabled people can 
claim for which there are also figures (such as Mobility 
Allowance), these figures may be misleading as people 
can claim such allowances with or without the major 
benefits. The major benefit schemes are the Severe 
Disability Allowance, and Invalidity Benefit. These 
schemes tend to exclude those over retirement age as 
those receiving the state pension will be better off 
than those on an invalidity benefit scheme. 
There has been a dramatic rise in numbers on both 
benefits since the mid-seventies, from a combined total 
of 615,000 in 1976-7 to 1,494,000 in 1989-90. 58 These 
numbers of people will not be included in claimant count 
figures of unemployment, whatever their status. The 
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reason for the rise in numbers can be accounted for by 
changing labour market conditions. An official report 
admitted as much, 
There is no single explanation for these 
increases. The rise in the number of Invalidity 
Benefit recipients may have been influenced by the 
labour market. Recent research ... found that the 
increase was more the result of people spending 
longer periods on b5~efit than on any increased 
propensity to claim. 
So length of time in the benefit system, due to an 
exclusionary labour market, has forced many to opt for 
disability benefits. The change from NelB to SDA 
reinforced this trend as coverage was purposefully 
increased. 60 
It is necessary to understand what the dynamics of 
disability as a social category. Here, a number of 
points need to be made. The assumption that there is a 
clear distinction between able-bodied and disabled 
people can be confusing. The scope and nature of 
disability is transformed by the life cycle. Thus, of 
those disabled living in private households, 58% are 65 
years or over, and 80% of those living in 'communal 
establishments , •61 Though not exclusively, disability is 
linked to ageing, and is thus part of the future 1 if e 
cycle of the many people not disabled at present. The 
statistical representation tends to marginalise the 
experience of disability, the fact that it affects many 
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of us at the older end of the life cycle. 
The age distribution of disability indicates that both 
disability and severity of disability increase 
significantly with ageing. 62 Thus, we might expect the 
interaction between disability and the labour market to 
be connected with falling rates of participation of 
older workers, whether this be due to disability 
pensions, or indirectly through early retirement. The 
treatment of disability in the labour market may be one 
of the principle reasons for this decline in economic 
activity.63 Piachaud examined the relation between 
unemployment, retirement and disability between 1971 and 
1981 and found, 
.. that disability, retirement and economic 
activity are significantly correlated with 
unemployment as defined. The evidence suggests 
that unemployment is not directly the cause of the 
increase in disability, indeed it seems probable 
that on a constant, objective definition the 
extent of disability has declined ... Rather it 
would appear that the impact of worsening labour 
market conditions has seen an increase in the 
proportion of men seeking and settling for the 
status of 'disabled' ... Similarly, in relation to 
retirement, the numbers discouraged from economic 
activity as a result of labg~r market 
conditions .. exceed the numbers added. 
This leads us onto an investigation of the state of 
economic activity of disabled people. The Department of 
Employment regularly publishes data on the levels of 
registered disability and the number unemployed, but, as 
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we have discussed, this is an unreliable guide as only 
20% of disabled men and 8% of disabled women are 
registered under the Disabled Persons Employment Act. 65 
The OPCS survey of 1989 broke down disability according 
to economic activity.66 
Economic activity of disabled people is a complex 
phenomenon. Firstly, there is the low level of 
employment of disabled people. Despite a government 
quota of three percent disabled people to be employed by 
large and medium employers, there is still widespread 
discrimination against disabled people. 67 There is a 
comparatively high level of unemployment amongst 
disabled people, though amongst women the figure is 
lower with high levels of women keeping house, which may 
indicate hidden unemployment. The OPCS survey explained 
the difficulty of measuring the economic activity of 
disabled people, 
It should be emphasised that this analysis was 
based on the conventional definition of unemployed 
as being available for work and actively seeking 
it. For disabled adults in particular, changes in 
the definition make a significant difference to 
whether they are classified as unemployed or 
economically inactive, and consequently to 
estimates of rates of unemployment among disabled 
adults. This analysis shows that the overall 
unemployment rates for economically active men and 
women were 27% and 20% respectively. At the time 
the survey was carried out, about 11% of 
economically active men and 9% of economically 
active women were unemployed according to the GHS, 
with whose ~esults this survey is most directly 
comparable. 68 
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Discouragement is probably a very important factor . 1 n 
understanding the economic activity of disabled people. 
The discouraged worker effect is something that has been 
well documented in general, but for four reasons it 1S 
likely to disproportionately affect disabled people: the 
age structure of disability, the longer lengths of time 
disabled people spend unemployed, discrimination from 
employers and lack of suitable jobs. Indeed, this last 
factor goes furthest in explaining the economic 
activity of disabled people for the social organisation 
theory of disability. If the organisation of work, the 
layout and equipment of workp~aces and division of 
labour is generally established without reference to the 
disabled population, then it is likely that high levels 
of economic inactivity, discouragement and unemployment 
will result from the existing social organisation of 
work. Indeed, according the OPCS survey of disabled 
people, of those disabled men looking for work 94% were 
not work ing for 1 ack of a su itab le job, for those 
available but not looking the figure was 68% and for 
women the respective figures were 89% and 56%.69 
Disability, then, is a category that requires careful 
investigation in the analysis of the measurement of 
unemployment. State policies and the social organisation 
of work have critical influence on the economic status 
227 
of disabled people. It is also argued that conventional 
norms in the conceptualisation of unemployment are ill 
suited to the lives of the disabled. The historical 
construction of the labour force is a process which has 
not by-passed disabled people. During periods of acute 
labour shortage, such as the Second War, efforts were 
made to integrate the disabled into the world of work, 
After the dismally high rates of unemployment 
throughout the 1930s, the rates had fallen 
dramatically in the early 1940s. In a period of 
full employment, rising levels of war production 
and public readiness to introduce sweeping social 
reforms, people with disabilities were able to 
find jobs and both employers and the state were 
prepared to take }3itiatives to make it easier 
for them to do so. 
However, with the onset of a prolonged period of slow 
growth and persistently high unemployment, as the Barber 
boom slid into the first recession of the seventies, the 
climate had quite clearly changed for the worse. Two 
decades of economic difficulties have fundamentally 
altered the position of disabled people. 
One of the effects of the economic recession of 
the 1980s is that disabled people who were 
regarded as 'essential manpower' forty years 
before ali now increasingly seen as 'surplus 
labour'. 
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4.5 Conclusions on the Measurement of Unemployment in 
Britain 
Britain's unemployment figures have attracted 
considerable controversy. To a certain extent this 
reflects contending conceptualisations of unemployment. 
The New Right see unemployment as an anomaly of a 
clearing labour market, either caused by search 
processes or the unions. The left viewed unemployment as 
the result of economic policy, that the market left to 
its own devices had not the solution to. 
Unemployment measurement in the UK can be seen to be the 
result of overlapping processes of social policy, state 
categorisation of the population and the evolution of 
the labour market. This has to be the deeper perspective 
for any discussion of political manipulation of the 
data. In particular four categories have reduced the 
level of measured unemployment. 
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Social policy has become increasing sophisticated with 
the stable development of the universal welfare state. 
In this way the state has a degree of control over the 
construction of unemployment that it never had before. 72 
In the British case, disability, youth training, and the 
treatment of women has allowed the state to mould 
unemployment in its own interest. 
In similar fashion, the state has become increasingly 
sophisticated as a statistical agency, with the 
increasing use of the superior survey method, which was 
only available through the 1931 census in the inter-war 
period, so it has greater control over the statistical 
process. This development indicates the limitations of 
simplistically talking of statistical manipulation 
alone. Increasingly accurate statistics are becoming 
available with increasing regularity through the Labour 
Force Survey. The state can shape unemployment through 
policy but it also needs to have an accurate picture of 
unemployment. 
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Chapter Five ~ The Measurement of Unemployment in France 
The emergence of unemployment in France and its 
statistical measurement contrasts with that of Britain. 
It would be incorrect to assume that the lessons of 
investigating British unemployment measurement can be 
automatically imposed upon any industrial nation. 
Further country-specific studies are required. This will 
firstly involve a detailed investigation of the French 
case. In several ways, the British case is not a 
un i versa 1, but a un i que mode 1, the first to tread the 
path of industrial revolution, modernisation and rural 
exodus, and the first to experience tendencies of 
relative decline in industrial nationhood. 
The British experience of industrialisation was in 
many ways a typ ica I not on ly of recent exper ience 
in the Third World but als9 of European experience 
in the nineteenth century. 
France was selected for a number of reasons. It has a 
developed liberal democratic political culture, with a 
singular political history. This creates the climate for 
statistical controversies. It is an industrially 
developed country, but with a pattern of development 
which has been the subject of interest for economic and 
social historians. French processes of industrial-
isation, so crucial to the historical concreteness of 
unemployment, differed from the British case in terms of 
timing, pattern and degree. The effects of the long 
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post-war boom and subsequent crisis were experienced by 
both Britain and France, but beneath the similarities 
very important differences can be determined. Several of 
the crucial non-industrial variables in the process of 
unemployment measurement do not correspond to the 
British model. State institutions, traditions and policy 
have a history in France distinct from those in Britain. 
The development of the welfare state and social policy 
has taken different trajector i es. State i nvo 1 vement in 
industry and planning is different in both countries. In 
France there were higher levels of state ownership and 
the French state formulated a more developed strategy of 
'indicative planning' and 'national champions'. Post-war 
government was also of a different political complexion, 
with a long period of right-wing rule being replaced by 
1 eft wi ng ru 1 e in the 1980s. For a 11 these reasons 
France commands attention in its own right and our case 
study is intended to understand the extent to wh i ch we 
should generalise or limit conclusions drawn from the 
British study. 
Our particular interest lies with the production of 
unemployment statistics, which takes place within a 
general framework of labour force concepts. In order to 
understand this production we have to situate it with 
po 1 it i ca 1 conf 1 i ct, the process of soc i a 1 and economl c 
development and the present economic crisis. 
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Statistical processes have to respond to a labour market 
. 
ln transition, which has brought about a 'crisis of 
representation I. France has undergone a transformation 
ln the composition of its labour force since the 
sixties. Female labour, migration, and welfare 
institutions have experienced important changes. Certain 
key sectors of industry have experienced decl ine whi le 
others, espec i a 11 y certain service industries, have 
expanded. More profoundly, from the mid seventies, the 
major economies of Western Europe experienced economic 
sluggishness, lower productivity growth, higher 
unemployment, and slower growth in GNP, that contrasts 
so sharply the golden years of the post-war boom. 2 
France stands out as the major OECD country which 
experienced the longest and largest uninterrupted 
rise in unemp loyment a fter the firs t 0 i 1 pr ice 
shock, with a peak of over 10% recorded in 1987 ... 
There has been a renewed rise in unemployment 
since the end of 1990. The nat ion a lso suffers 
from relatively severe probjems of long-term, 
youth and female unemployment. 
Our task, therefore, is to determi ne to what extent 
statistics and statistical definitions have consistently 
charted this changing reality. 
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5 . 1 Political Controversies over Unemployment 
Measurement in France 
France is no exception to the major controversy that has 
surrounded unemployment in Western Europe since the 
1970s. Ideologically, the French controversy arose out 
of the breakdown in the post-war Keynesian consensus. On 
a technical level it has been aggravated by the 
duplication of tasks by various institutions, especially 
with the establishment of the Agence National pour 
L'Emploi (ANPE) 1967-73 and the Employment division of 
INSEE at the same time. Materially, it has been more 
rooted in a radical transformation in labour market 
conditions in France. 
The issue of the true level of unemployment surfaced in 
the early 1970s. 
The deba te became hea ted in the 19 70s, 
particularly after 1974, it involved trade unions, 
and emp loyers and profess iona 1 assoc iat ions. The 
evolution of the number of unemployed constituted 
a strategic indicator for all sides, p laying an 
important role in the general conflicts. 
Bas ica "y, the emp loyers adopted a min ima 1 ist 
approach, questioning the category itself and 
estimating, from a very restrictive critique of 
officia 1 figures, different sub-categories. The 
core principle was that unemployment was extremely 
heterogeneous. The un ions took the oppos ite, 
rather maxima list, perspective. They supported, to 
a greater or lesser extent, unity of the 
phenomenon of unemp loyment. They used offic ia 1 
figures and multiplied them by a corrective 
coefficient'4 which varied according to each 
organisation. 
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For example, P.Cames ln L'Humanite, the French 
Communist Party's dai ly newspaper, challenged the 
official figures of registered unemployment. Carnes 
proposed that these should be multiplied by a 
coefficient of 1.65 in order to revise the registered 
unemployment figures in line with the data produced by 
the preceding census. 5 By 1972 the proliferation of 
unemployment measurement methodologies prompted M.Fahy 
to out 1 i ne and ca 1 cu 1 ate the contend i ng approaches for 
July of that year. The figures produced showed a 
startl ing divergence, as low as 143,600 at one extreme 
or as high as 820,000 at the other. 6 In part, as a 
recourse to a neutral arbiter in order to escape these 
arguments, the ILO definition was adopted for the Labour 
Force Survey from 1975 onwards. 
The right-wing Prime Minister Raymond Barre entered the 
fray in the late 1970s. He criticised the ILO measure of 
unemployment as, according to his analysis, it 
exaggerated the levels of unemployment by including 
peop 1 e who were not genu i ne ly seek i ng work. Barre, 1 ike 
Keith Joseph in Britain, preferred a restricted notion 
of unemployment, what he dubbed 'real job seekers ,.7 In 
a speech at the ILO, he dismissed comparisons with the 
1930s, as unemployment was not affecting adult male 
heads of household to the same extent, a formulation 
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which paralleled that being made by John Wood in 
Britain. 8 The ideological development ln Britain of a 
left and right critique of unemployment measurement, 
therefore, had their French counterparts; Joseph and 
Barre, Carnes and Standing were not simply parallels in 
form but also, at least partially, in the substance of 
their arguments. Thus, similar notions of falsely 
unemp 1 oyed or scroungers were connected to the right 
critique, unregistered unemployment to that of the left. 
But by the early eighties, the source and nature of the 
controversies were turned on their head. The focus of 
debate was redirected to a po 1 it i ca 1 controversy in 
which roles had been reversed compared to the UK: a left 
government defending unemployment figures against a 
different critique coming from the right, arguing for an 
extended notion of measured unemployment. 
This debate was made more complex still by duplication 
of technical statistical tasks, and contradictory 
results by different state institutions. 9 Whilst the 
official statistical institute, INSEE and the Employment 
Department disagreed on the level of unemployment, INSEE 
were quarrelling with L'Union National Interprofession-
elle pour L'Emploi dans L'lndustrie et Commerce 
(UNEDIC), which manages unemployment insurance payments, 
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over the size of the non-agricultural retail sector and 
the level of employment. 
Employment statistics have gone mad, doubly so, if 
we take into account the long running divergence 
between INSEE and UNEDIC which, each quarter, 
publish estimations of the evolution of thj labour 
force without any relation to one another. 0 
On the political level, public controversy continued as 
Lionel Stoleru, a former Barrist minister, published the 
Association de Recherches Internationales Economiques 
(ARIES) figure of 'rea 1 unemployment' which added some 
hundreds of thousands to the official figure. As 'real 
unemployment' was greater than official measured 
unemployment of the Mitterand government, so the simple 
left-right division in the argument became blurred. In 
the 1980s, in France, therefore, an open polemic raged 
over employment and unemployment statistics. 
This is certainly not without historical precedent. 11 
And, for those who expected controversy to vanish with 
technical improvements of the mid-nineteen eighties, 
they had to quickly rethink. As Alain LeBaude pointed 
out, successive Ministers for Employment and Social 
Affairs have been plagued by the same problem, 
•.. • After Michel Delebarre, the period of Lionel 
Stoleru's accusation, after Phillipe Seguin, who 
was forced to ca 1 1 for a report from Edmond 
Ma linvaud, the former head of INSEE, Jean-Pierre 
Soisson is in turn confronted by the weakness of 
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5 . 2 
statistics. Again we reproach statisticians for 
not knowing how to give account of the situation, 
of lacking credibility and, in the present case, 
of robbing the government of irrefutable ~roof of 
its success in the field of employment. 1~ 
Institutional Frameworks and Contending 
Methodologies of French Unemployment Measurement 
The production of official statistics is in France, as 
elsewhere, a socio-historical process affected by 
changes in technology, the economy and the state. 
However, the process is not an even-paced ascent to a 
plateau where everyth i ng is measured, understood, and 
planned; it is a journey fraught with difficulties, 
cho ices and contrad i ct ions. E. Ma 1 i nvaud, former head 
of L'Institute National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques (INSEE), the French statistical office, had 
no such illusions. He described statistical measurement 
since 1945 thus, 
It has benefited from investment and techn ica 1 
innovations in the manipulation of information ( 
much of which is behind the times). Statistical 
output has grown considerably in quantity and 
quality in the last forty years. However this 
growth is not sufficient to respond to the demand 
which develops apace. And two reasons, in 
particular, for dissatisfaction remain: the 
accuracy of much of the statistics is not what it 
is expected to be, and, the public statistical 
service is incapable f! providing the information 
so strongly demanded. 
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In order to establ ish a deeper understanding of the 
French unemployment controversies, it is therefore, 
necessary to look in greater detail at the substance of 
these problems, the state institutional frameworks which 
duplicate measurement, and the contending methodologies 
of unemployment measurement. 
The three major components of labour force statistics, 
active population, employment and unemployment are not 
uniformly derived from the same source and definitions 
in France. 14 
French unemployment statistics are also subject to the 
conflicting requirements of frequency, accuracy and 
international comparability. The 'Enquete Emploi I 
(labour force survey) was first conducted in the 1950s 
and were taken annually from the beginning of the 1960s. 
Since 1975, the annual labour force survey has measured 
u n e m p loy me, n t a c cor din g t 0 I LOr e com men d a t ion s . 1 5 Wit h 
the creation of the Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi more 
regular statistics were published, these measure those 
signing on with the ANPE offices. The resulting figures 
were initially known as the 'unsuccessful jobseekers', 
Demandeurs d'Emploi non Satisfaits (DENS), which was 
altered to the 'job seekers at the end of the month ' or 
Demandeurs d'Emploi en Fin de Mois ( DEFM ).16 Since 
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1985 the ANPE count has been recorded by a computerised 
postal response system. New problems accompanied GIDE 
(Gestion Informatique des Demandeurs d'Emploi), as it is 
called. It is subject to the vagarities of the post, the 
cut off date for receipt of responses can therefore mean 
fluctuations in the percentages that have returned the 
forms, the initial average rate being 94%. This can also 
distort the figures for entries and exits on and off the 
count. An example of this is how postal disputes 
affected the count in 1985. 17 
The problem with these figures ;s that they only count 
the people actually signing on, this as with so many of 
the problems is repeated in other countries. For 
example, Marchand and Thelot demonstrated that in March 
1985, 385,000 peop 1 e who were unemp 1 oyed accord i ng to 
the ILO definition, were not registered with the ANPE. 19 
Administrative claimant counts cannot, strictly 
speaking, give precise unemployment figures as this is 
not what they count, they give an accurate number of 
those signed on at unemployment offices, those, for 
example, who are not eligible for benefit are unlikely, 
therefore, to register. Malinvaud pointed out these 
deficiencies and the resulting frustrations of 
statisticians, 
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Figures derived from administrative functions 
rarely deal with precisely what statisticians aim 
to measure. They are conceived essentially for 
bureaucratic purposes. Therefore, they are more or 
less adequate. This is true of France where, 
statisticians often intervene naively according to 
their needs when an administrative operation is 
conceived or reformed. Sights should be set on 
the new law or regulation, on organisational 
competence not on thf9 economic and soc ia I 
information one desires. 
However, it may be dangerous to accept Malinvaud's 
conclusions, as it has been argued that administrative 
requirements are a convenient cover for ministers who 
manipulate statistics in their own interests. Both ln 
Britain and France administrative figures are used as 
indicators of unemployment and this has been the source 
of much controversy on both sides of the channe 1. For 
example, in the 1970s the French Communist Party rounded 
on the government for their use of the registered 
figures which were consistently lower than ILO data. 20 
Registered unemployment figures do, however, ha ve the 
real advantage of being able to show short-term shifts 
in the scale of unemployment. This contradiction has 
allowed confusion to develop around the accuracy and 
meaning of the figures. This confusion is encouraged by 
the med i a and not he 1 ped by changes in the 1 aw and 
regulations concerning eligibility. 
The DEFM and ILO unemployment figures often differ 
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significantly as to the rate of growth of unemployment. 
Indeed, whilst over the nine years 1979-88 DEFM rose by 
190% the ILO figure did so only by 179%. During the 
seventies the ILO figure was greater than the DEFM; this 
relationship was reversed in the 1980s. From 1982-86 
there was a more or less stable relationship between the 
two, but then the gap between the two series started 
widening. 21 Explaining divergences in these two 
unemployment series is a difficult and uncertain 
business. A report was commissioned by Mr. Seguin the 
Minister for Employment and Social Affairs. The report, 
E.Malinvaud's 'On the Statistics of Employment and 
Unemp 1 oyment I, attempted to exp 1 a i n these divergences 
as errors in individual figures; this was unconvincing. 
Thus, accord i ng to Ma 1 i nvaud, the DEFM exaggerated the 
1982-83 levels of unemployment, whilst this may have 
been the case, the 'isolated error l scenario does not 
provide a general explanation for recurrent contro-
versy.22 The knowledge that the two serles are 
distinguished by their ability to measure different 
variables of the active population (for example, ILO 
measure is far better at recording women's unemployment) 
should lead us away from an 'isolated error l explanation 
of divergences in long-run analysis. 
As the Malinvaud report was unable to resolve the 
confusion arising from the two series, the Government 
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felt it necessary to commission another report, to 
explain the widening gap between the two measures in the 
late 1980s. The proportion of the ILO figure to DEFM 
categories 1, 2, & 3 had fallen from 90.8% in March 1986 
to 78.0% in January 1990. The Lucas-Dubois report 
explained the break down in the relationship between the 
two series as due to the tighter 'seeking work ' 
criterion of the ILO measure. 23 However, the recommend-
ations of this report very much mirrored those of its 
predecessor. 
The picture is further complicated when the official 
statistics are challenged from outside official 
channels. This was the case with the ARIES series 
produced by L i one 1 Sto 1 eru between 1982 and 1986. His 
concern was that the creat i on, mass i ve expans i on and 
statistical treatment of various state schemes and 
policies had been used to distort true levels of 
unemployment. These policies had taken many out of the 
active population involuntarily. Hence, he argued that 
those forced into early retirement and that extended 
schooling should be considered unemployed. His argument 
went further, to criticise the notion of a strict 
dichotomy between emp loyment and unemp loyment in the 
active population, as it no longer fitted the reality. 
He therefore, establ ished a further category of under-
employment for those on training schemes. 24 An extended 
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definition of unemployment was taken up by others, for 
example, Andre Bergeron, head of the union Force 
Ouvriere. In March 1985 when official unemployment stood 
at around 2.4 million unemployed, he considered that, , 
We have easily overtaken the 3 million unemployed 
mark , . 25 
Continuing criticism of the official figures from the 
unions, the press and various political parties had 
undermined their credibi 1 ity. The existence of the 
alternative series had acted as a focus for critics 
normally at odds with each other. Seemingly, the matter 
was resolved by E.Malinvaud's report, having consulted 
the ILO and Stoleru, Malinvaud concluded that the ARIES 
IIrealll unemployment was unsatisfactory and that 
unemployment statistics had to comply to ILO 
definitions. Stoleru withdrew the series. The ILO was 
therefore able to legitimise the official figures when 
challenged by an unofficial series. 
Mal invaud did call for certain cosmetic changes. 26 
Nevertheless, Malinvaud's report was essentially an 
unapologetic defence of unemployment statistics. The 
following quotation demonstrates this and the isolated 
error approach he adopted. 
In sum, the public lack of confidence is not 
jus t ified, even if the experts can sight such and 
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such a case when some statjstjc or other underwent 
a small te~por~7Y devjatjon jn relatjon to what jt 
was measur7ng. 
Here we see two interesting factors, with the shape and 
social construction of statistics reinforcing one 
another. First, the authority of the head of INSEE 
resolved the question, not only due to his academic 
authority but also because of the legitimacy derived 
from the monopoly of statistical production by the 
state. Stoleru, a former Finance minister of the Barre 
government, based his series on a manipulation of 
official figures and his declared objective was also 
for the state to take up his redefinition of 
unemployment. He was, therefore, reliant on official 
. 
statistics in two senses. The second factor was the role 
of the ILO in backing up French official statistics. 
International comparability is deemed a necessity in a 
world economy whose financial and manufacturing systems 
are as integrated as present. Both institutions rely on 
being seen as neutral, disinterested and passive parties 
in the process of unemployment measurement. Ultimately, 
the twin monopolies of the state in statistical 
production and of international institutions ln 
definition were, therefore, the Achilles heel of Stoleru 
and other government critics; one which they seemed to 
have no effective answer to. 
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~ Understanding Unemployment in France 
In chapter two the historical development of 
unemployment was examined. Our conclusion was that the 
phenomenon of unemployment arose out of certain features 
of modern econom i c and soc i a 1 deve 1 opment. In br i ef 
modern economic development was based on three 
interconnected processes. The first aspect of 
development is the shift from a rural, agriculturally 
based society to an industrial urban one. Secondly, 
production became commodified; production for one's own 
consumption was replaced by production for the market. 
Thirdly, labour itself became increasingly commodified, 
with the expansion of wage-labour. 
The totality of unemployment ln France can only be 
understood if our starting point is the particular way 
this process of development took place in the French 
context. Th i s process has been subject to recent 
reinterpretation. The question of French development is 
an important point of comparison with British 
deve 1 opment, indeed, it is part of the very va 1 ue in 
using France as a subject of investigation. 
Traditionally, France has been viewed as a late or 
retarded developer in nineteenth century Western Europe, 
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particularly when compared to Britain and Germany. This 
perspective was very much based on a stage/diffusion 
approach, where industrialisation spread in the image of 
the industrial pioneer, Britain. Stages of economic 
growth and the leading sectors are assumed to follow the 
British model. However, this approach has been found to 
be potentially flawed. Britain is not typical in terms 
of economic development. Industrial productivity growth 
was slow outside a handful of leading sectors, that is, 
cotton, coal, iron and steel. Economic growth was 
unspectacular. However, structural change was dramatic 
with the pattern, scale and timing in the relative shift 
of labour from agriculture, being historically unique. 
Therefore, to methodologically impose the British model 
upon French social and economic history is misleading. 
If cotton, coal, iron and steel and structural change 
were seen as indices of economic development then France 
appeared relatively backward. However, if the basket of 
indicators was changed and finished industrial goods and 
demographic deceleration, i.e. the characteristics of 
French nineteenth century deve 1 opment, were be seen as 
key aspects of modernisation then, as Roehl has argued, 
France would be seen as the first industrial nation. 29 
The French trajectory of capitalist development 1S 
distinct to Britain's and this distinctness can point to 
some of the features of unemployment 1n France 
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historically. Our starting point has to be the broadest 
comparisons of French and British performance. From the 
point of view of economic growth, Britain did not 
significantly outstrip France ln the nineteenth century. 
When other genera 1 performance i nd i cators of the two 
countries are examined, important differences appear. 
Firstly, there is the performance of the agricultural 
sector. In Britain, agriculture had far higher 
productivity, it had greater proportions of capital 
(i.e. principally livestock) and land (which was of a 
higher quality) to labour. The higher level of 
agricultural productivity was the result of two 
connected processes. On the one hand, ownership of land 
was far more concentrated which allowed the creation of 
an investible surplus and on the other hand, 
commodification of agricultural produce was extended due 
to the separation of increasing numbers of British 
people from the land as a means of livelihood. P.O'Brien 
and C.Keyder described this process. In France, 
On each farm, output rema ined more divers ified 
because sma ller un its of product ion devoted 
resources to meeting their own demands for food 
and failed to take full advantage of opportunities 
for specialisation associated with production for 
the market. Fami ly farms also reta ined under-
employed labour, while in Britain 'capitalist' 
agriculture was compelled by market forces ( and 
the new Poor Law of 1834) to release or expel 
redundant labour. In France, the retention of 
labour in the countryside implied extensive 
cultivation of sub-marginal land of a quality that 
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in BritajB had long since been abandoned to rough 
pasture. 
Secondly, the industrial sector gives us some important 
po inters to the pattern of French deve 1 opment. Between 
1815 and 1914 there is little difference in industrial 
productivity in Britain and France. 31 Both countries 
adopted specialised patterns of industrial development, 
which followed relative comparative advantage, through 
factor endowments and factor supply. The British path 
was characterised by high labour supply, coal 
endowments, and good access to markets of consumer 
demand. Britain's specialisation followed a pattern of 
cotton, co a 1 , metallurgy, and particularly low 
wage/sk ill semi -manufactured goods, factory product ion 
was more pronounced than in France. In France more 
emphasis lay with finished manufactures, the workshop, 
high wage/skill areas, such as engineering, leather 
goods, silk/wool, building. The idea of a unique pattern 
of development was challenged by Zeitlin who argued that 
there existed alternatives to the mass production/heavy 
industrialisation path of development. 32 As O'Brien and 
Keyder pointed out, 
Concentration in some industrial histories on 
coa " iron and cotton text i les where labour 
productivity rose far more rapidly than in France 
diverts attention from the full range of ind-
ustrial employment and tends to exaggerate 
differences in the rates of increase of product-
ivity 35rom British and French industry as a 
whole. 
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From this brief assessment of the path of French 
development, there are several points that can be made 
about the construction of unemployment in France. 
If we are to reject the retarded development thesis, 
then this has implications for the timing, pattern and 
policy towards unemployment. There is no marked contrast 
in the timing of when unemployment was considered a 
problem in France compared to Britain. There are several 
criteria we can use to back this assertion up. Firstly, 
as we have noted elsewhere, the concern was first taken 
up by trade unions and the emerging working class 
movement in Br i ta in. French trade un ions a 1 so, in the 
course of the nineteenth century, established insurance 
for unemployed members. In some senses it could be 
argued that the French soc i ali sts were in advance of 
their British counterparts, with the establishment of 
the national workshops under the slogan of 'the right to 
work lin the Revo 1 ut i on of 1848. 34 Second 1 y, pioneer i ng 
social investigators of the new working class in both 
countries were aware of the problem from the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century.35 Thirdly, the 
development of labour exchanges occurred in both 
countries around the turn of the century and France was 
more advanced in this respect than Britain. 36 
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Although, unemployment was not substantially retarded by 
the French pattern of development, its dimensions and 
social content were different. This again results from 
the specificity of French economic development. The 
pattern of land ownership had implications for 
unemployment in France. As we have seen already, French 
agriculture was unlike British in that it had not 
experienced a similar level of concentration of 
ownership, capital accumulation, wage-labour or 
productivity. Thus, the rural exodus was stunted and the 
land retained large amounts of underemployment. The only 
way in which this underemployment, or if you like 
concealed unemployment, could be transformed into open 
unemployment would be through widespread farm 
ban k r u p t c i e s . Add i t i on a 11 y , t he 1 ow b i r t h rate mean t 
that there was not· the massive supply of labour for the 
industrial sector experienced in Britain. Also, the more 
rurally based nature of French industrial isation meant 
that the scope of open unemployment was 1 imited in two 
ways. Firstly, rural industrialisation, cottage 
industry, the putting out system and even the small 
fami ly workshop was able to conceal underemployment in 
the way in which a factory or mill was not. Secondly, 
families were able to combine agricultural and 
industrial pursuits; when industry is hit, activities 
were diverted into agriculture. 
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Therefore, the pattern of French development created 
unemployment at a similar time scale than that of 
Britain but its scope was more limited to that in 
Britain. The limited scope of French unemployment can be 
seen by long term comparisons of French and British 
unemployment. This situation existed right up until 
after the Second World War. Salais's examination of the 
1930s 1 inks areas of high French unemployment to 
urbanisation/ industrialisation shows the importance of 
this. 
In general, unemployment levels were much lower in 
France than Britain, the US or Germany. 1936 was the 
peak of interwar unemployment when, according to census 
figures, there were 860,000 unemployed (for registered 
figures the peak is only 470,000), which was not 
comparab 1 e to 1 eve 1 sin the other countr i es ment i oned 
which were much higher. 37 It would seem that this cannot 
be simply explained by greater resilience of the French 
economy during the 1930s. As Aldcroft demonstrated by 
several indicators, the French economy was very badly 
hit by recession. 38 The path of French development is 
part of the explanation as the Salais thesis suggested. 
Another part of the exp 1 anat i on is the expu 1 s i on of 
foreign workers. 
France, wh ich had eager ly we lcomed fore ign labour 
after the great war, turned its Service de la 
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Ma in-Oeuvre Etrangere to the tasks of cance II ing 
work permits and making sure that no foreigner 
held a job that a native Frenchman could fill. 
Between 1931 and 1933, more than ha If a mi I I ion 
Poles, Spaniards'39Italians, and other foreigners 
were repatriated. 
Our analysis suggests that the French pattern of 
development gave rise to unemployment of a 1 imited 
scope, but that the latter emerged as early as other 
early developing industrial nations. However, the 
persistence of the agricultural lag, though certainly 
true of the 1930s, had clearly disappeared by the 
emergence of mass unemployment in the late sixties/early 
seventies. 
In order to account for this we have to identify the two 
major characteristics of French agriculture in the post-
war period. Firstly, rural exodus profoundly transformed 
the weight of the agricultural sector within the active 
population. The agricultural sector withered, but this 
occurred far later than in the framework of British 
development. 
The process combined these quantitative changes with 
qualitative ones. A concomitant transformation occurred 
in capital and land ratios to labour. There was a 
spectacular growth in productivity, the average size of 
farm has increased dramatically, the sector became more 
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capital intensive, and output has shifted to more 
productive areas of farming. However, the increase in 
product i v i ty has added to pressures for a reduct i on in 
agricultural employment. 
Even the most competitive farmers are, paradox-
ically, more vulnerable than in the past: 
agr icu lture is the sector where the amount of 
capita I per head has increased the most, which 
goes hand in hand with acce lera ted debt ; the 
industrialisation of agriculture also translates 
into a very strong increase in intermediate 
consumption, which hardly reached 10% of va lue 
added in 1960, but a third in 1973. Farmers are 
therefore more and more sensitive to incidences of 
fluctuations in the rate of interest or of 
i n ~ u s t r
4
1if I p ric e s reI a t i vet 0 a g ric u I t u r a 1 
pr7ces. 
One dimension of the construction of measured 
unemployment is the historical process of industrial 
development. In this respect, France and Britain took 
different paths of development which had a crucial 
impact upon their levels of unemployment. In Britain, 
the demographic shift from agriculture, the 
commodification of agricultural activity and the 
uprooting of surplus agricultural population into wage-
labour occurred exceptionally early and rapidly within 
the process of development. These aspects of development 
occurred far later in France, what we might call an 
agricultural lag was experienced, a lag which only 
worked itself out after the Second World War. 
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These conclusions have considerable implications for the 
historical comparison of British and French measured 
unemployment. But during the present crisis their 
significance has waned. Our focus has to shift then away 
from development factors to characteristics of a modern 
society which can affect the construction of measured 
unemployment, such as social policy. 
5.4 Life-cycle and the Labour Market in France 
We have seen that the 1 ife cycle and the labour market 
interact in particular ways which have significantly 
given rise to certain phenomenon which affect the 
measurement of unemployment. Analysis of the 
participation rates in France demonstrates that 
considerable changes have taken place in the composition 
and nature of the active population in this economy. 
Analysis of the life-cycle can allow us to explore the 
impact of various areas of social policy on the active 
population. It can also help point to the extent to 
which we are measuring like with like when looking at 
long-run comparisons of French unemployment data or 
international comparisons of recent unemployment data. 
Study of the activity rates show that there are four 
major aspects of the evolution of the French labour 
force since the late nineteen sixties. 
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Firstly, male and female youth participation has 
declined significantly. Amongst young men (15-24 years) 
there has been a decline of 13.4% points, for young 
women 10.9% points (all figures for 1968-1989). 
Secondly, the middle working years (25-54 years) saw a 
striking difference in the experience of men and women. 
Amongst men high levels of participation were stable 
during the period. For women there was a spectacular 
growth in participation. For women aged 25-49 years 
participation advanced from 47.5% to 73.0% (1968-89). 
This, however, was not the largest swing for a section 
of the labour force; that occurred amongst older 
workers. 
Finally, then, there is the dramatic decline of older 
workers, which is more significant for men than women. 
Amongst men of 55-59 years, the fall in participation 
was 15.8% points, for those 60-64 years, 41.9% points. 
The decline was, respectively, of 1 and 17.7% points for 
women. 
As in the British case, it 1S therefore necessary to 
investigate youth, old age and women within the life 
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cycle, to understand the particular impact that the 
evolution of the labour force has had on the measurement 
of unemp loyment in France. Furthermore, each of the key 
changes in the life-cycle of economic activity we have 
pointed out in France, were experienced in Britain . 
.ti Youth 
Youth unemployment was identified as a particular 
problem as mass unemployment mushroomed across Western 
Europe in the 1970s. 41 The French government in the 
course of time was to develop measures to deal 
specifically with this problem. Youth unemployment rates 
in France have been roughly double the general 
unemployment rate since 1973. When the unemployment 
experience of various of the developed Western economies 
is studied, it becomes clear that France has a youth 
unemployment record worse than most comparable 
economies. The youth index, showing the relative problem 
of youth unemployment, in Table 5.1 calculates youth 
unemployment rate divided by the overall unemployment 
rates, indicating the extent to which youth unemployment 
is a particular problem. 
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Table 5.1:YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT lR SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES 1973-1990 
country 1973 1979 1987 1990 
II YI YI YU YI 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
USA 9.9% 2. 1 11.3% 1.9 11.7% 1.9 
Japan 2.3% 1 .8 3.4% 1.6 5.2% 1.9 
Germany 0.9% 1 . 1 3.4% 1.1 8.1% 1.3 
France 4.0% 1 . 5 13.3% 2.3 23.0% 2.2 
UK 3.1% 1 .0 10.3% 2.1 17.3% 1.7 
Italy 12.6% 2.0 25.6% 3.4 35.5% 3.3 
Canada 10.1% 1 .8 12.9% 1.7 13.7% 1.6 
(YU= youth unemployment rate 15/6-25 years; 








source: OECD Economic Surveys: France 1991/2, OECD, 1992 
266 
Table 5.1 shows that both both Italy and France suffer 
from a high youth unemployment rate and a youth 
unemployment index. 
In France, schemes would have meant large numbers of 
young people avoiding unemployment, or not being 
measured as unemployed. Indeed, the use of schemes has 
come under attack in other countries, notably in Britain 
where a critique of the relation of unemployment and 
various government schemes was used to undermine the 
employment record of the Conservatives in office. 42 The 
major schemes, with one exception, involved recate-
gorising the unemployed as employed in their statistical 
treatment. But according to accepted definitions of 
unemployment this is quite legitimate. In France, as we 
have seen, youth schemes and education have been an 
aspect of the controversy of measured unemployment. The 
claims of Stoleru, union leaders and others, about the 
inadequacy of the unemployment figures, rested in part 
on the notion that schemes, rather than dealing with the 
problem, simply concealed the scale of the problem. 
Thus, Montelh and Morgensztern write in the boom of the 
late eighties of the relation between the youth 
training/education and unemployment as follows, 
Because, even if the figures are encouraging, they 
should not conceal the truth. We mean the 
reduction is essentia lly caused by high rates of 
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education. It does not prove the education system 
is really more efficient, but simply that faced 
with a lack of jobs, the education and tra ining 
system thinks twice before getting rid of the 
young prematurely, fami lies u~1erstand there is no 
future in the factory anyway. 
The 1980s reshaped the activity of the youth. Existing 
patterns of education, employment, unemployment were 
restructured. 
Hence, significant changes have taken place in the youth 
dimension of the life cycle. Educational participation 
has risen considerably, with the effect of taking a 
large number out of the active population, that might 
have otherwise have added to out of work figures. 
Although the French government in the mid-eighties 
introduced a scheme to extend schooling, this in itself 
is unable to account for the 
. 
lncrease. In 1985-6 only 
60,000 benefited from the scheme which was intended to 
improve youngsters I chances of work through new sk ill s 
or qual ifications. 44 To have some idea of the numbers 
i nvo 1 ved in the increase of 12.8% in schoo 1 i ng from 
1983-91, extrapolating from the table above, meant 
close to a mi 11 ion more 18-25 year olds students. When 
considered alongside the development and increase of 
various training and work experience schemes, it 1S 
clear that the youth unemployment rates are only able to 
te 11 ha 1 f the story of a youth 1 abour market, where 
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youth job opportunities have seriously deteriorated 
since the seventies. In fact, the expansion of schemes 
is very visible and integral to the controversies about 
unemp 1 oyment. However, th i s is far less significant 
than the rise in those stayi ng on in educat i on, wh i ch 
is less visible and marginal to the political 
controversies. 
Unassisted employment fell considerably. Much of this 
employment was on short-term contracts. As for youth 
schemes, one feature 1S that they have offered 
employers methods of avoiding employing young people at 
the level of the minimum wage (SMIC), either through 
state subsidies, social security contribution exemptions 
or simply allowing employers to pay a fixed portion of 
the minimum wage. 45 These measures expanded considerably 
in the course of the eighties. 
Thanks to a significant expansion in targeted 
measures to combat youth unemployment between 1985 
and 1987 (whose budgetary cost was 0.14% of GDP), 
the authorities managed to turn the tide, and 
combine with a pick-up in the trend to extended 
schooling and therefore delayed entry into the 
labou~6force, youth unemployment rates eased until 
1989. 
The extent to which the state attempted to reshape the 
category of youth in the labour market should not be 
underestimated. One indicator is the expansion of public 
1 abour market expend i ture ( a s i zeab 1 e proport i on of 
269 
which is youth measures). Spending in this area (in 1990 
prices) rose from ff38.8 billion in 1973 to ff217.1 
billion 1n 1990. 47 Secondly, there 1S the complex 
evolution of numerous different schemes. The third 
testimony to the stress put on youth measures are the 
stocks of the numbers on French schemes. Indeed, the 
stocks on training schemes tended to rise through most 
of the eighties, overtaking early retirement schemes in 
significance from the middle years of the decade. The 
recategorisation of young people, therefore, took place 
in both Britain and France. However, the recategoris-
ation was more successful from the government 
perspective in Britain than in France. From the figures, 
youth unemp 1 oyment does not seem to be the prob 1 em in 
Britain that it is in other countries. British measures, 
in particular making under eighteen year olds ineligible 
for benefits, are 
French measures. 
more conscious ly exclusionary than 
From early in the 1970s, the French government reacted 
to the rise of unemployment by a strategy that focused 
on older workers. They developed an early-exit system 
based around UNEDIC. Various preretirement schemes were 
introduced which swelled the numbers leaving the labour 
market, principally through the Unemployment 
Compensation Fund (UNEDIC), as such the role of the Old 
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Age Fund (FNE) withered, until the lowering of the 
retirement age. 
The exp loding number of guaranteed- income 
beneficiaries signalled a revolution. This scheme, 
soon the major early exit pathway, was reshaping 
the process of definitive exit. A new phase of 
life, called preretirement (preretraite), was now 
occurring for most wage earners in the private 
sector between the time they stopped working and 
the time they started receiving an old age 
pension. The unemployment Compensation Fund, whose 
duty was to compensate wage earners for short 
periods of joblessness, was assuming responsi-
bility for covering jobless
4
!geing workers for as 
long as five years or more. 
In 1983, the ret i rement age on fu 11 pen s i on was lowered 
from 65 to 60 years. France was the only OECD country to 
do this. 
The combination of these various factors has resulted in 
the employment and activity rates for older workers 
having fallen more sharply than in most OECD countries. 
In France, early-exit is distinguished from the process 
in Britain, in that it is highly reliant on the state to 
organise the process. 
Large numbers were drawn into the respective schemes. A 
number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there is 
the massive expansion in preretirement arrangements from 
1972, reaching its height in 1983, when 705,187 were 
involved. As Guillemard points out, this expanslon 
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affected the unemployment figures and cushioned 
restructuring, 
Since firms could get rid of old wage earners as 
IIpreretireesll rather than having to dismiss or 
lay-off younger workers who would be registered as 
unemp loyed, preret ~rgement tended to s low the 
rising jobless rate. 
Secondly, there are the pol icy changes, from UNEDIC 
funded preretirement to FNE funded, and the solidarity 
contracts to the lowering of the retirement age. 
Finally, the significance of preretirement, although 
undermined by the lowering of retirement in 1983, 
clearly remained at least into the late eighties. Under 
these circumstances the focus of early exit has been 
shifted to younger sections of the workforce, those aged 
55-59 years. 
So state policy has played a crucial role in the shaping 
of the active population since the recession of the mid-
seventies. The overall effect is that the activity rates 
at the younger and older ends of the labour market have 
declined significantly, establishing large numbers in 
categories (training scheme, early retirement) that 
stand outside measured unemployment. It is true that 
France is certainly not exceptional in this respect, 
but, some of the measures by which it has achieved these 
ends, such as the lowering of the retirement age, are. 
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Even though a similar phenomenon occurred in Britain, it 
has taken a significantly different form in France. 
Principally, this is because of the extent to which the 
state is responsible for early retirement (lowering the 
retirement age and state early retirement schemes). In 
Britain the JRS does not compare to measures undertaken 
in France, although private and company pension schemes 
have to a large extent fi lled the gap. Secondly, French 
social policy does not significantly use the category of 
disability to exclude people from the labour market in a 
way that the British government has. 
However, ln Britain and France, the scale of the 
recategorisation fuels the controversies that surround 
measured unemployment. 
The scale of French labour market intervention of this 
nature is significant in several respects. Firstly, the 
obvious point that needs to be made is the effect upon 
measured unemployment, which which would be difficult to 
estimate, but nevertheless considerable. Secondly, there 
is the comparative aspect, many countries, including 
Britain have engaged in such strategies, however, France 
in 1989 spent 2.65% of her GOP on the labour market, a 
higher proportion than any surveyed DECO nation, the 
share of active measures within this was lower than all 
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other nations surveyed. 50 Consequently, the way in which 
the French state I s labour market programmes affect 
measured unemployment is specific: almost exception-
ally large-scale overwhelmingly passive labour market 
policies, principally early retirement and youth 
training taking people out of the category of 
unemployment. 
~ Women and the French Labour Market 
One of the most striking features of many of the mature 
industrial economies over the last decades has been the 
growth in female employment. 51 The feminisation of the 
labour market has been linked by some to the growth of 
certain specific forms of work relations, part-time, 
non-union, low pay. Increasing women1s employment has 
been a feature of many of the industrialised nations. 
But in most cases it is not simply a growth in the 
employment of women but also a growth ln the 
unemployment of women. The amount of women in the 
active population does present serious conceptual 
difficulties. 52 Women carrying out domestic work, or 
caring for the sick and elderly will not be considered 
as economically active. 
The proportion of women in civilian employment 
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throughout the twelve European partners has risen from 
35.6% in 1977 to 38.3% in 1986 a rise of nearly 4.5 
million. However, there are important differences 
between the various states. They can effectively be 
broken into two categories. Firstly, there are the lower 
female participation countries, Spain, Greece, Ireland 
and Italy (all <= 34%). Several factors could explain 
this the lack of developed welfare and nursery 
provision, areas of relatively low level of 
industrialisation, or cultural and religious reasons. 
The higher female participation ( >38% ) occurs in 
Denmark, UK, France, Portuga 1, W. Germany, Be 1 g i urn. Wi th 
the exception of Portugal, these are the more developed 
nations in terms of industry and welfare provision. 
Several authors have argued the importance of welfare 
institutions, especially of nursery provision, to the 
rate and pattern of women's employment. Garney, for 
example, points out that if we compare the employment of 
women in Britain and France, the pattern that emerges 
can be traced to the differences in nursery and 
maternity provision. 53 In France women are more likely 
to stay in the 1 abour market up to the i r th i rd ch i 1 d, 
they were more 1 ikely to hold full as opposed to part-
time employment, their jobs were less characterised by 
precariousness than their British sisters. 
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Due to inferior welfare provision for women in Britain, 
more were forced into part-time work or forced to leave 
the labour market because of child rearing. In Finland and 
Sweden, there is little difference between male and 
female participation rates, due to highly developed 
social legislation and extensive provision for maternal 
and paternal leave. Thus, the nature of the fami ly and 
the degree to which child rearing is socialised impinges 
on the nature of women I s work. Beechey goes further 
still in the comparison between Britain and France, she 
argued that not only has provision determined the 
pattern of women's employment between the two countries 
but also can give us an insight into the different ways 
in which female unemployment has developed in both 
countries. This explains how male unemployment is higher 
than women lsi n Br i ta i n but in France the oppos i te is 
the case. 
Ironically, it seems, women in Britain have been 
protected ( relatively speaking) against having 
higher levels of unemployment than men because of 
the precarious position in which they find 
themselves in the labour market. They are far more 
likely to be in part-time jobs which are 
insecure and unprotected, or to be in casua 1 ised 
forms of jobs. The point is that in France the 
flips ide of the fact tha t those women who ha ve 
jobs enjoy more security and protection is that it 
is very difficu lt for women to get jobs i'54the 
first place. The labour market is very rigid. 
In France then, women have suffered from higher 
unemployment than men in absolute terms for most of the 
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time since the early seventies. If we take into account 
men's higher activity, the position of women is further 
underlined; women have been hit disproportionately by 
mass unemployment in France. In this respect women in 
France have come off worse than their British 
counterparts. However, the figures are not uniform as 
can be seen by the comparison of the LFS and registered 
figures. The LFS shows higher women's shares of 
unemployment than the registered figures. Partially this 
is connected to the disincentives for women registering, 
principally, the eligibility for benefit being based 
around the notion of the fami ly, with a male head of 
household. In the 1989 LFS, of 811,000 unemployed women 
who classified themselves as spouse to a head of 
household, only 315,000 received benefits. 55 Where this 
is concerned the British picture, as has been described 
in chapter 3, mirrors the French. In countries such as 
France with higher levels of women I s unemployment 
(relative to men), greater scope exists for this factor 
to distort registered unemployment figures. 
The debate around women I s unemployment has often 
revolved around the reserve army of labour thesis. 56 The 
reserve army thesis cannot be appl ied crudely to the 
French ex per i ence. However, it is usefu 1 in order to 
draw out the conclusions of the differential aspects of 
women's unemployment experience in France. Firstly, the 
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levels of women1s unemployment have been strikingly high 
relative to their share in the active population as a 
whole and relative to male unemployment. Women have 
suffered unemployment disproportionately at a time of 
cr is is, as the thes i s wou 1 d suggest. However, in two 
senses the reserve army thes i s does not descr i be the 
experience in the past two decades. Firstly, taking the 
LFS figures, women have not disappeared back into the 
home, i. e. become i nact i ve in terms of 1 abour market 
categor i es or a 1 atent reserve in terms of the thes is; 
they have become openly unemployed. Certain women have 
fallen out of the active population but this is 
connected to the features of youth and older worker 
participation. As an independent variable women1s 
activity has been rising. Secondly, women1s economic 
activity is not simply connected to the swing of 
economic growth but involves other aspects such as the 
sexual division of labour and the sectorial and wage 
structures, reproductive and maternity rights. This 
increasing complexity of women1s work has made simple 
expulsion counter-productive. 
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5.6 Conclusions on French Unemployment Measurement: 
some similarities but significant differences from 
Britain 
The conclusions that should be drawn from the French 
study lie on two levels. 
At the most basic level it is our contention that 
controversy is inherent to unemployment measurement. The 
study of France has uncovered features critical to an 
understanding of unemployment measurement. 
The development of late capitalism in France has put the 
state in a historically unique position, in terms of its 
sway in various aspects of social life which impinges on 
the measurement of unemployment. An Orwellian conspiracy 
theory has to be rejected; these processes were not 
developed with the sole purpose of manipulating the 
measurement of unemployment. However, with the 
development of the modern welfare state, social policy 
and statistical apparatus, it would be absurd to 
consider the state as anything but an agency within the 
social construction of unemployment measurement. The 
government cannot passively record unemployment, though 
it may claim or wish to. It has no option but to 
formulate policy which will, whether consciously or 
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unconsciously, affect its construction. This is the 
source of modern controversies about unemployment 
statistics. They are aggravated by economic crisis, the 
deterioration of the labour market, the end of full 
employment and so on. However, these contradictions have 
no immediate resolution, and the state always has the 
trump card, that is, its very position as the only body 
able to regulate social policy and statistical 
production. 
The second level is the comparative aspect. Despite a 
whole series of similarities between Britain and France, 
historically, socially and economically, the study has 
made clear that there is no single case study that can 
offer understanding the process of unemployment 
measurement. Through the complexities of modern 
development, the uneveness of crisis and alternative 
political strategies open to decision makers, 
unemp 1 oy- ment has been invented 1 n France 1 n a way 
specific to that country. Although, both countries use 
youth training and early retirement schemes, France has 
not used the category of disability as Britain has, 
neither has it revised downwards the registered 
unemployment figures. The French government has taken a 
more structured approach to early retirement than Britain, 
the latter a more determined recategorisation of young 
people. The conclusion is that, if a framework of 
280 
understanding, a methodology, is to be established, it 
has to develop at a considerable degree of abstraction. 
Conceptual tools are necessary for understanding 
unemployment as a social and historical construction. 
The third chapter identified labour market dynamics, the 
life cycle and state categorisation as important to the 
invention of unemployment measurement. The French case 
study has shown the significance of the pattern of 
development in its inventio,n. 
However, theory is no substitute for historical and 
social research as the French case study confirms. To 
mean anything, theory has to be applied to the 
peculiarities of the country being studied. Detailed 
attention needs to be paid to the statistics themselves 
and their methods of collection. In the next chapter our 
approach wi 11 be tested and refined by important 
questions raised by the case of Poland. 
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Chapter 6: Poland and the Measurement of Unemployment 
The general argument of this thesis is that the 
measurement of unemployment reflects the intersection of 
two social processes, the development of statistics and 
the institutional forms and historical evolution of the 
labour market. Seen through the prism of the Polish 
experience this argument acquires particular clarity. 
The statistical development of Poland has conditioned 
the measurement of unemployment in ways that have not 
been experienced by Britain and France. This development 
has undergone two profound transformations and is now 
experiencing a third, in which the statistical 
construction of reality is re-defined again. 
6.1 Origins of unemployment measurement in Poland 
The first national transformation arose with the 
independent capitalist development of interwar Poland. 
Previously, Poland had been part of the Russian, German 
or Austrian Empires; it was only to gain independence 
with the post-World War 1 settlement. Like other newly 
established states a statistical apparatus was perceived 
to be a crucial part of modern statehood. A national 
statistical office was established, and the first 
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nat i ona 1 census conducted in 1921. But Po 1 and did not 
repeat the evolutionary stages of the institutional 
development of statistics in states such as Britain and 
France, where former achievements were grafted onto the 
new. In Poland, with the new statistical apparatus came 
definitional criteria and organisational practices. In 
terms of the labour force, this meant that unemployment 
was measured nearly from the inception of Pol ish 
official statistics. Unemployment insurance and the 
measurement of unemployment were introduced and widened 
between 1924 and 1927. 
The second transformation in Poland came with the 
establishment of Stalinism in Eastern Europe. After, the 
existing definitional criteria of the labour market was 
overthrown, i. e. the subject i ve process of stat i st i ca 1 
measurement was 'reinvented' and old organisational 
pract ices were rep 1 aced by new ones. Unemp 1 oyment 
'disappeared'. The statistical measurement of the labour 
force was distorted by its bureaucratic categorisation 
by the planners. In their consciousness, the labour 
force became the object of planning and was, therefore, 
defined by the subjective process of setting stocks and 
flows within the planned labour force. As a result, the 
ex i stence of unemp loyment in Po 1 and and elsewhere 1 n 
Eastern Europe could be compared to unemployment before 
its invention in official consciousness ln Western 
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Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. In both cases, institutional forms and 
statistical criteria were 'unemployment-blind ' through 
either the poor law or 'planned full-employment ' . 
The third transformation 1S the process of jettisoning 
the subjective criterion of Stalinism and the adoption 
of the definitions of the advanced West. There have been 
several aspects to this. The first was to adopt 
international statistical criteria. The second was the 
need to restructure the organisational basis of 
statistical measurement. Statistical measurement of the 
economy mirrored, and was connected to the planning 
structure. That had to change. The centra 1 p 1 an-l arge 
business organisation-enterprise structure is being 
dismantled, industry is being privatised 
demonopolised. In the case of unemployment, 
and 
the 
employment exchanges are becoming important centres of 
data collection on the labour market. The third aspect 
was the official recognition of unemployment in law, 
which came with the 1989 Labour Code Amendment Act. The 
Act perhaps demonstrates most graphically the invention 
of unemployment in the current transition. 
So the statistical process as regards the measurement of 
unemployment can be summarised as follows. Unemployment 
was statistically invented in the interwar period, at 
the time of the birth of Polish statistics. In the post-
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war Stalinist regime, unemployment was statistically 
obscured, as one reform magazine from the 1956 movement 
put it, it became 'the prob 1 em wi thout a name 1.1 I n the 
current transition, unemployment is again being 
statistically re-invented. 
The counterpart process to the statistical construction 
of unemployment has been the evolution of the labour 
force, i.e. the social and economic construction of 
unemployment. We have argued elsewhere that unemployment 
is a product of industrial capitalism, or more precisely 
the growth of wage 1 abour, the i ncreas i ng d i vis i on of 
labour and growing concentration of capital. Care has to 
be taken with this argument. Wage-labour, the division 
of labour, and capital accumulation grew significantly 
in Poland before World War Two but it was still 
predominantly an agricultural society. The Stalinist 
regime did not reduce these tendencies towards wage-
labour within the economy but massively accelerated 
them. The effect of the latest transition upon the 
patterns of economic relationships is not yet clear. 
Unemployment is now open and institutionally supported. 
However, employment/work relations could move in 
directions which make classification and measurement 
more difficult. 
In earlier chapters we identified how state policy can 
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mould labour force categories and, therefore, affect the 
measurement of unemployment. The categories which 
governments acted upon to alter their labour market 
state in our earl ier study were the young, women, the 
old and the disabled. This approach can also shed light 
on some of the past and present practices of the Polish 
state. However, there is a significant difference with 
our two other case studies. The process of state policy 
and the labour market has not become clear-cut. As with 
aspects of the economy, the current transition has not 
resolved the question. But we can identify nascent 
trends of a labour market policy similar to that of 
Britain and France. 
The Pol ish case then can put into perspective the 
arguments made about Britain and France. Here we can 
concretely examine the institutional invention of 
unemployment and the relationship between objective and 
subjective processes in that social construction. Most 
scholars have identified unemployment with industrial 
capitalism, they do not do so for ideological purposes 
but because of objective conditions that develop under 
capitalism. 
l.the expansion of wage-labour. 
2.the accumulation of capital, i.e. the concentration 
of capital and labour. 
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3.the increasing division of labour, the fragmentation 
of work, ultimately expressed in Taylorism. 
4.the cyclical and dynamic character of the system. 
But, as we wi 11 see, Eastern Europe showed a 11 these 
features under Stalinism. The transition in Poland is 
therefore, one where the objective conditions for 
unemployment were already long established, but the 
subjective criteria and institutional forms to recognise 
it had to be invented. The implication of this is that 
there is no mechanical relationship between the two 
processes in the measurement of unemployment. The real 
relationship is between two relatively autonomous and 
dynamic processes. 
6.2 Statistical development under Stalinism in Eastern 
Europe and Poland 
The issues involved in understanding statistics in 
Eastern Europe are rooted in the history of the region. 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 was succeeded by a period 
of significant statistical development, compared to 
Tsarism and even the most industrially advanced 
countries of the world at that time. 
In the fjrst years of the Sovjet regjme, more 
statjstjcal jnformatjon was publjshed than jn 
Tsarjst Russja. Sovjet statjstjcal agenc}es ranked 
amongst those of the advanced countrjes. 
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This was a considerable achievement, given the 
devastation reaped upon the country, having been torn 
apart by the years of the First World War, the War 
against White and Allied forces and famine. Jasny 
descr i bed how i nte 11 ectua 1 c i rc 1 es blossomed ln the 
twenties in the field of statistics and economics, with 
figures such as Krondratyev, Groman, and Bazarov. 
Statistical and economic agencies published regular 
statistical reviews. 3 
But in 1928, Sta lin suppressed the Economic 
Bulletin of the Moscow Business Cycle Institute, 
and in 1930 its head Professor Kondratyev, was 
tortured by Stalin's police, and because he would 
not join in the new statistical lies, he was 
liquidated. In 1930, all the great Russian 
statisticians ... .. were arrested. The Great 
Blackout, the great conspiracy against the soviet 
peop le by the sov iet government became tota land 
all embracing .... It was as if a plague had hit the 
economics institutes and 4Publications, the 
economists and statisticians. 
Th i s blackout was put into effect as a resu 1 t of 
Stalin's offensive against the peasantry and his drive 
to rapid industrialisation through the five year plan. 
In the history of Eastern European statistics, this was 
as important a turning point as the October Revolution 
itself. Eight economic and statistical publications were 
closed down in the next two years. Bas i c i nd i cators, on 
the cost of living, real wages, prices indices, 
agricultural and industrial prices were no longer 
available; statistics when they were produced were 
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official state secrets. The darkness was to last until 
Stalin's death when statistics were again to emerge in 
the Soviet Union, but in a much distorted form. 
As a consequence of the post-World War Two division of 
Europe, the Stal in regime became a prototype for the 
regimes of Eastern Europe. Bai ley noted that between 
1945 and 1956 there was widespread adoption of the 
Soviet planning and accounting system. 5 After Stalin's 
death, with the reins of Moscow's central control 
slightly relaxed by Krushchev, the Eastern European 
countries modified these procedures. Essentially, 
however, they shared similar methods and institutions. 
In Poland, statistical production resumed after the war, 
Annual Statistical Yearbooks were published for the 
years 1946-50. A report on national income was produced 
in 1947. 6 However, as the pretended coal ition with the 
Polish Socialist Party (PPS) gave way to open communist 
rule, so the process of suppression, that had been 
carried out twenty years earlier in the Soviet Union by 
Stalin, was conducted by the Polish Communist Party 1n 
Poland. The trail, purge and replacement of the Central 
Planning Office (CUP), which was dominated by the PPS, 
was i tse 1 f one of the major events in the i ntroduct ion 
of Stalinism. According to Drewnowski who was at the 
Central Planning Office at the time, 
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The next step was the destruction of statistics. 
Calculations of many indices, which the Central 
Statistica 1 Office (GUS) restarted after the war 
ended, was stopped. Research into househo ld 
budgets was amongst the first casualties .... and 
the secrecy of offic ia 1 da ta became so extens ive 
that even high-ranking economic functionaries had 
no access to releva'7t information. The CUP 
archives were shredded. 
Stat i st i cs in Eastern Europe genera lly and Po 1 and 1 n 
particular, therefore, bear the impress of these origins 
even now as the region prepares itself for opening up to 
the world economy, its so-called transition to a market 
economy. 
Statistics, as they began to emerge from 'high 
Sta 1 in i sm I, did so under contend i ng pressures 1 n the 
first reform period. So the pattern, that was to recur 
periodically, began. A cycle of economic impasse, 
reform, and clampdown was set in motion by Stalin's 
death, the 'secret speech' of the Twentieth Congress of 
the CPSU and the accession of Krushchev. 8 The scope and 
qua 1 i ty of stat i st i cs became 1 inked to the process of 
economic and political reform. This was a process that 
not only took place in the USSR, but more widely in 
Eastern Europe. Poland is a good example. In this case: 
In 1956, the statistical flow resumes, most 
prominently in the publication of the statistical 
yearbook for 1955, the first since 1950. 
Succeeding issues of the yearbook became more 
comprehensive, and discussions in the economic 
periodicals gained in seriousness and perception 
295 
in contrast to their sterility before the thaw. 9 
The 1956 reforms therefore marked a break with the 
suppression of statistics. By 1967, Hunter could say 
rather optimistically of the Soviet Union. 
Severa 1 important aspects of the economy and 
society now seem to be well understood, 
statistically speaking. Publication of the 1959 
census, for examp le, together with the subsequent 
demographic research, has provided well rounded 
understanding of the demographic situation ... 
Production data concerning severa 1 major 
relatively homogeneous products like electrical 
power, certain ores, and basic steel products have 
come to be available in considerable detail. Here 
no doubt the scept ic ism that preva i led in 1947 
has, I think, given way to a reasonable degree 18f 
understanding and satisfaction with the data. 
However, the vac ill at i on of a 11 the Eastern European 
regimes between reform and reaction was to affect their 
statistical development. Not only did the openness and 
integrity of statistics move according to these criteria 
but also, according to Alton, discussing the Polish 
case, they depended on the relative performance of the 
economy. When the economy was booming the supply of data 
would improve, as it entered difficulties, statistics 
would deteriorate. 11 
Initially, the industrialisation programmes existing 
within a statistical vacuum created a 'self deluding 
optimism ' amongst the state bureaucracies. 12 However 
optimism was to give way to concern, concern gave way to 
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a realisation of the need for change. The lack of 
statistical information had become an impediment for the 
planners and officials. It led in part to irrationality 
and uninformed decision making. The official theoretical 
journa 1 of the CPSU discussed th i s on the eve of the 
Krushchev reforms. I3 Wolfe describes the implications 
of the period of suppression of statistics. 
The Soviet officials responsible for alternative 
investment of scarce capital and other matters 
requiring accurate statistics will never be able 
to engage in real planning as longl~s the blackout 
and statistical juggling continue. 
Obviously, it was in the interest of the nomenklatura to 
reform this state of affairs. Their requirement of 
further statistical information was not straightforward, 
as statistics were needed in order to present the 
interest of the nomenklatura as being in the universal 
interests of society. 
The first general problem of Polish and East European 
statistics is that they were enlisted as support in the 
Cold War battle of ideas with the West. Therefore 
Krushchev, for example, was to claim that per capita 
bread consumption in Russia was higher than that in the 
United States. While this was true, it was only because 
of the poverty of the Sov i et workers diet, wh i ch had a 
far higher proportion of bread to milk or meat products. 
These facts were of course neatly suppressed. I5 For this 
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reason, there was a considerable selectivity in Eastern 
European statistics, in part due to twin pressures that 
were in confl ict at the very heart of East Europe 
development. Economic development which was indeed 
considerable largely took place at the expense of the 
class that was meant to be in power. More specifically, 
the duality stemmed from a desire to overplay its 
achievements in comparison to the West, and a desire to 
obscure the costs of those achievements. Jasny's 
unofficial companion to the 1956 Soviet Statistical 
Handbook demonstrated heavy industry, transport and 
investment were responsible for the high, though 
exaggerated, aggregate growth rates; real wages, on the 
other hand, had not reached the 1928 level, the 
beginning of the first Five Year Plan. He noted that 
there were no nominal wage structures, his statistical 
extrapolations illustrate the reason for this. 
One million in a superhigh class earn 
10 million in the low wage group 
country th~t hit reached socialism and 
for commun7sm. 
as much as 
this in a 
is heading 
Investment throughout the Eastern bloc grew at the 
expense of consumption. Regimes desired to inflate their 
international economic performances. Statistics were 
called upon for these services. The exposure of 
falsifications by the former head of the Polish Central 
Statistical Office illustrated the point. Official 
aggregate investment data were too low, coal exports and 
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house construction figures were exaggerated. I ? 
The second problem was the way in which statistics were 
refracted through the pr ism of centra 1 p 1 ann i ng. The 
planning structure was open to abuse, as various sectors 
and enterprises competed for the favours of the central 
planners, by target achievement in order to be allocated 
the limited amounts of investment, raw materials or 
labour. Statisticians would at times be drawn into this 
process by colluding with enterprise chiefs to produce 
misleading data. This is not surprising as statistical 
offices had no independent status, and 1 0 cal 
statistical offices and enterprise heads were connected 
by the Communist Parties. 18 This was further complicated 
by accounting procedures acting at different levels. In 
Po 1 and, for examp 1 e, there was a three tier account i ng 
procedure, the Planning Commission of the Counci 1 of 
Ministers being the central organisation of aggregate 
planning, the Large Business Organisations at an 
intermediary level allowing the tracking of the last 
unit, the individual enterprise. 19 
Thirdly, Eastern European concepts were often not 
comparable with Western ones. They were formulated with 
reference to neo-Marxist criteria. For example, the 
principal economic indicator - national income, was 
quantified in a very different way to which national 
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accounts are constructed in the West. Eastern European 
countries used the Net Material Product (NMP), 
established by the Material Product System (MPS), as the 
indicator of national output and therefore to calculate 
growth rates. It was based purely on the material, i.e. 
industrial or agricultural production, or those services 
such as transport that are closely tied to industrial 
production. Services were officially considered as 
unproductive and therefore should not be included. The 
transition to market economies would therefore involve 
adopting Western notions, in this case, the DECO-UN 
National System of Accounts, to quantify Gross National 
Product (GNP). Two major problems have been associated 
with old procedures. The first was double counting, that 
is because the account i ng procedures are not concerned 
with value added by various production processes, it 
could count the value of materials through each of their 
intermediary stages to final product. So that the value 
of iron could be counted as iron ore, as steel, and as a 
component of the car, so it is counted three times. 20 
The second was defective pricing which could distort 
proportionalities within the economy and hinder time 
series comparison. 21 
The consensus amongst experts in Soviet or Eastern 
European statistics is that data was mostly not 
falsified. Far more important than falsification were 
the non-existence or suppression of data, spurious and 
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changing concepts or confusing aggregations. In the case 
of Poland, Alton argued that, 
Fortunately, our detailed examination of Polish 
statistical materials yields no evidence of 
deliberate falsification of primary data. Although 
da ta s till serves propaganda purposes in Po land, 
this goal is achieved primarily by manipulation of 
data or withholding information rather than free 
invention. This view is supported by the mutual 
consistency of data derived from various sources, 
by the evident use of the published data for 
ope rat ion alp u r po s e s wit h in Pol and, a n d __ by c h e c k s 
with the statistics of other countries. 2T 
The transition to a market economy will require a change 
in institutional and statistical practices. Blades has 
dubbed this process , the statistical revolution . 1 n 
Centra 1 and Eastern Europe I. The process i nvo 1 ves three 
major aspects. Firstly, statisticians have been 
decoupled from the Party apparatus allowing a 
profes s i ona 1 ism and independence not afforded to them 
before. Secondly, statistical concepts are being 
harmonised with Western (DECO) concepts. Thirdly, the 
gaps in statistical information have to be filled, 
particularly those areas the Stalinist regimes found it 
to uncomfortable to quantify. However, the transition to 
the market does not seem to be an end to the matter, 
instability has threatened the newly established liberal 
democracies in several parts of this region already. And 
after all, the Communist Parties don1t have a monopoly 
on statistical manipulation. 
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6.3 Employment relationships in Eastern Europe and 
Poland 
Employment relationships in Eastern Europe were 
transformed by planning. Again the development of the 
Soviet Union under Stalin provided the model that was to 
be introduced in Eastern Europe and Poland. Before 1928, 
employment exchanges and open unemployment existed. 
During the New Economic Policy the near full employment 
of war-time gave way to growing unemployment. It was a 
problem that was officially recognised and openly 
discussed by the Commissariat of Labour and the economic 
and statistical publications. 23 Within two years of 
Stalin's first five year plan open unemployment seemed 
to disappear, and the economy was operating with serious 
labour shortages. The Soviet and East European economies 
were characterised as low wage full employment 
economies. In the case of the USSR, 
Grea ter regu la t ion of emp loyment may ha ve been 
implied by the launching of the first five year 
plan. But what actually produced it was the end to 
unemploy~ent in 1930 and an acute labour 
shortage. L " 
The state did away with the labour exchanges and 
organised industrial recruitment from the newly 
established kolhozs (collective farms). This employment 
policy was subject to two considerations. Economically, 
it was a requirement of the industrialisation drive 
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carried out by state planning. Ideologically, full 
employment was officially described as the 'state of 
work ' under socialism. 25 
Despite the ideological veneer of the 'worker's states ' , 
workers did not have control over production. In each of 
these states, constitutiona 1 rights for various works 
committees were meant to demonstrate participation in 
decision-making in the process of production. Much was 
made in the Soviet constitution of the worker's council 
and the power of mass meetings of workers in the 
production. The reality didn't match up to this. 
The management for its part, wi 11 be ob 1 iged to 
'cons ider and respond to' workers' suggest ions, 
and the opinion of the work collective will be 
'taken into account'. Clearly, the enterprise 
management and the communist party organisation 
will retain the final, controlling say in the 
dec is ion mak ing process. Th is is ensured by 
Art ic le 1 of the new law, wh ich s ta tes tha t the 
work collectives must operate under the leadership 
of the organisations of the CPSU and that 'their 
duty and obligation'2t!ncludes 'the implementation 
of party decisions'. 
The surface appearance of official ideology had to be 
penetrated to understand the characteristics of the 
workforce in Eastern Europe. The working population was 
not in control of production. Consumption was 
deprioritised and consumer goods were of a notoriously 
poor quality. As a result, a poorly motivated working 
class made for chronically low labour productivity. 
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Growth . ln output and therefore plan fulfilment were 
based very much upon the growth in the labour supply. 
The result was that participation rates grew 
considerably in all East European economies. 
Reserves of female and rural populations were pulled 
into production. Female participation across the whole 
of Eastern Europe is high by international standards. In 
1983, the proportion of Polish women in total employment 
was 43.7%, for the European 12 the figure was 38.0%.27 
The growth in population was another factor that should 
not be ignored, the Polish population grew from 25 
million in 1950 to 36.7 million in 1983, the working 
population grew by 49.6% during this period. 28 
The key to the economy was the expansion of the capital 
stock. Th i sin turn cond i t i oned the deve 1 opment of the 
labour market. 
The investment p Ian tended to be used not to 
balance capital construction with other competing 
needs •.. , but to mobilise all possible resources 
and pour them into capital construction regardless 
of opportunity cost. A result of this was the 
tendency to loss of investment discipline and to 
periodic overinvestment. An investment cycle 
appeared in wh ich mass ive investment plans and 
extremely rapid growth in capital stock resulted 
in surges in demand for labour and industria 1 
goods far 2gxceeding their supplies at full 
employment. 
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The Soviet-type system operated at full employment but 
cycles of production existed. Fallenbuchl describes the 
cycles of the Polish economy in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
first investment drive began with the plan of 1950 but 
met increasing difficulties by 1954-5. Targets and 
projects were revised in terms of investment and 
production. In the labour force those seeking work 
increased wh i 1 e open i ngs fe 11 1 n 1959. Another dr i ve 
began in 1961 but again collapsed in 1963-4, when again 
labour demand fell significantly.30 In the West, 
cyclical production is associated with unemployment. 
According to orthodox economics, disequi 1 ibrium arises 
in the 1 abour market in wh i ch rea 1 wages over reach 
their market clearing price. But, in Centrally Planned 
Economies (CPEs) open unemployment did not exist, as 
wages were low and rational pricing in the labour market 
was suppressed. Many commentators think that it is 
wrong, therefore, to talk of unemployment in CPEs. 
As to cyclical unemployment, most Western scholars 
seem to be of the opinion that command socialism 
has nothing remotely resembling cyclical 
unemployment ... Nevertheless, command socialism 
does exper i ence cyc I i ca I f I uc tua t ions in econom i c 
activity stemming primarily from fluctuation]l in 
the growth and rate of investment and output. 
What tended to happen was that firms hoarded workers and 
concea 1 ed the i r reserves of 1 abour from planners. From 
the point of view of managers, it was in the interest of 
the enterprise to have the highest inputs and the lowest 
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plan targets. In effect then, there was hidden 
unemployment from this source. 
Disguised unemployment .•.• now re-emerges in the 
modern world of the soviet office and giant 
factory. Workers might as we 11 be redundant, but 
the ir wage is pa id out as a wage by the factory, 
not by the labour exchange ••. Eve~th ing is 
permitted as an excuse for not working. 
This situation was general to the Centrally Planned 
Economies. Feiwel described the situation for Poland and 
makes a very similar point about the cause of hidden 
unemployment. 
In Po land the high and esca la t ing ra te of 
investment throughout the 1960s (from 16.5% of 
national income in 1959 to 21.9% in 1968) was 
accompanied by an acce lerated rate of growth of 
employment, not corresponding to the growth in the 
rate of output. For examp Ie, whereas in 1956-60 
the average annua 1 rate of growth of emp loyment 
was 2% and of gross output 9.9%, the
33
respect ive 
figures for 1961-7 were 3.3% and 8.3%. 
If we accept the notion of hidden unemployment, then we 
also have to accept that the cyclical fluctuations in 
the demand for labour, give hidden unemployment a 
cyclical character. 
For Feiwel additional features of the Polish economy 
created the conditions for hidden unemployment. 
Ironically, industrial overemployment was the result of 
directing rural labour surpluses into the towns. The 
mechanisms of central planning combined to bring this 
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about. Wage relations encouraged high and increasing 
participation rates. Wages were low and differentials 
within the working class were not such that a family 
wage mode 1 was poss i b 1 e. Th i s did not change over time 
significantly as wages were restricted, not only because 
of the imperatives of accumulation, but also because the 
wages fund was put under strain by the increasing level 
of employment. When wages were paid in piece rates they 
had slack norms which meant that productivity was kept 
stagnant. Planning induced firms to increase 
employment, without providing necessary restrictions. 
Almost inevitably this led to structural mismatching in 
regional and training aspects of the labour force. 
The system of functioning of the economy induces 
the enterpr ises to expand emp loyment without 
providing sufficiently effective restraints ... 
Superiors usually combat excess employment by 
administrative means ... The ha lf measure reforms 
did not succeed in interesting the enterprises in 
more effective use of manpower, but afforded the 
enterprise greater persuas ive ffwers in swaying 
centra 1 planners in its fa vour. 
Demographic factors aggravated this, particularly the 
further down the road of industrialisation we find 
ourse 1 ves. One major headache of the planners 1 n USSR 
was the regional dislocation between demographic 
dynamism (the Central Asian republics and the Caucasus) 
and the industrial heartlands of the economy (Russia, 
Ukraine, and the Baltic). This is of particular 
importance when we consider that the growth in labour 
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supply was a key factor in growth and that rura 1 and 
female reserves in many parts of Eastern Europe had been 
exhausted. 35 This may account for the current regional 
disparities in Polish unemployment, with the highest 
unemployment in agricultural areas such as Polnoco-
Wschodni and Srodkowy. 
Not only did hidden unemployment exist in the form of 
labour hoarding, but so too did frictional unemployment. 
According to Teague, the USSR's annual turnover rate of 
the workforce was about 14% in the early eighties, which 
is not particularly high in international terms. What 
did trouble the regimes was that each job change took on 
average 24 days.36 Porklet confirmed this feature. His 
figures stated that in 1965, job change took between 14 
and 40 days, 1967-68 33 days (47 for women) and 1978-83 
20-30 days. This means considerable lost production and 
frictional unemployment. 37 
So (hidden) unemployment existed in those forms 
described in market capitalism. Officially, of course, 
this was strenuously denied. For the ruling bureaucracy 
the supposed non-existence of unemployment demonstrated 
the superiority of the Soviet bloc. Therefore, statist-
ical evaluations of this are always difficult. Eastern 
European statistical year books printed unemployment 
rates of the industrial ised West and even pointed out 
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that these were understated, (for which there is a case) 
whilst denying its existence domestically. What is 
perhaps more surprising than this, as Adrim notes of the 
ILO, is that official sources in the West played along 
with the Soviet bureaucracy's deception .38 
The genera 1 aspects of the East European labour force, 
from the Second World War to the end of Stalinism 
(1989), can be summed in five points. 
Firstly, industrialisation drew greater and greater 
numbers into the labour force and over time exhausted 
female and rural reserves of labour. Participation rates 
by the late sixties in Eastern Europe were extremely 
high by historical and international comparisons. 
Increasing labour supply was a crucial component in the 
growth experienced by the Eastern European states. 
Secondly, industrialisation was not a smooth, virtuous 
circle of growth. The economies were geared towards the 
accumulation of capital, particularly in the heavy 
industrial sectors. Investment cycles resulted. Demand 
for labour therefore fluctuated cyclically. 
Thirdly, planning suppressed rational prices ln the 
sphere of labour. Firms tended to hoard labour. This 
lead to misallocation of labour in quantitative and 
qual itative terms. Labour shortages were a permanent 
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feature of the economy. 
Fourthly, this coexisted with structural, frictional and 
cyclical unemployment or underemployment. 
Fifthly, employment relationships were a crucial 
dimension for the crisis which beset the East European 
economies. Low labour productivity was always bemoaned 
by the bureaucracies which called for greater discipline 
and less job changing. The allocation with its 
coexistence of shortage and underemployment became 
increasing wasteful, as the potential for extensive 
growth in the labour force dried up. 
6.4 Impact of Transition in Employment Relationships 
We have establ ished the necessity to discard the 
Stalinist regimes' view of employment and unemployment 
if we are to understand the dynamics of the labour force 
in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe from 1946-1990. 
A far greater similarity to the situation in the west 
was found than this view would have us believe. It has 
been argued that unemployment in Poland and Eastern 
Europe existed in a slightly different guise, widespread 
hidden unemployment. It would be a mistake to conclude 
that from this that 'the transition to a market economy' 
will then be a superficial one. On one level the 
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transition is superficial, those who once held power in 
Eastern Europe through the Communist Parties now hold 
onto it through the reformed enterpr i se or army of the 
new democracy.39 But at the level of employment 
relationships, a profound transformation or, more 
strictly, a massive restructuring is taking place. 
The bureaucracy in Poland made periodic attempts to 
reform the system before So 1 i dar i ty entered off i ce in 
September 1989. This process began as early as 1956. 
Under Krushchev in the USSR and Gomulka ln Poland 
certa i n reforms were imp 1 emented. I n Po 1 and, workers 
wages were raised, intellectuals were afforded more 
leeway, peasant farmers were granted greater security, 
and the Catholic Church became tolerated. A similar 
period of reform was entered in 1971-4 under Gierek and 
again at the beginning of the eighties. 40 Two factors 
coalesced to impel the regime to reform: pressure from 
below and the economic impasse. By the eighties, the 
economic problems were increasingly sharpened; the 
socialised sector was stagnating, the only source of 
dynamism was the private sector. Leaders introduced 
1 imited market reforms, but even this was a painful 
process, which would meet with resistance from sections 
of the bureaucracy (in particular the heavy industry-
police section, otherwise known as the Natolin group). 
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Thus, Rostowski points out that reforms implemented in 
1987 by the Pol ish regime were reforms that were 
supposed to have been undertaken several years earlier. 
The "second stage of reform" out lined by Prime 
Minister Messner on 10 October 1987 which has 
received so much publicity in the Western Media 
goes a little bit of the way put forward in the 
report on the Polish economy printed here. The 
right noises have been made: the size and powers 
of the centra 1 economic bureaucracy are to be 
reduced, subs idies to the socia lised enterprises 
a re to be cu t, workers I counc i 1 s a re to rece i ve 
more power, a secur it ies market is to be 
created... The government proposa ls are 
definitely welcome. Unfortunately, all of them 
were supposed to be introduced in the first period 
of reform of 1981-2. They were not introduced 
be c a use 0 f tJie po we r 0 f ve s ted i n t ere s t sin the 
bureaucracy. 
The scale of the two aspects of crisis described above 
grew to necessitate a qual itative break with this 
established pattern of reform, resistance and reaction. 
By the mid-eighties this crisis did not just affect one 
Eastern bloc partner, it had become a reglon wide 
crisis. The West had two major advantages over the 
Soviet block in dealing with the economic crisis. 
Firstly, advanced capitalism had outgrown national 
boundaries of production and establ ished a complex 
relationship between the nation state and increasingly 
internationalised production. The competitive advantage 
firms could forge by finance, technology, trade and 
production, that ignored national boundaries was not 
offered to the East European states. Secondly and 
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consequently, the restructuring that takes place within 
t~e Eastern bloc is not done with reference to the world 
economy, but through the actions of the state (though it 
would be a mistake to overlook state activity in the 
West, e . g . subsidies to industry, the Common 
Agricultural Policy etc.). Chris Harman described the 
effect of being insulated from such restructuring 
through recession. 
In the classical capitalist cr7S7S, the exhaustion 
of resources to sustain new investment expressed 
itself in the fall in the rate of profit. This 
drove the least effic ient firms out of bus iness 
and increased unemployment, reducing the demand 
for a 11 goods for a period But in the 
bureaucrat ica lly contro lled economies it has not 
been left to blind compet it ion between different 
enterpr ises to dec ide wh ich go under and wh ich 
stay in production. The bureaucratic state itself 
has intervened, without a llowing a per iod of 
unemp loyment of labour or resources to intervene. 
Crises cut growth rates and produced unused 
productive capacity in various parts of the 
economy, but they did not usually lead to piles of 
finished consumer goods for which there was no 
demand. Nor did they genera lly lead to a fa 11 in 
industria 1 4futput, plant closures and 
unemployment. 
Despite its existence in the CPEs, unemployment was, 
therefore, unable to play its distinctive function in 
the process of restructuring. Opening the economy to 
market forces would introduce this. Firstly, it would 
allow the recession to function as it does in the West 
(although this is tempered by state intervention). 
Secondly, it would allow the East European ruling 
classes to 1 ink their economies of Eastern Europe to 
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the chains of internationalised production, technology, 
trade and finance. 
The three major economic components of the transition 
are macro-economic stabilisation, liberalisation of 
economic activity (prices, trade, money), and 
privatisation. Poland is relatively advanced in this 
process, although there has been criticism of the course 
of action it has taken. 43 
The results have thus far been dramatic for Poland. It 
has become obvious that there are no guarantees for 
medium and long term success, the short term is painful. 
Open unemployment has emerged and grown considerably. 
Industrial production has fallen spectacularly, by 25% 
in 1990, by over 14% in 1991, (a year in which recovery 
was expected). 44 Prices have accelerated, slowed and 
accelerated again; in August-December 1989 inflation ran 
at 30% per month, in February-March 1990 that had fallen 
to 5%, back to 12.7% per month in January 1991. 45 By 
April 1991 there was increasing impatience with the 
reform program, the Solidarity government and Walesa's 
presidency, who themselves had gained office on the back 
of widespread dissatisfaction with their predecessors, 
the first Sol idarity government of Tadeusz Mazowieck i. 
As one commentator put it in early 1991. 
Economic difficulties rather than receding have in 
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fact, intensified: productivity has declined, and 
inflation in January and February exceeded the 
projected rates. Moreover, attempts to accelerate 
the p r i vat i s a ~ bo n 0 f s tat e en t e r p r i s e s h a ve 
largely failed. 
The transition programme, or the 'shock therapy', was 
initiated on 1 January 1990. Virtually all price 
controls were removed, those which were not were 
increased several times. The price of coal, which had 
been a tenth of its price on the world market, was 
increased sevenfold for households, fivefold for 
industry. Subsidies which had accounted for 14% of GNP 
were to be slashed to a planned 6% of GNP. Interest 
rates, which made borrowing unrealistically generous, 
rose. The rate, wh i ch had been negat i ve under the old 
reg i me, was ra i sed and was pos i t i ve by Februa ry 1990. 
The exchange rate which was too high was devalued. Wages 
were restrained by the 'popiwek', a tax that sought to 
keep wage increases below prices in state firms (a 
measure that was to provoke working class discontent 47 ). 
The final element was the privatisation programme, which 
was set the task of transforming ownership, i n the 
country where 90% of the economy was 1 n state hands. 
Here the state opted for the British mode 1 , whereby 
privatisation of firms was prepared one by one. There 
has been criticism of the relevance of this model in the 
Polish context, in particular because of the shallowness 
of the market. 
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A lternative methods have been adopted in East Germany 
and Czechoslovakia. In East Germany unification brought 
more rapid across the board privatisation and 
demonopolisation, the result of which was devastating in 
terms of industrial production and unemployment. The 
East German case, for obvious reasons, is exceptional 
having the task of integration into one of the world's 
strongest economi es. In Czechos 1 ovak i a, a two tier 
system has been introduced, where the large firms are 
privatised according to the British model over a ten 
year period, but smaller firms are auctioned off 
rapidly.48 The thinking behind this is how to establish 
a social group capable of owning shares and accumulating 
wealth. In similar vein, Lipton and Sachs propose rapid 
privatisation through free distribution of shares. 49 
Ultimately, so their argument goes, capital markets 
would resolve problems, such as too diverse ownership. 
The giveaway scheme increasingly gained favour with the 
Pol ish g 0 v ern men t a s the d iff i c u 1 tie s of t he ' B r i tis h 
model I became evident. The state became uncertain of its 
own programme and dithered as to what methods to 
implement. 
The legislation also recognised mass stock 
distribution as a possible instrument in the 
privatisation process, but it did not specify how 
it cou ld or shou ld be used. The new Min istry of 
Owners hip Tra ns forma t ion ha d 90 days to formu late 
a programme, but failed to meet this deadline. 
With the election of Walesa as President, however, 
a principal proponent of stock distribution 
schemes was appointed Minister of Property 
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Transformation in December 1990. The state was 
clearly moving towards giveaway schemes and away 
fr: om sa les at least with respect to manufactur ing 
f7rms, but as of the spring of 19fJd still had not 
presented any concrete proposals. 
Privatisation and transition, even by its advocates, is 
going to create enormous difficulties. 
Even though, we favour rapid privatisation, we 
doubt it wi II produce immediate, large increases 
in product iv ity or manager ia I effic iency. The rea I 
gains from the private ownership will take years 
to manifest themselves - the length of time needed 
for managers to be upgraded, supervisory boards to 
ga in experience, stock markets to improve the 
quality of valuation of ent51prise, and the real restructuring to take place. 
By the end of 1990 five companies had been privatised, 
4,330,000 shares worth zl.350 billion were sold to an 
estimated 100,000 investors. The object of the 
privatisation plan, established in the Privatisation Act 
of 1990, was to conform to Western norms of ownership in 
five years and to have half of state assets transferred 
in three. 52 
The agonising process of privatisation and transition is 
aggravated by the regional crisis in patterns of trade 
and price structures. Poland1s major trading partner has 
been the USSR, export i ng mach i nery, text i 1 es, sh i ps and 
electrical equipment and importing energy and raw 
materials. In 1990 Polish exports to the USSR fell by 
11%, whilst imports dropped 40%.53 The conversion of the 
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USSR to hard currency accounting has further aggravated 
the situation, as hard currency reserves in the region 
are exposed. The break up of the USSR under 1 i nes th i s 
point. This may be counterbalanced by the developing 
relationship with Germany. 
The main reason for this decline was the 
shortage of hard currency of the Soviet republics 
and loca 1 enterpr ises, wh ich had been encouraged 
by the central authorities in Moscow to enter 
separate trading arrangements with Poland ... This 
decline in trade has, of course had a major effect 
on Po 1 ish enterpr ises, and there is already ta lk 
in Po land tha t many indus tr ia 1 plants tha t re lied 
on the Sov iet Un ion wi 11 be forced If c lose down 
or drastically cut their operations. 
Poland also had the greatest debt burden of the Eastern 
European countries. Its debt service ratio in 1989 was 
estimated to be 88%, with a foreign debt totalling 
US$40bn. 55 This was eased by the Paris Club of 
i nterna tiona 1 cred i tor governments. I n Apr i 1 1991 they 
forgave 50% of Poland's publicly held foreign debt 
provided that the stabi 1 isation programme was adhered 
to. 56 Transition is, therefore, likely to be a prolonged 
and difficult process for the Polish government. 
6.6 The rise of unemployment and state regulation of 
the labour force 
For our purposes, the significant aspect of shock 
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therapy in Poland lS the spectacular rlse ln measured 
unemployment, and its relationship to socially 
constructed processes, founded upon official ideology, 
state regulation and the labour market. 
When discussing levels of unemployment, we should be 
careful about its precise nature. Official figures 
indicated 13.6% unemployed in December 1992. 57 The 
government had estimated that unemployment would rise in 
1992 to reach 3.5 million or nearly 25% unemployment. 
The eli min at ion 0 f 1 abo u rho a r din g wo u 1 d a c c 0 un t for 
something like 15-20% of the workforce. Despite its 
dramatic rise, much of this unemployment is not on the 
basis of the elimination of labour hoarding. According 
to Kwiatowski writing on the situation up to May 1991, 
when unemployment was 7.3% it was mainly due to other 
sources, i.e. new entrants and women. 58 This would 
suggest, considering the scale of industrial production 
decline, an enormous potential aggravation of 
unemployment, unless sources of employment mushroom. The 
crucial indicator in this respect, is the proportion of 
group lay-offs to unemployment, initially this was very 
low but has been rising. In summer 1991 the turning 
point came when industrial sackings took-off, from that 
time unemployment grew at 150,000 a month. 
The rjse jn unemployment jn 1990 was not a result 
of a more ra t jona 1 use of labour jn the s ta te 
owned enterprjses. A drop of employment 7n the 
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socialised sector was 
less than the fa 11 
sector, suggtgsting 
unemployment. 
in the period examined much 
in production in the same 
the increase in hidden 
This view is confirmed by the regional distribution of 
unemployment. Unemployment grew much faster in rural 
areas than industrial urban areas. 
Between January and June, unemployment rose from 
zero to 3.3% of the act ive workforce. The IIgap II 
between the fa 11 in product ion and rise in 
unemployment was thus "widell, wider still if we 
consider that more than a third of those 
unemp loyed had not recent 1y he 1d state jobs. 
Moreover, officia 11y registered unemp loyment in 
June [1990J was well under 3 % in large industrial 
centres ... Low urban unemployment was caused by the 
rapid growth of the68rivate sector, particularly 
nonregistered trade. 
The transition also requires construction of an 
institutional framework for the labour market. 
Employment offices and grudging recognition of 
unemployment did come in several of the Eastern European 
states, particularly in the 1980s. These were inadequate 
for the transition. So the governments have had to 
expand employment offices and establish unemployment 
compensation. Poland, because of its advanced stage of 
transition, has been the first to establish an unemploy-
ment compensation system, followed by Hungary. This 
point is demonstrated by the situation in the summer of 
1990, as described by Micklewright. 
The impetus 
compensation 
for the deve lopment of unemp loyment 
in Eastern Europe is of course the 
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emergence of open unemp loyment. In Po land, where 
dramatic structural adjustment has been adopted as 
the solution to the economyls ills, the stock of 
unemployment benefit recipients was over 550,000 
by June 1990, about 4% of the workforce, compared 
to only 6,000 the previous December ... Change in 
Hungary is being effected in a less dramatic way. 
Unemployment was only about 1% in Spring 1990 but 
the fear of what may come is apparent. The USSR is 
hesitating over major reform but it is widely 
recogn ised that th is must enta i 1 substant ~l re-
allocation of labour and open unemployment. 
The unemployment insurance system was established in the 
transition programme of 1 January 1990. Unemployment 
insurance is itself a crucial dimension of the 
construction and measurement of unemployment. The 
national unemployment insurance scheme allows the state 
to define unemployment, as with the law embodying the 
transition programme. 
An unemployed person was defined as someone who is 
without a job registered at a regiona 1 Labour 
Office and is ready and ab le to start work. In 
addition he or she must not be receiving an old 
age pension or be covered by sociaJ2insurance, nor 
be an owner of a farm or business. 
Under the new code, the unemployed received 70% of their 
previous wage for 3 months, 50% for the next 6 months, 
and 40% after that. An upper 1 imit of 100% and a lower 
1 imi t of 40% of the average wage were estab 1 i shed. New 
entrants into the labour market receive between 150% and 
100% of the minimum benefit level according to their 
educational qualifications and duration of unemploy-
ment. 63 However, national unemployment insurance schemes 
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can also be adjusted by the government, hence redefining 
unemployment. In Poland, the government had amended the 
original provisions five times by December 1991 when a 
new law was adopted. Ostensibly these revisions have 
been to cope wi th fraud. The new 1 aw created a twe 1 ve 
month limit for benefit. Seeking work criteria was also 
tightened, those refusing two job offers will be 
disqualified. The December law also intended to prevent 
school-leavers going straight onto the unemployment 
figures. 
This is all shrouded in the rhetoric of fraud and false 
claimants. Several Western commentators accept this 
account of things, L.Vinton entitles her article on 
unemployment insurance in Poland, 'Poland: widespread 
abuse l . 64 The ILOls Social and Labor Bulletin 
(2/91,p.172) echoes this view. 65 Even, if the claims 
made about fraud are true, then they are only half the 
story. The changes in eligibility are usually reported 
uncritically. However, they are, in reality, obviously 
geared to reducing numbers on the register. As is often 
the case, it seems that those engaging in Labour Office 
fraud are fewer in number that those eligible but not 
claiming, only 73.9% of those eligible were claiming at 
the end of 1990 i. e. after the 1 ega 1 amendment in June 
1990 cutting out the fraudulent 30% off the unemployment 
register. 66 Indeed, the fact that registered figures in 
Poland underrecord unemployment was backed up in the 
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first Labour force Survey of May 1992, when unemployment 
was 12.9% compared to the registered figure of 12.3%.67 
The state also plays a crucial role in establishing 
labour market and inactive categories of the population. 
One such category is women. The role of women within the 
labour force is shaped by the state on two levels. The 
first is ideological. The example of war-time industrial 
recruitment in Britain and the subsequent discouragement 
of women's waged work is obvious. In this regard, 
Malgorzata Tarasiewicz noted: 
The political climate is dominated by traditional 
values. With the growth of unemployment there are 
government plans to send women from their jobs in 
order to improve the situation in the labour 
market. More~ver58women see staying at home as new 
and progress 7 vee 
More important are the sexual division of labour, access 
to child care facilities and wage structures. Before the 
transition women were drawn into the labour force on all 
these counts. Ideologically, female participation was 
encouraged. Wage differentials gave little incentives 
for workers to opt for the family wage model. Child 
care facilities were generally available and relatively 
cheap. Poland experienced high levels of female 
participation, the drudgery of housework and child care 
was combined with the drudgery of a routine job for most 
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women of working age. 
In terms of child care facilities, there has been a 
rapid rise in the cost of day care facilities. The 
proportion of the cost of using these facilities on an 
average women I s earnings rose from 58% in January 1990 
to 81% in July 1990. 69 
Alternative care takers (that 7S, family, since 
the use of a baby sitter is rather foreign to 
Polish society) may also have been more widely 
used by working mothers. At the same time, the 
high costs of day-care fac i lit ies undoubted ly 
discouraged n..ol1work ing mothers from jo in ing the 
labour force. lv 
Figures for the job appl ications tend to suggest that 
labour market options are being narrowed for women. In 
April 199157 women applied for each job advertised, 
whereas on ly 18 men did so. Th i s gap had been growi ng 
over the previous year. The result of these changes has 
been a significant drop in women's activity rates and 
higher unemployment for women than men. 71 
One other category of the population, on working within 
the Western scheme, are the disabled. It is a category 
that has been used to take people out of the 
unemployment figures in some West European countries. In 
Poland it is unclear whether this will be the case but 
the category has been defined by the state through the 
Employment and Vocational Rehabilitation of the Disabled 
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Act of 1 July 1991. The Act proclaimed five aims. 
- the creation of new jobs, and the orientation of 
existing jobs, for disabled people; 
the organisation of training and retraining for the 
disabled; 
the construction and modernisation of premises for 
the vocational, medical and social rehabilitation of 
disabled people 
- the creation of workshops for completely disabled 
people, for whom the workshops wi 11 form social 
rehabilitation; 
the granting of 10ans. 72 
Some of these measures could be used to isolate the 
disabled off from the core of the unemployed. 
The definition of unemployment also excludes the 
peasant-workers, whose major source of income is 
industrial employment, but who also own a small amount 
of agricultural land. Peasant-workers number nearly two 
million, a considerable fraction of the labour force ( 
which stands at approximately 18 million).73 
Therefore, despite the difficulties ln establishing long 
term patterns from the relatively short experience of 
transition in Poland, we can draw conclusions which test 
the argument of the other chapters. Firstly, the 
transition itself is a repetition of the kind of process 
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which the Advanced West underwent between 1900-35, that 
is moving from being an unemployment-blind to an 
unemployment-sighted society. This is taking place on a 
number of levels, institutionally, ideologically and 
socially. Secondly, the role of the state in the 
definition and categorisation of the working and non-
work i ng popu 1 at i on is demonstrated. The state is not a 
simple transmission belt for labour market realities, 
but is an agent in the social construction of that 
reality. Thirdly, not only does this confirm the general 
arguments of the other chapters, it also points to 
likely options for the Polish state. These conceivably 
include regulation of migration, relaxation of 
disability criteria, reducing female participation, or 
early retirement to redefine the labour force and 
therefore the politically contentious levels of 
unemployment. 
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Conclusion 
The study of the measurement of soc i a 1 phenomena has 
presented us with a number of serious questions which we 
have tried to draw together and answer with respect, in 
particular, to unemployment measurement. 
Our introduction established the central questions of 
the study as follows. Firstly, how should the process of 
the measurement of social phenomena be understood? 
Secondly, how can the dynamic of the relationship 
between unemployment and its social representation be 
uncovered? These first stages are theoretical in nature. 
Thus, we need to construct a methodology to bridge the 
gap between the theory and empirical investigation. The 
underlying question is can we trust unemployment 
statistics? 
The originality of the thesis lies in its theoretical 
approach to the issue. The existing 1 iterature was 
deficient for the purposes of understanding the 
measurement of unemployment. The weaknesses of the 
existing literature are twofold. Firstly, it does not 
sufficiently combine a historical-theoretical under-
standing of both unemployment and the measurement 
process. Secondly, it is not sufficiently based on 
detailed comparative empirical investigation. 
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Conceptualising 'statistics' begins with its history. We 
found the literature divided into different approaches. 
Our discussion of this literature led to the rejection 
of both idealist and crude materialist views. The rise 
of statistics was linked to the rise of industrial 
capitalism. This fact, in itself, does not demonstrate 
the connecting points between the era of bourgeois 
revolution and statistics. These links were the tumult 
of ideas (science, the 
economics), the process 
(culminating in the 
bureaucratisation of the 
enlightenment, classical 
of nation-state building 
professionalisation and 
state), the rise in 
quantification (concomitant with the commodification of 
life) and the ideological appeal to ideals of 
rationality and democracy under modern capitalism. 
Statistics developed certain general characteristics as 
a result of its origins. These features give clues to 
understanding the process of measurement of social 
phenomena. The most significant feature is the state 
monopoly of statistics, or monopoly of certain crucial 
aspects of the measurement process. This has 
considerable implications for the nature of the 
statistical controversies. This monopoly is rooted 1n 
the material resources of the state and the importance 
of statistical data in the political arena. This gives 
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the state the advantage in any disputes over statistics. 
This monopoly may seem to be challenged by the growth of 
international organisations that disseminate statistics, 
agree definitions and establish statistical conventions. 
In reality this growth further legitimises the state's 
monopoly and establ ishes a symbiotic, rather than 
antagonistic, relationship. International organisations 
rely on the local nation state to provide it with the 
data. The state is backed up by the i nternat i ona 1 
organisations in the disputes over the measurement of 
social phenomena, as they share the common framework of 
the official view of statistics. 
Secondly, 'statistical consciousness' developed. 
Statistical consciousness is the prevailing set of 
ass urn p t ion sma d e b.y soc i e t y abo u t s tat i s tic s. The t win 
sources of this consciousness are the official attitudes 
of the state to statistics and the ethos of 
statisticians. This consciousness 
elements. The first is the notion 
comprises several 
that statistics is 
positive, progressive and 
social problems. The more 
behalf of statistics, 
able to scientifically solve 
exaggerated c 1 a ims made on 
often from statisticians 
themselves, verge on the utopian. Within this 
ideological framework the statistician is a universal 
character and an internationalism amongst statisticians 
emerged at quite an early stage. The second element in 
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'statistical consciousness' is the professionalism of 
the statistician. The statistician has professional 
standards and is therefore objective, impartial and 
independent of hierarchical influence, or of the social 
process of which he or she may be part. As a result the 
prob 1 ems in the measurement of soc i a 1 phenomena stem 
from technical difficulties or individual errors that 
the statistician valiantly battles against. 
Such notions are clearly insufficient when we consider 
the controversies about statistics that have emerged. 
The statistician is one dimension of a wider social 
construction. They are subject to hierarchical 
structures of management and control. Hence fundamental 
questions in the statistical process are beyond the 
statisticians control. Governments are able to use 
several strategies which demonstrate the limits of the 
statistician's control. In this case we used Britain to 
demonstrate this point. Statistical series may be 
suppressed or discontinued, as in the case of poverty 
statistics. Administrative processes, by which some 
statistical series are derived, may be altered as with 
registered unemployment figures. Funding may be 
withdrawn, as with a study of sexual behaviour. New 
conventions may be established which government 
officials favour, as was the case with inflation and 
income figures. 
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The origins and development of unemployment were 
likewise linked to the development of industrial 
capitalism but again it is important to establish the 
connecting points between the two phenomena. 
Unemployment emerged from the industrial revolution and 
the generalisation of wage labour. Limits and 
complications to the notion of unemployment come with 
the continued non-universality of wage labour, which can 
lead to confusions in definition, to hybrid forms, and 
to conceptually difficult categories. The case of women 
is the most obvious source of ambiguity where the 
privatised nature of reproduction leads to various forms 
of marginal work, family production, homeworking and so 
on. 
The conceptualisation of unemployment emerged after 
unemployment itself. This anomaly raises the question of 
the relationship between unemployment and its 
ideological representation. The late conceptualisation 
of unemployment demonstrates a certain degree of 
independence between the concept and reality, at least 
historically. However, the relationship is more complex 
than this would suggest as there can be no radical 
separation between concept and reality, as the 
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conceptualisation of unemployment has an impact upon the 
reality of unemployment. The development of unemployment 
insurance and the recategorisation of the poor with the 
emergence of the welfare state demonstrated this to be 
the case. Therefore, the 'invention ' of unemployment is 
not responsible for the existence of unemployment but it 
does affect its development. This process of invention 
rests, to a large part, in the hands of the state. 
Having establ ished the dynamics of the underlying 
processes which produce unemployment measurement, the 
validity of our methodology then rests upon whether we 
can generalise about the contemporary measurement of 
unemployment. Our methodology aimed to bring together 
the genera 1 i sed and the spec i ali sed study of measured 
unemployment. On the general ised level, a number of 
issues have been clarified. 
Firstly, we have identified the problems of comparlson 
on a technical level, in particular with registered 
unemployment figures. These technical difficulties exist 
at the national level, with contending institutions and 
methods of measurement, and on an international level 
with comparison of national series. This technical level 
of inquiry constitutes the parameters of criticism 
within the official view of statistics. Hence the reply 
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to criticism of British registered unemployment figures 
was that the changes in measurement took place because 
of necessary alterations to the eligibility and 
administration of unemployment. 
Secondly, we were able to identify a list of categories 
which should be considered in the social construction of 
unemployment data. Migration, gender, education and 
training, disability and older people were all found to 
be significant in the construction of unemployment. In 
some cases, such as Switzerland (with migration) or 
Belgium (with early retirement) or the Netherlands (with 
d i sab i 1 i ty pens ions), the state has taken an act i v i st 
stance with one of the categories to consciously shape 
the level of unemployment. Indeed, even where the state 
did not go to such extremes, a combination of strategies 
redef i ned the 1 abour market of the 1970s and 1980s to 
narrow the unemployment share of those in the population 
of working age. The implications of this are serious. 
Criticism on the technical level had mainly been of 
registered unemployment figures. However this 
methodology puts a question mark over the better trusted 
comparat i ve 1 abour force survey 
Indeed, it would suggest that 
unemployment rates. 
these rates are not 
comparable, in the sense in which they are superficially 
presented, no matter what degree of harmonisation that 
exists. These figures provide a rough guide, the best 
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one we have, but nevertheless they are a rough guide 
which conceals the complexity of the social construction 
of unemployment. 
Interesting political implications arise from this. One 
quest i on that ar i ses is the extent to wh i ch there are 
offenders in the i nterna tiona 1 commu n i ty when it comes 
to unemployment data. Such notions are not without 
precedent, the stat i st i cs of the Eastern bloc were 
a lways cons i dered, at the very 1 east, as break i ng the 
norms and conventions of good statistical practice. A 
case could be made for singling out individual countries 
as manipulating their unemployment statistics. It would 
seem that there are countries which maintain 
comparatively low unemployment levels artificially, 
Switzerland, Austria or even Japan could be included in 
this category. 
However, pointing the finger at other liberal 
democracies may not have the same ideological value and 
may raise embarrassing scrutiny of one's own statistics. 
This is no conspiracy of silence, but a product of the 
shared ideological framework for statistics. Hence the 
international organisations, nation states and 
statisticians are mutually reinforcing, as they share 
the same view of the wor 1 d. Rather than there be i ng 
individual countries guilty of statistical manipulation 
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of unemployment data, this manipulation is endemic to 
the measurement of unemployment itself, and therefore, 
becomes a matter of degree. 
Thirdly, the general study revealed the diversity and 
complexity of Western European states and therefore the 
value of more in depth studies of single countries. The 
methodology which was used at the general level showed 
real limitations. In the third chapter, the insights 
into individual countries were very limited and could 
only provide a broad overview. The methodology at the 
general level could demonstrate the existence of 
complexity, without actually getting to grips with that 
complexity. 
The validity of looking at both the general and the 
specific became clear. The general study was followed by 
the three single country studies, in order to retain a 
comparative dimension and investigate in greater detail 
the measurement of unemp 1 oyment. We move then to the 
conclusions that the single country studies were able to 
provide. 
On the first level, controversy is endemic to the 
measurement of unemployment. In each of the cases 
measured unemployment was racked by controversy. In 
341 
Britain, France and Poland unemployment figures caused 
controversy. However, the content of that controversy 
differed. In Britain, left and right developed critiques 
of unemployment figures which remained more or less 
fixed in the 1970s and 1980s. They were connected to 
differences in econom i c thought, ideo logy, and po 1 icy 
towards unemployment, in other words r i val 
conceptualisations of unemployment. In the 1980s the 
controversy centred on a critique of changes to official 
unemployment figures, on the claim that the government 
had cooked the books to make their unemployment record 
look better than it was. In France, this second element 
also existed but served to confuse the left-right 
division that existed due to the Socialist Party in 
office. Government reaction to criticism and 
alternative indices in Britain and France was similar. 
In both cases senior statisticians, Hibbert and 
Ma 1 i nvaud, bo 1 stered f 1 agg i ng pub 1 i c conf i dence 1 n 
unemployment statistics. The explanations for the lack 
of confidence in unemployment statistics was put down to 
public ignorance, opportunistic journalists and 
politicians and technical difficulties or isolated 
errors. It was at this point that the governments showed 
their strength. Both in Britain and France, the 
governments I pos i t i on of strength compr i sed of three 
elements, the state monopoly of statistics, the 
widespread acceptance of the statistical consciousness 
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and international organisations monopolising authority 
to resolve such disputes. Here the duality of the 
statistical consciousness i s revealed. For 
statisticians, the criticism of government statistics 
was an attack on their professionalism, to which they 
reacted defensively. In reality, the question of 
professionalism 
. 
1 S a red herring obscuring the real 
issue which is criticism of a process which the state 
monopolises. Trapped in the ideological framework of the 
statistical consciousness, this duality even confused 
the critics. A logical criticism of unemployment 
measurement has, therefore, to challenge, not only the 
detail of the manipulation but also, the wider socially 
constructed statisical consciousness, the state monopoly 
of statistics and the right of international organisa-
tions to resolve the disagreements. 
In both Britain and France, alternative indices relied 
on manipulating official data. The timing, accuracy and 
methodological rigour of the official series could not 
therefore be matched. In France, the ILO stepped in to 
rule in favour of official methods leaving Stoleru to 
abandon his alternative series. In Britain, the 
statisticians' organisations, and official statisticians 
sprung to the defence of their profession. In both 
cases, the conclusion that criticism of statistics 
implies criticism of the state monopoly of statistics 
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and the illusions of statistical consciousness were not 
made a central issue of the debate. 
In 
and 
Poland, the situation 
the transition to 
was complicated by Stalinism 
the market. Controversy of 
ex i sted 1 n a very different 
In the case of the Soviet bloc 
unemployment measurement 
form than in the West. 
the very existence of unemployment was denied and was 
therefore controversial. The debate and estimates of 
Western scholars were met with official silence, however 
oppositionists did attempt to grapple with the notion. 
In Poland, unemployment was dubbed the problem without a 
name. Stalinist planning reconceptualised the labour 
market, the concept of unemployment was abolished. This 
does not mean that unemployment itself did not exist. 
However, the conceptualisation of the labour market did 
have a significant impact on the form of unemployment 
('frictional' and 'hidden'). As our theoretical analysis 
might have suggested, the existence of generalised wage-
labour and cyclical accumulation of industrial capital 
led, in however a truncated form, to the existence of 
unemployment. With the transition to a market economy, 
comes a new conceptualisation of unemployment, with it 
unemployment statistics, controversy and contradictions 
in their use. In the new climate, it is easier to openly 
criticise unemployment statistics. 
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The pattern of development of each country is able to 
give an invaluable insight into its measurement of 
unemployment. The general level of investigation was 
unable to reveal this. Britain and France might seem too 
similar in their history for this to be the case. 
However, the comparative development of Britain and 
France allowed for important insights into the 
measurement of unemployment in two countries. The 
traditional account of French development is of relative 
economic backwardness. Historical investigation had, 
however, revised this view to identify the higher wage-
skill, smaller unit of production, lower urbanised 
pattern of development. That France was not backward in 
comparison to the rest of Western Europe, but that its 
pattern of development was different led to a history of 
unemployment where emergence measurement and 
conceptualisation does not lag significantly behind 
Britain. The particular nature of French development, 
though not retarding unemployment's emergence, did 
effect its scale in the period before Second World War. 
The history of Pol ish development is dominated by 
questions of independence, Stalinism and transition. 
Independence after the First World War brought a modern 
statistical apparatus and unemployment insurance and 
measurement. Stalinism suppressed much of those 
achievements but did develop a statistical apparatus in 
its own image. Stalinism did signal rapid 
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industrialisation and the further generalisation of wage 
labour, so that despite its official denial of 
unemployment, it has created the conditions for open 
unemployment of a wider scope come the transition. 
Our investigation of the three countries was also able 
to put comparative experience of the last decade under 
the magnifying glass. Both Britain and France use a 
combination of categories which had the effect of 
reducing levels of unemployment. Both used youth 
training schemes. In France, despite the greater press 
attention given to schemes as a means to take the youth 
from the unemployment figures, the rise in education 
participation involved far greater numbers. Both 
countries saw a significant fall in participation of 50-
65 year olds. However, French policy-makers had a far 
more state-orientated means of achieving this with 
extensive early retirement schemes which were on a far 
greater scale than in the UK. The French state confirmed 
this strategy by lowering the retirement age. However, 
in some respects, Britain and France had quite different 
strategies. In Britain, policy-makers opted for the 
tacit expansion of disabi 1 ity measures though this 
category did not play a significant role in France. 
Here, women found themselves more likely to become 
unemp 1 oyed than men. However, th i s was not the 
. case ln 
Britain. In Poland the transition sees the beginnings of 
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a new conceptualisation and categorisation of the labour 
market. Hence the state . 1 S in the process of 
establishing disability, gender, and the unemployed as 
labour market categories. 
The issues raised in the thesis have a particular 
pertinence to the future. Most forecasts of the nineteen 
nineties predict a continuation of the sluggishness of 
the wor 1 d economy. Hence mass unemp 1 oyment is here to 
stay for at least the medium term. The long-term 
weakness raises several questions that should properly 
be dealt with here. Firstly, do states aim to reduce the 
levels of measured unemployment? On one level, it could 
be argued that many of the measures that reduce the 
levels of unemployment are genuine welfarist attempts 
to deal with the problems of unemployment. Indeed, this 
is the case, however it is not the whole picture. Other 
measures are clearly more directed to reducing the 
numbers of unemployed. Also, some of the welfarist 
responses could be criticised for the marginalisation of 
sections of the population, in particular the disabled, 
the young and the old. So if it is the case that 
governments consciously attempt to reduce the numbers of 
unemployed, why is this the case? Unemployment is 
damaging, but unemployment figures may limit the damage. 
A bad unemployment record is a disincentive to 
investors. The experience of trying to attract investors 
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to unemployment black spots has been at best patchy, as 
high levels of unemployment deteriorate local labour 
markets. The illusion of lower unemployment limits the 
political damage of unemployment, unemployment lS an 
individual not a collective experience, unlike for 
example the use of a national rail system, therefore it 
is difficult for voters to validate claims about 
unemployment through their own experience. It is only 
one of severa 1 ways in wh i ch the e 1 ectora 1 damage of 
unemployment has been 1 imited by governments. 
Governments have an interest in reducing the level of 
unemployment through the tools of the welfare state and 
the statistical apparatus. The 1 imit is set by the 
contradiction within statistical consciousness, that is, 
statisticians seek internationally comparable and 
professionally produced data. In the sphere of 
statistical methods, definitions and harmonisation, 
significant advances have been made over the last two 
decades. However, what is outside this sphere is not the 
concern of statisticians. It is this contradiction which 
is at the heart of the controversies of measured 
unemployment. The economic crisis also raises the 
further question as to continued ability of the state to 
act ln this manner. As we have already established, 
measures adopted by the state to reduce the level of 
unemployment are mainly within the realm of the 
statistical apparatus and the welfare state. 
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The implications of economic malaise since the 1970s 
have fed through into the ideological level with the 
increased questioning of statistics. States are under 
pressure to reduce levels of unemployment at a time 
when, certainly in high welfare countries, there is an 
unprecedented level of control of the categorisation of 
the labour market and technical capacities in the field 
of statistical production. 
However, the weakness of the economy saps the welfare 
state, which is the way in which the state categorises 
the population, through education, pensions, 
unemployment and disability benefits and so on. Hence, 
the degree of control over categorisation of the 
population may start to loosen. This tendency will be 
most stark in weaker economies, such as Poland, where 
the creation of large scale early retirement or training 
schemes may prove simply beyond the means of the state. 
But it may also, sooner or later, be reflected in the 
stronger economies. 
The statistical implications of the thesis are twofold. 
Firstly, the empiricist notions of statistics should be 
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discarded. Statistics is a social construction. One 
aspect of statistical training should be devoted to 
understanding statistics in society. 
Secondly, a more critical approach needs to be taken to 
the ideological framework of modern statistics what we , 
have called statistical consciousness. This should 
involve an awareness of the statistical monopoly of the 
state. 
The economic implications of the thesis fall into three 
categories. 
Firstly, in the realm of economic forecasting, modelling 
and comparison, serious question marks have to be raised 
about the use of unemployment statistics. Sophisticated 
manipulation of data is meaningless if the data is 
suspect. Hence predictions, models and so on dealing 
with unemployment should be treated with caution. Indeed, 
some forecasting institutions 
Unemployment Unit data which 
in Britain purchased 
shows a degree of 
recognition amongst the forecasting profession of this 
point. If possible, forecasting should attempt to find 
more reliable categories or variables, or establish 
methodologies to rework existing series to make them 
comparable. 
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Secondly, economic theory has, until now, insufficiently 
dealt with the question of persistent mass unemployment. 
One implication of the reduction of unemployment by the 
various strategies employed is that it has allowed 
economists to treat the representation as real ity. The 
response of the various Schools, from Monetarists to 
Keynesians, has not sufficiently explained the rise of 
mass unemployment and the policy prescriptions of both 
schoo 1 s ha ve not reso 1 ved the prob 1 em when adopted. In 
th i s context, figures may ha ve proved a comfort from 
vexed questions. 
Thirdly, criticism of economic policy and of the data 
shou 1 d go hand in hand. The po 1 icy debate shou 1 d be 
informed by an awareness of the contradictory nature of 
the economic data. Greater openness and scrutiny of 
statistical processes is necessary if the desired 
objectives are to be met. 
Fin all y, we t urn tot h e que s t ion r a i sed in the deb ate s 
on unemployment statistics in the 1970s and 1980s, ~can 
we trust statistics?' 
Unemployment statistics, and statistics in general, are 
a necessary part of modern society. However, the social 
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process by which unemployment is measured is too complex 
for statistics to be held up as holy truth. The key to 
the question of the trustworthiness of unemployment data 
is to understand the complexity of the social 
construction of those statistics. This understanding has 
to be dua 1 in nature, in other words to work at the 
theoretical and applied levels, for it to be in any 
sense meaningful. Essentially, the understanding 
provides us with a set of parameters for the use of 
unemployment statistics. These parameters may be used to 
two ways. Firstly, they define the limitations to the 
international or historical comparability. Secondly, 
they act as a guide to criticism of government methods 
of unemployment measurement. Unemployment measurement 
then should not be trusted, as trust conceals the 
complexity of the process of unemployment measurement, 
rather it should be understood and used with 
appreciation of its inner nature and limits. 
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Appendices: Tables (numbered according to which chapter they 
refer) 
Table 2.1a: Size of workplace Qy industry in France 
from the 1906 census 
Industry Median Percentage Qy number of employees in 
the workplace 
-------------------------------------








Leather & skins 18 
Quarrying 29 
Print 47 
Ceramics, glass 132 
Chemical 118 
Rubber, paper 142 
Textile 200 

























































(Median: the size of establishment such that 50% of those 
employed are in larger establishments, 50% in smaller ones.) 
source: Braudel & Labrousse, p.259 
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Table 2.2a:Coverage of public pension insurance 1900-1970 
(percentage of the labour force) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
France Germany Netherlands !LK. 
1900 8 51 0 0 
1915 9 58 50 55 
1930 15 64 55 90 
1945 52 65 66 109 
1960 93 82 169 99 
1970 100 81 170 98 
source:P.Flora & A.J.Heidenheimer,The Development of the Welfare 
State in Europe and America, Transaction, 1981. 
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Table 2.3a:Origins of state unemployment and welfare provision 
~nemploy't employment accident sickness pension 
lnsurance exchanges insure insure insure 
G~~~~~~--1927a------191o~i9i4b-i884-----i883-----i9ii----
France 1928 c.1990 1898 1928 1910 
UK 1911 e1920
c 1908 1880 1911 1908 
Austria 1920f c.1900 1887 1918 1906 Switz 1924 c.1900 1911 1911 1931 
Denmark 1933 1913 1922. 1891 
Neth. 1919 1901 1892~ 1919 
Belgium 1920 c.1900 1903 1919 J 1927 
Sweden 1935 1906 1901
h 
1913 
US 1935 1933 1917 1935 
Japan 1947 1921,1925 g 1916 1926 1926 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
a. but unemployment benefits introduced in 1918 
b. 1910 the labour exchanges regulated, 1914 central labour 
exchange established 
c. 1911 limited coverage, 1920 extended to all workers except 
domestic and agricultural workers. 
d. 1902 for London only 
e. unemployment benefits introduced in 1918. 
f. Unemployment insurance introduced to Bern in 1893 and St. 
Gallen in 1884, unemployment benefits from 1917. 
g. In 1921 law established state employment exchanges, 1925 
regulated private ones. 
h.individual states had previously introduced accident insurance 
but were ruled unconstitutional by the courts in 1917 supreme 
court accepts it. 
i.regulation of the extensive private schemes and means tested 
payments for those not covered 
j. legislation passed in 1913 but only implemented via further 
acts in 1919 and 1930. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
sources: 
P.A.Kohler & H.F.Zacher, Evolution of Social Insurance 1881-1981, 
St.Martins press, 1982. 
B.B.Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance in Britain: the 
Origins of the Welfare State, Michael Joseph, 1966. 
D.Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, Pelican, 1966. 
W.G.Jones, Denmark-a Modern History, Croom Helm, 1986. 
E.H.Kossman, The Low Countries 1780-1940, Oxford University 
Press, 1978. 
J.A.Garraty op cit. 
S.Oakley, The Story of Sweden, faber, 1969. 
P.Baldwin, 'Scandinavian Origins of the Welfare State', 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
P.Mathias (ed.), Cambridge History of Europe VII: Industrial 
Economies: Capital, Labour and Enterprise, vol.2, Cambridge 
University Press, 1978. 
Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan, Kodansha, 1987. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3.1a: Net benefits on old ~ pensions as ~ percentage of 










United Kingdom 46 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
source: Eurolink ~ Bulletin, October 1987, p.2 
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Table 3.2a: Social security expenditure: Percentage of the total 
expenditure spent on the following functions in 1983 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
B OK o FR IRL IT NL UK E9 G E 
Old age 27.0 34.3 29.8 34.0 24.9 34.7 27.0 40.6 33.3 70.3 42 
Health 21.9 23.5 27.0 24.7 29.0 22.5 25.6 20.3 24.1 18.7 29 
Family 9.9 9.4 6.5 9.6 9.4 6.9 8.1 10.6 8.3 3.3 0.02 




27.0 19.1 29.6 21.9 23.6 32.7 26.6 18.4 25.9 5.5 9.0 
* 31.9 30.2 28.9 28.8 24.6 27.3 34.0 23.7 12.6 20.2 18.5 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1.social security expenditure as a percentage of GNP. 
* European 11 
source: Eurolink ~ Bulletin, October 1987, p.2 
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sources: OECD Observer, November 1978; OECD Observer, February 
1991. Social Trends 1990; 
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Table 4.1a: Department of Employment and Unemployment Unit 
Figures for British unemployment 1982-1992 
in 1000s 
Year Male Female Total 






























































All figures seasonally adjusted fourth quarter figures except 
(1) which is first quarter figures. 
(2) II third II II 
Source: Unemployment Unit, UK Unemployment figures 1980-90, 1990 
Labour Research, 1990-92. 
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J.Lawlor & C.Kennedy, 'Measures of unemployment: claimant count 
and LFS', Employment Gazette, July 1992. J.Lawlor, op.cit. 
Statistical Services Division (Department of Employment),' 
'Measures of unemployment: the claimant count and the 
LFS', Employment Gazette, October 1990. Anon., "Measures of 
unemployment: the claimant count and the LFS', Employment 
Gazette, August 1989. Anon.,"Measures of unemployment and 
characteristics of the unemployed', Employment Gazette, 
October 1988. 
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60-64 >=65 all>=16 
82.9 19 . 3 80.5 
80.4 14.5 78.9 
73.0 10.3 77. 5 
69.3 10.3 76.5 
59.4 8. 1 74.2 
56.7 8.2 74.3 
57.3 8.4 74.5 
53.8 7 . 7 73.8 
54.6 9.0 74.2 
54.4 8.6 74.2 
55-59 >=60 all >=16 
50.9 12.4 43.9 
54.3 10.3 46.8 
53.8 7.4 47.4 
53.4 8.2 47.6 
50.6 7.5 47.0 
51.1 7.6 48.4 
51.8 7.8 49.0 
51.8 6.5 49.6 
54.3 7.6 52.5 
54.9 7.5 52.8 
---------------------------------------------------------------
1.British labour force definition to 1984; from 1984 ILO 
definition 












m f t 
2,409 
1981 
m f t 
2,748 
1986 
m f t 
2,633 
16 16 16 16 17 16 17 17 17 
7 9 8 7 11 9 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
8 13 11 
433 
1987 
m f t 
2,577 
17 17 17 
1988 
m f t 
2,547 
17 18 17 
8 13 11 10 14 12 




65 66 65 54 52 53 42 44 43 42 44 43 40 44 42 
5 5 5 12 9 10 14 11 12 18 13 16 
9 7 8 14 12 13 17 13 15 15 12 14 12 9 10 
of which p-t ed. 22 5 14 19 5 13 12 5 8 11 4 8 10 4 7 
(included in employed/unemployed)(7) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Age as at 31 August 
(2) Some 10% of the age group attend evening only courses. These 
cannot be classified by education/employment status and are not 
shown separately in this table. 
(3) Full-time and sandwich excluding private education outside 
school. Excludes those on YTS within colleges. 
(4) Outside YTS; Including in 1976 and 1981 the unregistered 
unemployed and those who were neither employed nor seeking work 
(eg because of domestic responsibilities) and for 1986-88 those 
who were actively seeking work but not claiming benefit and those 
who are neither employed or seeking work 
(5) Including those of YOP in 1976 and 1981 and those in further 
education establishments attending YTS/YOP courses. 
(6) Registered unemployed in 1976 and 1981 and claimant 
unemployed in 1986-88 (DES estimates). 
(7) Public sector part-time day study only, excluding those 
attending YTS courses. In addition, DES estimate of employer 
provision outside Local Education Authority colleges or YTS is 4% 
of 16 year olds and 6% of 16-18 year olds in 1983-4. The majority 
of part-time day students are in employment but some are 
receiving unemployment benefit under the 21 hour rule. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------




Table 4.5a : Number of recipients of disability benefits 
in thousands 
1976-77 79-80 81-82 84-85 86-87 88-89 89-90 
-----------------------------------------------------------------* SDA 105 165 180 245 265 270 284 
IB 510 620 660 825 935 1100 1210 
TOTAL 615 785 840 1070 1200 1370 1494 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
*.Non-contributory invalidity benefit before 1984. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
sources: Social Trends 1991, HMSO, 1991. Social Trends 1989, 




Table 4.6a :Age distribution of disabled adults by severity of 

























































































































Table 4.7a: Economic Activity of Disabled Adults Under Pension 
Age by Severity and Sex 
Men 
working 
looking for work 
intending to look, 
but temp. ill 
available, but not 
looking for work 
full-time education 
adult training centre 







looking for work 
intending to look, 
but temp. ill 
available, but not 
looking for work 
full-time education 
adult training centre 





*65 men, 60 women. 
severity All disabled adult 





















































































































source: opes disability survey, 1989. 
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-----------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.8a: Whether looking for work and reasons for not 
looking given by disabled people under pension age who may work 




currently looking 53 
has stopped looking because:-
no suitable jobs for someone 14 
with subjects disability 
no suitable jobs - general 6 
employment situation 
other reasons 2 
has not looked for work because: 
no suitable jobs for someone 18 
with subjects disability 
no suitable jobs - general 3 
employment situation 




















source: OPCS disability survey, 1989. 
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source: Annee Politique, Economique et Sociale, 1982-6, 
Le Monde 23/7/87 
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Table 5.2a :UNEMPLOYMENT PEAKS lR INTERWAR EUROPE 
country peak year unemployment rate thousands 
unemployed 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
France 1936 4.5% 860 
Britain 1932 21.5% 2,745 
Germany 1932 30.1% 5,575 
Belgium 1932 23.5% 72 
Netherlands 1936 32.7% 414 
Switzerland 1936 13.2% 81 
Denmark 1932 31.7% 100 
Poland 1932 16.7% 250 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
sources: B.R.Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, MacMillan, 
1982; 
J-J.Carre, P.Dubois and E.Malinvaud, French Economic Growth, 
Oxford University Press, 1976. 
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Table 5.3a: THE SECTORAL DECLINE OF FRENCH AGRICULTURE 













1955 19048 5065 27.0% 
1960 18951 4189 22.4% 
1965 19813 3468 17.7% 
1970 20750 2907 14.0% 
1970* 21434 2751 13.2% 
1975 22354 2156 10.0% 
1980 23370 1854 8.5% 
1985 23916 1581 7.4% 
source:Employment and Unemployment 1971-77, Eurostat, 1978. 
Employment and Unemployment 1988, Eurostat, 1989. 
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Table 5.4 ~ PARTICIPATION RATES IN FRANCE 
at AGE GROUP 1968-89 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
men 
year 15-24 25-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1968 55.7 97.5 93.2 83.9 65.9 
1969 52.9 97.3 93.4 84.2 66.8 
1970 52.5 97.3 93.4 82.5 65.3 
1971 51.7 97.3 94.4 82.0 64.7 
1972 50.9 97.6 93.8 82.0 63.4 
1973 49.1 97.5 93.7 82.8 61.8 
1974 48.5 97.4 93.6 82.0 60.4 
1975 50.1 96.7 93. 1 83.3 56.7 
1976 48.9 96.8 93.6 82.7 51 . 6 
1977 48.5 96.6 93.4 83.9 48.8 
1978 46.9 96.5 92.2 82.6 45.0 
1979 47.6 96.8 92.3 82.3 45. 1 
1980 47.1 97.0 92.9 80.9 47.6 
1981 45.5 96.8 92.4 79.5 42.5 
1982 51.5 96.9 91 .4 75.6 40.0 
1983 50.8 96.9 91 . 7 71 . 0 33.6 
1984 49.3 96.6 91.4 68.1 3 1 . 1 
1985 49.0 96.6 91.2 67.8 30.8 
1986 47.7 96.7 90.8 69.4 27.4 
1987 46.3 96.6 90.4 67.3 25.7 
1988 43.5 96.4 90.2 67.3 25.4 
1989 42.3 96.3 90.1 68.1 24.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
source: INSEE, Enguete d'EmQloi, Collection D. 
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Table ~ ~ PARTICIPATION RATES IN FRANCE 
~ AGE GROUP 1968-89 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
women 
year 15-24 25-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1968 46.1 47.5 48.4 45.7 35.3 
1969 47.1 48.7 48.8 47.2 33.5 
1970 46.2 49.3 49.1 45.8 33.7 
1971 44.7 50.4 48.6 44.5 32.7 
1972 44.3 51.9 50. 1 45.0 32.7 
1973 43.7 53.7 51.2 42.9 32.5 
1974 43.7 55.7 50.9 43.6 31 . 2 
1975 45.6 58.3 52.2 43.5 29.8 
1976 45.7 59.8 51.8 44.9 27.7 
1977 45.4 61.4 52.5 46.4 27.2 
1978 44.1 62.0 52.0 45.7 24.1 
1979 44.4 63.8 53. 1 45.9 24.0 
1980 43.2 64.5 54.7 47.3 27.3 
1981 42.5 65.5 56.8 46.6 25.3 
1982 42.5 67.6 57.6 46. 1 23.3 
1983 41.5 68.8 56.7 43.7 20.6 
1984 41 . 1 70.0 58.1 42.9 19.0 
1985 40.3 70.8 57.8 42.8 18.9 
1986 39.7 72.4 59. 1 43.1 18.4 
1987 38.7 72.3 59.8 44.6 18.0 
1988 36.1 72.9 60.4 45.3 17.9 
1989 35.2 73.0 62.2 44.7 17. 7 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
source: INSEE, Enguete d'EmQloi I Collection D. 
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Table 5.6a: SITUATIONS Q[ THE YOUNG lR FRANCE (16-25 YEARS) 
MARCH 1983-MARCH 1991 
-----------------------------------------------------------------































































source: B.Montelh & F.Morgensztern,'Jeunes a tout faire ' , 
Autrement, no.110, October 1989. 
DECO Economic Surveys: France 1991-2, DECO, 1992 
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Table 5.7a: Beneficiaries under various preretirement schemes. 
1968-88 
1963 
year FNE Act 

















































































































source:UNEDIC, Bulletin de Liaison, appendix 8, no.92-206, 1987. 
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Table 5.8a: Beneficiaries of Labour Market Programmes 
(average stock in thousands) 
measure 1973 1980 1987 1988 1989 1990 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
early retirement 44 
unemployed exempt 0 
from job search 
professional training 47 
for the unemployed 
private sector 0 
subsidised employment 



































Table 5.9a: EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
iiR thOusands of avoided unemployed) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stage and non- Early retirements Job creation Total 
market jobs schemes 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1974 30 26 0 56 
1980 66 115 7 188 
1985 120 150 14 284 
1986 145 130 14 289 
1987 136 98 18 252 
1988 142 66 23 231 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Le Monde 10/5/90 
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Table 5.10a ~ PART-TIME WOMEN l! THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 












































































Table 5.11a: FRENCH WOMEN'S UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE 
year women registered share of women share of 16-25yrs 
unemployed in total in total women's 
1000s unemployment unemployment 
(France) (European 12) 







































































~ o ~ o 
share of 16-25yrs 





1983 50.7 45.2 54.9 
1984 1213 47.5 45.7 48.3 
1985 1281 51.3 46.2 49.7 
1986 1269 54.1 47.2 51 . 6 
1987 1399 53.7 49.2 48.6 
1988 1334 50.0 51.4 39.6 
Source:Employment and Unemployment 1988, Eurostat, 1988 
Employment and Unemployment 1989, Eurostat, 1989. 
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Table 6.1a: Unemployment in Poland 1990-2 
end of month 
11.90 
12.90 
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source:Builetyn Statystyczny, February 1992, January 1993 
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Appendices: Figures 
Figure 2.1a: Introduction of Factory Legislation ln Comparative 
Perspective 

































prohibits apprentices working >12 hr/day 
II II children <9yr working 
9-13yr limited to 9hr/day 
12-18 II II 12 II 
prohibits chimney sweeping by children 
II II women and < 13yr down mines 
women limited to 12hr/day, regulations 
on dangerous machinery 
women and children limited to 10hr/day 
prohibits children <11yr working 
II II <12yr II 
II II <14yr II 
prohibits children <8yr working, limIted 
8-12yr to 8hr/day, 12-16 to 12hr/day 
apprentices <14yr limited to 10hr/day, 
14-16yr to 12hr/day 
prohibits children <12yr working 
prohibits children <13yr working unless 
passed education test, limited 13-16yr 
to 10hr/day, 16-18yr to 12hr 
women restricted to 11hr/day prohibited 
from mines 
prevention of accidents; health + safety 
10 hr/day 
8hr/day for miners 
weekly day of rest 
truck system ended 
codification of factory laws 
prohibits children <9yr working, limited 
hours for <16yr 
truck system ended 
prohibits children <10yr, <llyr (1854), 
<12yr (1855) working; limited <14yr to 
7hr/day 
prohibits children <12yr working ln 
Pennsylvania cotton mills 
ban on child labour <12yr) 
prohibits children <12yr working 
limits women and children 12-16yr to 
11hr/day 
8hr/day 
prohibits children <12yr working, limited 
12-15yr to 8hr/day 
11hr/day 
prohibits children <12yr working, limits 










prohibits children <12yr working 
limited work day to 12hr 
prohibits night labour for women and 
children 
prohibits children <14yr working 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1. limited to workplaces employing 20 or more or steam machinery 
2. enforced in 1916, but only on factories employing 15 or more 
3. enforced in 1926 
sources: H.Heaton, Economic History of Europe, Harper, 1936. 
W.O.Henderson, Industrial Revolution on the Continent???? 
Kodhansa Encyclopaedia of Japan, Kodhansa, 1983. 
E.H.Kossman, The Low Countries 1780-1940, Oxford University 
Press, 1978. 
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Figure 5.la Various measures of unemployment in France, July 1972 
Numbers 
Unemployed 








those on unemployment benefits 
job seekers at the end of the month 
without work, seeking and available for work 
calculated from previous INSEE LFS 
without work, 'Carnes coefficient ' 
without work, if we add the surplus 
population established by the local 
Mauberge study on unemployment 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
source: M.Fahy,'Pour evaluer le chomage ' , Projet, January, 1973. 
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Figure 5.2a: ILO and ANPE unemployment compared at the time of the 









































*DEFM categories 1, 2, or 3 those seeking all forms of work, 
including part-time and temporary work. 
source:'Bilan de llemploi en 1990 1, Dossiers Statistigues du 
Travail et de L1Emploi, 
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Figure 5.3a:Training schemes and their treatment in the statistics - --
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Name status pay date 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
stage d'insertion de inactive 
qualification 
(stages Rigout) 
stage d ' initiation dans employed 
la vie professionelle 
(SIVP) 
travail d'utilite employed 
collective 
(TUC) 




















source:OECD Economic Surveys: France 1991-2, OECD, 1992 
Schemes with an Impact on the Labour Market, Eurostat, 1987. 
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